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CENTENNIAL YEAR
1886-1986

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Issue No. 3, 1986

Jo Freeman — The Political Culture of Democrats and Republicans

William B. Quandt — Camp David and Peacemaking

Steven Metz — The Anti-Apartheid Movement in American Politics

Richard Weitz — Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $25.00 a year. Three years, $58.00. Students, $16.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $35.00 a year. Foreign postage, $6.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 101 Number 3, 1986.
Postmaster—Send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885.
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CENTENNIAL YEAR 1886–1986

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Published continuously since 1886.

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Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885.

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Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index.* Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci,* the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents, The International Political Science Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Urban Affairs Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life.* Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals, Book Reviews Index,* and *Book Review Digest.* A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1976 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Co., Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $6.25. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Toll free number: 800-521-0600. One copy, $10.00. Additional copies, $1.50 each. Complete issue, $0.20 a page with a $20.00 minimum charge. All prices are subject to change.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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Volume 101
Number 3
1986

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

JO FREEMAN argues that despite the many similarities in external forms of the Democratic and Republican national parties, there are significant differences in various aspects of their political culture such as legitimacy and representation, organizational style, attitudes toward dissent and disloyalty, means of maintaining cohesion, and response to the demands of new groups.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT assesses the impact of the Camp David Accords on subsequent developments in the Middle East. He pays special attention to the American role as a prospective mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

STEVEN METZ contends that the anti-apartheid movement in the United States has often been ineffective in attempts to influence American policy toward South Africa because of a tendency to rely on populist strategies of influence. He attributes this to the influence that the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements had on the leaders of the anti-apartheid movement.

RICHARD WEITZ examines insurgencies in Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Bolivia with an aim toward establishing conditions related to success and failure.

ROBERT C. GRADY analyzes values and assumptions underlying proposals to revitalize the American economy. He argues that they require a form of functional representation that is incompatible with traditional liberal democratic ideals.

JOHN GIMBEL reflects on the controversy over the American evacuation of some German scientists and technicians and their families from the Soviet zone of occupation in 1945.

ROBERT J. McMAHON looks at recent scholarly literature concerning the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration. He concludes that the current wave of "Eisenhower revisionism" has tended to slight Eisenhower's persistent failures in the Third World and thus presents a distorted view of his administration's overall diplomatic record.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties

JO FREEMAN

Although political parties have been a pervasive part of American politics, studies of their internal organization and style have not received a great deal of attention. Some commentators have noted that "despite their deceptively similar governing forms" the two major parties are "distinctively separate entities,"[1] and others have observed that "the two parties are different not only in name, program, and coalitional components but also in type," yet no one has attempted any systematic comparison.[2] It is the contention of this article that despite the similarities in governing forms, and even policy outcomes, there is nonetheless a fundamental difference between the national Democratic and Republican parties. That difference can be seen not so much in outcomes, which must pass through the filter of political reality, as in the mode by which internal politics is conducted. The difference is not one of purpose, but of political culture.

I am relying on the definition of political culture in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*:

> . . . the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a polit-

[1] William Crotty, *Party Reform* (New York: Longman, 1983), 205–206.

[2] David Nexon, "Asymmetry in the Political System: Occasional Activists in the Republican and Democratic Parties, 1956–1964," 65 *American Political Science Review* (September 1971): 717; see also passing comments in the special section on the 1976 Republican Convention in *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Winter 1977–78); and repeated but brief references in Theodore White's popular histories of *The Making of the President* for 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 (New York: Atheneum, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973).

JO FREEMAN, a political scientist and lawyer, is the author of *The Politics of Women's Liberation* and editor of *Women: A Feminist Perspective* and *Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies.*

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ical process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of the system and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experience.[3]

This is a study of national party elites in the party system created by the New Deal realignment.[4] The subjects include holders of public and party office and activists in national party affairs (party and presidential campaign staff, delegates to national conventions). The data for this article derive primarily from interviews with these officials and activists, from observations made by me at the 1976, 1980, and 1984 national conventions of the Republican party, and at every national nominating convention of the Democratic party since 1964. I also briefly attended the 1960 Democratic and 1964 Republican national conventions. In addition, I conducted numerous interviews with insightful participants in both parties on the national level in the fall of 1984 and read newspaper accounts, party platforms, speeches, and other key documents.

Both parties are currently undergoing major transformations, which are strengthening their national organizations in different ways. These transformations have been molded, but not caused, by the fundamental characteristics of each party's distinctive culture and do not represent a change in the culture itself.[5] While the parties may also be undergoing a change in their electoral base,[6] it is well established in the literature that party elites and party masses (the voters) do not always think alike. Therefore, no attempt is made to ground the description of each party's culture in their electorates. However, if the ideas posited in this article have explanatory value, they should be generally applicable to the state parties; reference will be made to them where appropriate.

There are two fundamental differences between the parties in which all others are rooted. The first one is structural: in the Democratic party power flows upward and in the Republican party power flows downward. The second is attitudinal: Republicans perceive themselves as insiders even when they are out of power, and Democrats perceive themselves as outsiders even when they are in power.

[3] *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 218.

[4] See Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970) for an analysis of party systems.

[5] Republican Party Chair Frank Fahrenkopf claimed in "Campaign 84: The Contest for National Leadership," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 14 (Spring 1984): 176, that while the Democratic party is still that of the New Deal, the Republican party "is, ideologically, a new party." Even if this new ideology should not prove transitory, it does not necessarily mean the party has a new political culture.

[6] John R. Petrocik, *Party Coalitions: Realignments and the Decline of the New Deal Party System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

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Party Structure and the Flow of Power

In Ronald Reagan's acceptance speech at the 1984 Republican convention he declared that the Democrats' "government sees people only as members of groups. Ours serves all the people of America as individuals." Although this characterization was intended as a stinging criticism of the Democrats, and they would decry it as inaccurate, it does capture an essential difference between the two parties (though not necessarily their governments). Essentially, the Democratic party is pluralistic and polycentric. It has multiple power centers that compete for membership support in order to make demands on, as well as determine, the leaders. The Republicans have a unitary party in which great deference is paid to the leadership, activists are expected to be "good soldiers," and competing loyalties are frowned upon. These differences are a direct consequence of the different direction in the flow of power. In a collectivity in which power flows downward, separate and distinct internal groups are potentially dangerous; they provide loci for the development of competing loyalties and competing leadership. But when power flows upward, it must do so through some mechanism. Unorganized individuals without institutional authority or financial resources cannot exercise power. They must organize into groups in order to develop an agenda and act collectively in order to effect that agenda. Organization is the creator of collective power; it is the means by which followers influence leaders.

The post New Deal Democratic party has long been viewed as composed of constituencies. But while the party's distinct components could be indentified in the electorate, they were not directly represented in the national organization. Organizationally the Democratic party was a collection of state and local organizations, with only organized labor, through the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education, having direct influence on the very weak national party. Insofar as the interests of the different constituency groups were represented it was through the state and local party organizations, by whatever means and to the extent that those organizations permitted. Thus while Democratic party leaders were often assumed to put together slates of candidates with an eye to group representation, major voting blocks would often be ignored. For example Mayor Richard Daley's Chicago machine was regularly observed to slate persons identified as Irish, Polish, and Jewish for each of the top city offices, but never a black though blacks significantly increased their importance in the electorate during the Daley era. In effect the organizational components of the national party were geographic, even though the electoral constituencies were identified by religion and ethnicity as well as region.

The transformation of the Democratic party during the last twenty years has not changed its basic nature as a coalitional, pluralistic party.[7] But the nature of the coalition and the manner in which the party's constituency groups make

[7] Everett Carll Ladd and Charles D. Hadley, 2nd ed., *Transformations of the American Party System* (New York: Norton, 1978).

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their concerns felt is changing. As the national party has strengthened itself, groups that were previously unorganized or whose organizations could not make their influence felt on state and local parties have sought to directly influence the national organization. Some of these groups are also demanding representation on the local level, but their success has not been as noticeable as it has on the national level.

These new constituencies are ones who identify themselves as having a salient characteristic, creating a common agenda that they feel the party must respond to. Virtually all of these groups exist in organized form independent of the party and seek to act on the elected officials of both parties. They are recognized by Democratic party officials as representing the interest of important blocks of voters, which the party must respond to as a party. Some groups have been recognized parts of the Democratic electoral coalition since the New Deal (blacks and labor); others are relatively new (women and gays). Still others who participated in state and local Democratic politics when those were the only significant party units have not been active as organized groups in the party on the national level (ethnics).

Between 28 May 1982 and 13 July 1983, seven of these constituencies were recognized as official caucuses of the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Five represented demographic groups (women, blacks, hispanics, Asians, and gays) and two ideational ones (liberals and business/professional). In May 1985 the DNC Executive Committee revoked official recognition of these caucuses to deflect attacks on the party as being run by "special interests,"[8] The caucuses still exist, but they no longer receive support services from the DNC. Until May 1985 some of them had staff members of the Democratic National Committee identified as their liaisons. In addition, in the last few years an informal understanding has arisen that one of each of the three vice-chairs will be a member of and represent women, blacks, and hispanics. These groups still have their vice-chairs, as well as ex-officio membership on the DNC Executive Committee. The largest and most important constituency—labor—never had a staff liaison, for union leaders feel they should deal directly with the party chair without benefit of an intermediary. Instead, a majority of the twenty-five at-large seats on the DNC, as well as seats on the executive committee and the rules and credentials committees at the conventions, are reserved for union representatives.

Party constituencies generally meet as separate caucuses at the national conventions. While caucuses are usually open to anyone, the people who attend, not all of whom are delegates, are generally those for whom that constituency is a

[8] Since the 1984 election, the accusation that the Democratic party is a "captive of the special interests" has become a sufficient public relations problem that party leaders bemoan it in public and several Democratic governors and senators have set up an independent Democratic Leadership Council with the goal of recapturing the loyalty of Democrats who supposedly left the party because of this capture. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 9 March 1985, 457–59. Although official recognition of the caucuses was withdrawn, there is no evidence that the party intends to institute a major revolution in its structure or outlook, and the main Democratic "special interest," organized labor, is not among those groups whose supposed influence is under internal attack.

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primary reference group—a group with which they identify and which gives them a sense of purpose. Thus it is the most committed or identified constituency members who set the tone of the caucus. Not unexpectedly, most of those attending the women's caucus are committed feminists. Virtually all black delegates attend the black caucus, but not all union members go to the labor caucus. When forced to choose between conflicting meetings of the black and women's caucuses during the 1984 convention, black women went to the former. They also held their own separate caucus for the first time, as did Asians and the handicapped.

Although the leaders of these caucuses are rarely chosen by the participants, they nonetheless feel compelled to have their decisions ratified by them through debate and votes in the caucuses. With an occasional exception the power of group leaders derives from their ability to articulate the interests of constituency members to the party leaders. Ratification is the means by which their right to lead is renewed. The fact that the votes usually go the way the leaders direct and that caucus attendees may not perfectly reflect the interests of the constituency is usually overlooked. But when there is a conflict between claimants to leadership, those who do not have caucus support will dismiss it as unrepresentative.

The Republican party also has relevant components, but they are not as important as the Democratic party's constituent groups, because they are not mechanisms for exercising power and they are not primary reference groups.[9] The basic components of the Republican party are geographic units and ideological factions. Unlike the Democratic groups, these entities exist only as internal party mechanisms. At the quadrennial conventions the geographic units—state and local parties—are primarily channels for mobilizing support and distributing information on what the party leaders want. They are not separate and distinct levels of operation.

Ideological factions are also not power centers independent of their relationship to party leaders. Unlike Democratic caucus leaders, Republican faction leaders do not feel themselves accountable to their followers.[10] Sometimes there are not identifiable followers. Although faction leaders hold press conferences at the national conventions, they rarely have meetings. When they do, they too use them to mobilize support and distribute information, not debate the issues. The purpose of ideological factions—at least those that are organized—is to generate new ideas and test their appeal. The leaders' concept of success is not winning benefits, symbolic or otherwise, for their group, so much as being able to provide overall direction to the party.[11]

[9] Fahrenkopf, "Campaign 84," described the GOP as "clearly the homogenous political party" compared to the "unhomogenized" Democrats.

[10] When conservatives sought to start a third party after Reagan wasn't nominated in 1976, they held meetings among themselves at the convention but made no effort to contact delegates. Jeffrey L. Pressman, "Groups and Group Caucuses," *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Winter 1977–78): 680.

[11] This is less true of the New Right, some prominent members of which have occasionally threatened to form a new party. However, their efforts have been strongly opposed by traditional Republicans such as Barry Goldwater, who refused to join in the 1976 third party effort. See William

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The Republican party does have several demographic groups within it, such as the National Federation of Republican Women, the National Black Republican Council, and the Jewish Coalition; but they are auxiliaries, not constituencies. Their purpose is to recruit and organize group members into the Republican party as workers and contributors, not to represent the views of these groups to the party. They carry the party's message outward, not the group's message inward. Democratic constituency group members generally have a primary identification with their group, and only a secondary one with the party. The primary identification of Republican activists is with the Republican party. They view other strong group attachments as disloyal and unnecessary.

Convention Activities

The difference in the flow of power can be seen in the operation of the national conventions. When not in session, the time of delegates attending the Democratic convention is largely occupied with caucus meetings. In addition to state caucus meetings, there are caucus meetings for any group that wishes to call one. Generally the DNC makes space available for these meetings; but occasionally it declines when it feels the group making the request is clearly operating contrary to the interest of an incumbent president. Virtually all of these caucuses are open to whomever cares to attend, including nonmembers. Competing candidates for the presidential nominations acknowledge the importance of the group by speaking to its caucus. Indeed the importance of a particular group within the Democratic party can be ascertained by the number and status of the party leaders who seek to address it.

Republicans do not attend caucuses apart from those of their states. They go to receptions. These receptions are usually by invitation only. Invitations may not always be hard to obtain, but they are required. Receptions are privately sponsored, with each group responsible for getting its own space. There may be some speeches, but they are perfunctory ones and no debate is asked for or expected.

Republican receptions do have one major characteristic in common with Democratic caucuses; they are both places for demonstrating the status of the group and individuals within it. Status at caucuses is conveyed to those individuals invited to sit at the speakers' platform, as well as to the group by those who agree to speak. Status at receptions is conveyed to those introduced or acknowledged by the occasional speaker and to the sponsoring group by the prominent people attending the reception who are not also sponsors.

The kind of interaction between delegates at caucuses is very different from that at receptions. Caucuses have many speeches and frequently have debates. Occasionally votes will be taken, if only to give the "sense of the meeting."

Rusher, *The Rise of the Right* (New York: William Morrow, 1984), chap. 11. Others, such as the Reverend Jerry Falwell at the 1984 convention, threatened to sit the election out if the platform was not to their liking.

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Caucus meetings are places for the groups' leadership to listen as well as to speak, though some leaders listen better than others. Discussion is public, and it's quite permissible to be loud and demanding in one's behavior—as long as one doesn't interfere with others' ability to listen to the speaker. Caucuses are supposed to be places where delegates debate, discuss, and decide on the relevant issues before the convention. Thus, even when the outcome of a particular question is forgone or there are no decisions to make, the illusion of participatory decision making is maintained. One exception to this is the labor caucus, which is less frequent and less vocal. Participants come to get their marching orders and find out who their floor leaders are, not to debate issues. Since the leaders of this caucus are established union leaders, their right to lead doesn't need to be ratified.

Despite the occasional speech at Republican receptions, discussion is largely private. Consequently, people usually talk to those they already know and who most likely agree with them. Even when participants of different views encounter each other, the exchange is expected to be very civil in keeping with the rules of polite society. Receptions are not places to exercise group influence. They are places to network, to be seen, and to get information. If one wishes to exercise influence, it is best to arrange an introduction to a recognized leader by a mutual friend.

Legitimacy

The different direction in the flow of power also creates different conceptions of legitimacy. In the Democratic party legitimacy is determined by who you represent, and in the Republican party by whom you know and who you are. It is this difference that makes the Democratic party so much more responsive to demands for reform within it and the Republican party so much more responsive to changes in leadership.

Reform within the Democratic party is usually traced to the 1968 Chicago convention, which was marked by external strife and turmoil. Although few delegates and no leaders joined the demonstrators outside, reform Democrats nonetheless used these demonstrations to argue that the nominating system was closed to dissent and unrepresentative of popular opinion. The fact that there were seventeen credentials challenges involving fifteen states, some of which were successful, reinforced their claims.[12] In the decade before the 1968 convention many local Democratic clubs had been taken over by reformers who believed that "management of the affairs of the party ought to be widespread and in accord with strictly democratic procedures."[13] At the 1964 convention the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party (MFDP) had heightened the contradiction between the national party's claim to be the party of civil rights and its traditional defer-

[12] Crotty, *Party Reform*, chap. 3.

[13] James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1966), vii–viii.

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ence to state parties in the governance of their affairs by challenging the right of the regular Mississippi party to seat an all-white delegation.[14] Although the resulting compromise pleased no one (two MFDP delegates were seated as at-large delegates and the regulars were required to sign a loyalty oath) it opened Pandora's box. The implicit threat of numerous credentials challenges at future conventions added force to the demands of reformers that the party open up.

Party leaders were sensitive to these demands, because they were quite conscious that the Democratic party is a coalition party and that maintaining and broadening the coalition has been its primary political strategy. Claims that it was unrepresentative of a relevant bloc of voters was a serious challenge to the party's legitimacy. But it was a challenge that could be met only by reforming the structures of representation to an extent that has been characterized as revolutionary.[15] For years party leaders had automatically assumed that geographic representation would sufficiently reflect the interests of its many voting blocs in party affairs. The MFDP undermined this assumption by demonstrating the obvious: a southern state party did not represent southern black Democrats. They made it clear that another means of representation than a strictly geographic one was necessary for all members of the coalition to feel adequately represented. These demands were amplified in 1968 when antiwar protestors, most of them young enough to be drafted, marched in the streets during the convention and the Democratic candidate narrowly lost in November. The party responded to the recommendations that it open up the system and involve more groups in party decision making by agreeing to a reform commission. By the time it made its report women had been added to minorities and youth as publicly vocal demographic groups who felt unrepresented by geographic organization. Thus, a key feature of the reforms was an attempt to impose requirements for demographic representation on the loose geographic structure of the party. However, these changes did not result in a consensus. Consequently, a new reform commission is appointed after every convention.

Legitimacy within the Republican party is dependent on having a personal connection to the leadership. Consequently, supporting the wrong candidate can have disastrous effects on one's ability to influence decisions. Republican presidents exercise a monolithic power over their party that Democratic presidents do not have. With the nomination of Ronald Reagan, many life long Republicans active on the national level who had supported Gerald Ford or George Bush and did not immediately change their views to conform to those of the winner found themselves completely cut off. Others immediately flocked to the Reagan banner, curbing any dissenting views in order to do so. Mavericks, who do not have any personal attachments to identified leaders, may be able to operate as gadflies, but can rarely build an independent power base. Since legitimacy in the Democratic party is based on the existence of just such a power base, real or

[14] *National Party Conventions 1831–1976* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1979), 105.

[15] Barry Shafer, *The Quiet Revolution: Party Reform and the Shaping of Post Reform Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

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imagined, one does not lose all of one's influence within the party with a change in leaders as long as one can credibly argue that one represents a legitimate group.

While the importance of personal connections works against those Republicans who have the wrong connections, it rewards those who spend years toiling in the fields for the party and its candidates. The longer one spends in any organization, the more personal connections one has an opportunity to make. These aren't lost when one's party or leaders are out of power, and thus can be "banked" for future use. Occasionally a dedicated party worker can develop sufficient ties, even to competing leaders, to assure continued access, if not always influence, regardless of who's in power. Those Democrats whose legitimacy derives from leadership of a coalition group find it is quite transitory when they can no longer credibly represent the group. The greater willingness of the Republican party to reward loyalty and dedication to the party in preference to any other group makes it easier for the party to discourage extraparty attachments.

The operation of these different forms of legitimacy can readily be seen in the activities of feminists at the 1976 conventions. A group of women including DNC members, prominent feminists, and elected officials met with the Carter campaign to negotiate whether there would be a floor fight on the minority report to the Rules Committee that future conventions should require that half of all delegates be female. These women felt it necessary to call and report to meetings of women delegates (and whatever non-delegates cared to attend) on the progress of the negotiations every day. When they finished, all women attending, including non-delegates, took to the floor to express their own opinions on what should happen. After agreement was reached in the negotiations, the women's caucus leadership asked the participants to vote on the agreement. Since Jimmy Carter packed the meeting with delegates committed to him, the outcome was forseeable, but no one suggested that the process was irrelevant. The daily reports, debate, and ratification were all essential parts of the legitimation process. They gave the largely self-selected leadership of the women's caucus their claim to represent a key constituency.[16]

At the Republican convention, four women with close personal ties to the Ford campaign, but operating as the Republican Women's Task Force (RWTF) of the National Women's Political Caucus, quietly lobbied to keep the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the platform. They called one meeting, the Sunday before the convention, which was poorly attended. There they passed on information on what they intended to do and what kind of volunteer help they could use. There was no debate or discussion, no votes, and no further meetings. Furthermore, they focused strictly on the ERA, leaving abortion to others, because ERA was the only issue Ford supported. They said that reelecting Ford was the single most important thing they could do for women.

The 1980 GOP convention had few former Ford supporters. The women who

[16] Jo Freeman, "Something DID Happen at the Democratic Convention," *Ms.*, October 1976, 74–76, 113–115.

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represented the RWTF had no influence at the convention, which saw the ERA removed from the platform by an overwhelming vote, because they had no access to the Reagan campaign, which had complete control of the proceedings. Mary Louise Smith, former chair of the Republican National Committee (RNC), finally intervened with Reagan on their behalf. She was able to secure a meeting, but no influence, because she too had supported the wrong candidate.[17]

Career Paths

The different structure of the parties has different consequences for the fate of activists. Since the Democratic party is composed of groups, the success of individuals whose group identification is highly salient, such as blacks and women, is tied to that of the group as a whole. They succeed as the group succeeds.

That is not the case within the Republican party. It officially ignores group characteristics, though it is obvious that it does pay attention to them when it feels the need to cater to the interest of the voting public in a particular group. In 1984 women were showcased as they had never been before, though both black and hispanic speakers addressed the convention. Generally, individuals succeed insofar as the leaders with whom they are connected succeed. Another means of getting access is through sponsorship. If persons who are already accepted pass favorably on someone new, it is a lot easier for the latter to obtain recognition than if they must make it on their own. Many of the influential women within the Republican party are related to influential men. These men are their sponsors.

World View

New York Governor Mario Cuomo in his keynote address to the Democratic convention accused the Republican party of having policies that "divide the nation—into the lucky and the left-out, into the royalty and the rabble." Whether the party's policies are divisive is certainly debatable, but Cuomo did articulate a difference in perspective by the parties that shapes their way of dealing with the world. It has been argued that society as a whole has a cultural and structural "center" about which most members of the society are more or less "peripheral."[18] Republicans see themselves as representing the center, while Democrats view society from the periphery.

The Republican center does not include the state, that is, the major organs of the national government. Republicans have always felt a tension between the state and society, and have viewed the former with suspicion even when in power. Since Republicans as individuals control most of the major private institutions, particularly economic ones, a strong central government is seen as a threat to

[17] *In These Times*, 30 July–12 August 1980.

[18] Edward Shils, "Center and Periphery," *Selected Essays* (Chicago: Center for Social Organization Studies, University of Chicago, 1970).

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their power. The Democratic periphery feels a strong government is necessary in order to counterbalance private economic domination. Indeed, they feel that the state's primary function *ought* to be a check on private economic power. Nonetheless, Democrats, like typical outsiders, are ambivalent toward the state. Their ambivalence derives not from a suspicion of strength, but from concern that the state will not act as they feel it should. Indeed, until Reagan began to redirect the national government, most Democrats did not appreciate how valuable the federal government was to them or even how thoroughly they had captured its main components.

Although Republicans do not want to increase State power, they nonetheless feel that what they are and their conception of the American dream is inherently desirable. They are insiders who represent the core of American society and are the carriers of its fundamental values. What they have achieved in life, and wish to achieve, is what every true American wishes to achieve. The traditions they represent are what has worked for America, and the policies they pursue are ones that ultimately will be best for everyone. They argue that the Republican party and Republican policies represent the national interest, unlike the Democrats, who only serve the "special interests" that are powerful within it. Their concept of representation is as a trustee who pursues the long-range best interests of the represented.

The Democrats have a very different world view and a different concept of the meaning of representation. To them, representation does not mean the articulation of a single coherant program for the betterment of the nation but the inclusion of all relevant groups and viewpoints, Their concept of representation is delegatory, in which accurate reflection of the parts is necessary to the welfare of the whole. Ironically, this requires a free market view of the political arena as one in which the most collective good comes from maximizing properly represented individual goods. Because there is no common agenda, there is no common conception of a national interest independent of the total interests of the parts. Instead, groups seek to maximize what each gets through bargaining and building coalitions on the assumption that everyone should get something.[19] This expectation lay behind Jesse Jackson's statement to the Black Caucus at the 1984 Democratic convention that blacks had received nothing from the Democrats, unlike women and Southerners, who had.[20] Thus blacks had a legitimate reason to be angry and Democrats should not expect their undivided loyalty without giving them something in return. The Republican attitude is more one of "to the victor go the spoils."

Guided by a more unitary conception of representation as meaning the correct articulation of the national interest, Republicans feel the needs of minorities will be met best by improving the economy. They believe that that which most benefits the whole will most benefit each part. Although the party sometimes

[19] White, *Making of the President—1964*, 59, 62.

[20] "Women got what they want in Geraldine Ferraro. The South got what it wants in Burt Lance. What did you get? You ain't got nothing." Quoted in *Time*, 19 November 1984, 72.

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does offer discrete programs or benefits to discrete groups, it does so reluctantly and only because it must meet Democratic criticisms that it is ignoring the needs of such groups.[21] Complaints such as Jackson's might be voiced privately, but never publicly. To do so would be disloyal, for it would call into question the universal desirability of the Republican program.

Democrats do not have an integrated conception of a national interest, in part because they do not view themselves as the center of society. The party's components think of themselves as outsiders pounding on the door seeking programs that will facilitate entry into the mainstream.[22] Thus, the party is very responsive to any groups, including such social pariahs as gays and lesbians, that claim to be left out.

Insofar as the Republican idea of a national interest can be summed up in a single phrase, it would be the promotion of "individual success." Insiders generally view their achievements as due to their own merit and efforts rather than to aspects of the social structure or plain luck. Success is its own justification. Thus what's worked for them, or what they acknowledge as having worked for them, should work for everyone. For government to interfere, other than to remove barriers to individual action, is undesirable.

The word that would most aptly characterizes what Democrats want is "fairness."[23] This is a common goal of outsiders who do not accept their fate as being caused by their own failures. They are rather skeptical that there is a linear relationship between individual effort, ability, and reward and feel that a major function of government is to make life more fair. Exactly what is fair, however, is rarely debated. Thus, potential conflicts between groups that might have contradictory goals are avoided.

Organizational Style

It has often been noted that Democratic party politics are open, loud, and confrontational, while those of the Republican party are closed, quiet, and consensual. These contrasting characteristics are consequences of the structural and attitudinal differences discussed earlier. They result in different styles of party organization, even though there is a superficial similarity in the formal structure of both parties and they have the same ultimate goal of winning elections.

[21] White, *Making of the President—1964*, 62, summed up the difference between the parties' beliefs by saying the "Republicans are for virtue, the Democrats for Santa Claus."

[22] White, *Making of the President—1968*, 62–64.

[23] See "The Democratic Party Credo" in Section 17, Article 11 of the *Charter of the Democratic Party*. "At the heart of our party lies a fundamental conviction that Americans must not only be free, but they must live in a fair society." The Charter was adopted in 1974, and the Credo was added in 1984. In 1965 Theodore White wrote that the most hallowed word among Democrats was "humanitarian"; among Republicans it was "principles," 138. This word reflects a similar outlook as "fair," but is less of an outsider's term. The language of the Charter probably reflects the influence of insurgent Democrats who were only recently outsiders but nonetheless share the basic vision of regular Democrats.

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These contrasting styles were exemplified by a description of the battles over replacing the Massachusetts state party chairs in 1956.

> . . . in the Democratic party the affair could best be called a brawl all the way—at least as the press reported it, no doubt with some gleeful exaggeration. Statements and counter-statements to the press, accusations of falsehood mutually tossed back and forth, gave the dispute most of the elements of an Irish donnybrook, minus only the swinging of fists. There were threats of that too. While the Democrats were having their fracas, the heir apparent for the Republican nomination was carrying on a quiet war against the incumbent Republican chairman, but with a very different tone and with very different procedures. A dispatch to the *New York Times* illustrated the differences of approach. It noted that the Democrats had allowed the reporters in to hear their showdown on replacing their chairman; it then went on to describe the Republican methods: "Following a brief exchange of statements in the newspapers, a characteristic hush fell over the Republican headquarters. It has been the experience of political reporters in Massachusetts for years that the Republicans promote publicity, and hire press agents to carry out the program so long as it is favorable. Anything unfavorable is carefully thrashed out behind closed doors of private social and dining clubs. The participants then walk out smiling at each other, each trying to ignore political knife handles protruding from their backs. So it was Tuesday night. . . . Reporters were barred from the meeting until after the balloting was finished. They were admitted in time to hear [the defeated chairman] make his valedictory."[24]

The Republican party sees itself as an organic whole whose parts are interdependent. Republican activists are expected to be good soldiers who respect leadership and whose only important political commitment is to the Republican party. Since direction comes from the top, the manner by which one effects policy is by quietly building a consensus among key individuals, and then pleading one's case to the leadership as furthering the basic values of the party. Maneuvering is acceptable. Challenging is not. This approach acknowledges the leadership's right to make final decisions and reassures them that those prefering different policies do not have competing allegiances. On the other hand, open challenges or admissions of fundamental disagreements indicate that one might be too independent to be a reliable soldier who will always put the interests of the party first. This cuts off access to the leadership and thus is quite risky—unless the leadership changes to people more amenable to the challengers. While not risky like an open challenge, quietly building an internal consensus is nonetheless costly of one's political resources. Activists learn early to conserve their resources by only contesting issues of great importance to them.

Liberals in the Republican Party (former supporters of Nelson Rockefeller and William Scranton), who have repeatedly challenged the Reagan administration, have been virtually read out of the party. On the right, Representative Newt Gingrich's (Ga.) attack on David Stockman for betraying the supply side "revolution" (not a Republican word) incurred very angry responses from the Repub-

[24] *New York Times*, 27 May 1956; quoted in Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 138–139.

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lican leadership, who dismissed his arguments as "ego-gratification."[25] However, Gingrich has been more successful at being listened to than the liberals, who no longer even use the word "liberal," having retreated to "moderate" after Reagan came to power. His success and that of other vocal challengers from the right is based on their ability to demonstrate a public following. If Gingrich can translate this following into winning campaigns, whether for himself or people who support him, he will continue to be listened to and eventually join the leadership. If not, he not only won't join the leadership, he won't even have access to it. Reagan was not accepted by the Republican establishment until his electoral successes gave them no choice.

Liberal Republicans have largely failed to demonstrate a following and thus have lost power as their leaders have ceased to occupy major roles within the party. They argue that the "yuppies" who voted for Gary Hart ought to look favorably upon Republicans like them who have liberal social agendas and conservative economic policies.[26] Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the Ripon Society and more recently the Mainstream Republican Committee, they know how to talk but don't know how to organize. Thus their potential following is not really aware that they exist. Apart from the unlikely event of a spontaneous public uprising in their favor, their position within the party will continue to atrophy as individuals learn that the price of access to conservative leadership is keeping quiet.

In the Democratic party, keeping quiet is the cause of atrophy and speaking out is a means of access. As the type and importance of powerful groups within it has changed over time, there has been a great deal of conflict. Former participants resist declining influence (for example, the South, Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley) while newer ones jockey for position (women and blacks). Successfully picking fights is the primary way by which groups acquire clout within the party.

Since the purpose of most of the conflict is to achieve acceptance and eventually power, it does not matter whether the issues that are fought over are substantive or only symbolic. In the 1950s and 1960s these fights were usually over credentials as southern delegations were challenged because of their refusal to declare their loyalty to the national ticket and their inadequate representation of blacks. In the 1970s and 1980s, the fights have usually been over platform planks, but some have concerned rules changes or designations of status. In 1976 women's groups fought over the equal-division rule to require that half of all delegates be women. Although they lost, they had to find another issue in 1980 because the DNC decided to adopt "50–50" in 1978. That year they focused on

[25] Helen Dewar, "Republicans Wage Verbal Civil War," *Washington Post*, 19 November 1984.

[26] This was the message of Representative Jim Leach (R. Iowa) in a press conference at the 1984 Republican convention. He is chair of the Ripon Society and co-chair and chief spokesperson for the Republican Mainstream Committee (RMC). Leach asserted that the RMC would hold a membership drive, but later in an interview stated that this would be done through "networking" with other organizations. There is no evidence that the RMC has attempted to organize Republican activists since the convention.

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minority planks on abortion and denying party support to opponents of the ERA. In 1984 the issue would have been a woman vice presidential candidate, but this was preempted by Walter Mondale's selection of Geraldine Ferraro as his running mate, so there was nothing to fight over.

Jesse Jackson's entire campaign was a way for a new generation of black leaders to establish clout both within the party and within the black community. The means by which blacks have exercised power in the party has been less through organizations than through elected officials and their individual followings. As there is no internal mechanism for selecting leaders among the many contenders, those blacks who have exercised power within the party have usually been those whom white party leaders chose to listen to. Jackson's candidacy challenged both the current black political leadership and the right of whites to decide which blacks were legitimate leaders. By showing that black voters would unite behind his candidacy in the primaries, Jackson established his legitimacy as a national black spokesperson independent of white approval. This gave him a claim to dictate the black agenda in the party, even though he had not previously been a party activist, and there were many competent black leaders within the party who were not supportive of this upstart.

Because Jackson represented a generational split within the black community, his demands for recognition presented the Mondale campaign with problems not presented by feminists. Among feminists, elected officials and organizational leaders were united on wanting a woman vice presidential candidate and even agreed on a particular individual. Since blacks were not united, any recognition of Jackson and his followers threatened the position of established black elected officials to speak for the black community. If Jackson had subsequently refused to campaign for Mondale, his legitimacy as a *party* leader, though not as a *black* leader, would have been seriously undermined. Since he chose to play by the rules, he's still a contender.

Fights do not have to be won in order for those picking them to be successful. They are opportunities for demonstrating political skills and establishing territory. Feminist leaders didn't win the equal division fight in 1976, and everyone knew that had it gone to a floor vote, they would have lost. What they won was recognition. The Carter campaign negotiated with them, because they showed that there were a substantial number of women willing and able to fight on the issue. This established the right of women to be recognized as an important group within the party. However, Carter refused to negotiate with feminists in 1980, largely because he perceived them as surrogates for his rival, Ted Kennedy, and not important in and of themselves. This was changed by their success in getting the convention to adopt two minority planks that the Carter administration opposed. By showing that they were both politically skilled and persistent, feminists successfully claimed the right to represent women within the party.

The Jackson campaign did for a new generation of black leaders what the equal-division fight did for feminists. They are now recognized as contenders, but are not yet players. Many party leaders, both black and white, still hope they will go away. Thus Jackson and his followers cannot take any concessions for

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granted. It will be necessary to organize for 1988 in order to demonstrate continuity.

The open confrontations that occur in the Democratic party do not take place within the Republican party, because it is a very different kind of organization. If one were to place the many different forms of collectivities on a spectrum, the Democratic and Republican parties would not occupy the same point. At one end would be groups exhibiting a great deal of spontaneity that are easy to join and have minimal structure, such as fads and crowds. At the other would be formal organizations that have well developed divisions of labor, hierarchical layers of authority, are selective in their membership, and are relatively impervious to spontaneous impulses, such as corporations or at the extreme end, military bodies. In the middle are most social movements, which, however diverse they may be, exhibit both noticeable spontaneity and a describable structure. Parties and campaigns lie on the more organized end of the spectrum, but because they must mobilize voters, raise money from contributors rather than by selling a product, and recruit volunteers to accomplish their goals, they exhibit many properties of social movements.

Republican party organizations have more characteristics of the corporate style and fewer typical of social movements than do Democratic party organizations. This has been a continuing attribute; the semi-organized chaos seen in the Democratic party today is not a consequence of contemporary reforms. Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy wrote in their book on the national party committees in the early 1960s that the

> . . . Democrats are relatively undisturbed by—and often seem to thrive on—the *ad hoc*-ness of politics. Republicans embrace order; they try to impress it on the anarchy of politics. Democrats resist order or accept it only as a last resort. This difference may be, in part, no more than the prodigality of the majority party willing and able to waste some of its margin, and the frugality of the minority party aware that organization may compensate for numbers. Or it may be, as some have suggested, a psychological and temperamental difference between those who are attracted to one party and those attracted to the other.[27]

Evidence that minority status is not the cause is given by Duane Lockard's description of the Massachusetts parties in the late 1950s, when the Republican party was dominant in that state. He wrote that the parties responded very differently to challenges by ethnics to advance within them.

> The Republicans lay down the line in the pre-primary convention to assert some control over those who would disrupt the party organization in a primary. In the Democratic party the non-Irish, non-Boston candidate comes to the fore by using the free-for-all tactics of the primary; in the Republican party the leadership arranges to put some ethnic representative on the ticket.[28]

[27] Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, *Politics Without Power: The National Party Committees* (New York: Atherton, 1964), 183.

[28] Lockard, *New England State Politics*, 147.

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Data to test the psychological theory are not available. A simpler explanation is found by looking at the different resources of the parties. Like corporations, or well-established interest groups, Republican party organizations rely heavily on money and professional expertise. Like social movements and volunteer organizations, Democratic party organizations rely more on donations of time and commitment.[29] The RNC has had a larger staff for decades, while the DNC has always relied heavily on volunteers to fulfill its functions.[30] One function of the Democrats' constituency groups, especially organized labor, is to recruit volunteers for local campaigns.

This resource analysis was used by James Q. Wilson to explain some of the differences he found between amateur Democratic and Republican clubs in the 1950s. He found that Democratic clubs were mass based and stressed intraparty democracy and participation, while Republican groups were "leadership-oriented organizations." While he found some explanation for this in the different political philosophies and professions of the typical Republican and Democratic amateur activist, he also noted that

> the chief resource the conservative brings to civic—or to political—action is economic: money, corporate power, and the personal contacts flowing from business position. The liberal, lacking money, brings numbers and personal contributions of time and effort. The conservative organization, to the extent that it is successful in mobilizing money and prestige, incapacitates itself for direct political action insofar as the people it recruits are successful in business or their careers; personal success leaves them little time for or interest in personal participation. The contributors are at a point where political action can offer little in status or recognition—indeed such action is more likely to be considered harmful. This lack of personal involvement may produce an indifference to organizational forms and procedures and an emphasis on organizational goals. To say the same thing another way, whatever incentives a conservative club can offer will derive from its stated goals; direct participation itself is not an important reward to the member, and internal democracy is therefore not of crucial significance to him.[31]

Nationally the Republican party supports its larger permanent staff and its numerous services for candidates by raising and spending several times the amount of money that the Democrats do. The attitude toward money raising of the 1950s and 1960s is still true today. The Republican party approaches "the problem of national party financing with businesslike matter-of-factness. . . . The Democratic national finance machinery is decentralized, with each committee doing what it damned well pleases. . . . In general, money-raising proce-

[29] See Jo Freeman, "A Model for Analyzing the Strategic Options of Social Movement Organizations" in Jo Freeman, ed., *Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies* (New York: Longman, 1983), for an analysis of how resources effect organizational structure and style.

[30] Cornelius P. Cotter and John F. Bibby, "Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Spring 1980): 1.

[31] Wilson, *Amateur Democrat*, 186–88; see also Hugh A. Bone, "New Party Associations in the West," *American Political Science Review (APSR)* 45 (December 1951): 1115–25; and Frank J. Sorauf, "Extra-Legal Political Parties in Wisconsin," *APSR* 48 (September 1954): 692–704.

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dures at the Democratic National Committee remain informal and largely oral."[32]

The greater financial resources of the Republican party are somewhat illusory, though their greater centralization is not. The party organizations outspend their Democratic rivals, but Democratic candidates often have more money than Republican ones. The evidence is that that Democrats are more likely to donate money to candidates than to the party, which may partially explain why the national committees of the minority party have so many more contributors than the majority party, as well as more money to spend.[33] This also appears to be true on the state level. Lockard's data on Massachusetts in the early-1950s showed that not only did the Republican party raise and spend more money, but it was spent by the state committee; Democratic money was raised and spent by the candidate organizations. Even non-campaign money was raised centrally and passed down to the town committees for local use. Democratic money was raised locally and spent locally.[34]

The nature of the Democratic resource base requires it to devote more time and energy to organizational maintenance—keeping the troops satisfied. Thus it has less available for external programs. This places a greater burden on the staff of the Democratic National Committee compared to the RNC. Senior staff of both, especially the chairs, must be good managers, but DNC officials in addition bear responsibility for creating and keeping a concensus among the party's many constituencies.

This pattern is not necessarily repeated on the local level where party organizations are much more diverse. Indeed of all party organizations, past and present, few have been more hierarchical, exclusive, and hostile to spontaneity than the big city Democratic machines. However, these machines relied on patronage, not volunteers. Where state civil service acts undermined the material basis of their power, they became vulnerable to challenge by reformist volunteers whose political commitment was greater than theirs.

Even where staff and money are plentiful, many party functions are accessible to or require volunteers, and groups that can mobilize volunteers can be very influential. These groups are often dedicated to specific causes, and like social movements, they rely on the time and commitment of their members to attain their goals. In particular the delegate selection processes of both parties are vulnerable to adherants of specific causes (sometimes called special interests), who can engage in intensive short-term efforts. This is especially true in caucus states, because so few people are willing to attend and participate for the hours or even days necessary to elect delegates. However, even in primary states the voters usually only determine how many delegates a given candidate will get. Other mecha-

[32] Cotter and Hennessy, *Politics Without Power*, 177–179.

[33] Gary Jacobson, "Party Organization and Campaign Resources in 1982," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Winter 1985–86): 612; Xandra Kayden, "The Nationalizing of the Party System," in Michael J. Malbin, ed., *Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Laws* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 263, 268.

[34] Lockard, *New England State Politics*, 137–38.

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nisms determine who these delegates are. Ideological groups whose members see being a delegate as a way to pursue their issue concerns can frequently have an impact far greater than their proportion of the voters would warrant. Observers of the last three Republican conventions have noted that the delegates were disproportionately to the right of typical Republican activists. As one disgruntled Ford supporter explained his near loss at the 1976 Convention, "They're willing to get up at 6:00 A.M. and go to caucus meetings and we're not."

Groups operating on the social-movement model can also be very effective in campaigns, at least those for which heavy media attention is not key. If group members are geographically concentrated and willing to contribute large amounts of time and energy to a particular campaign, they can be very important to its success and consequently very influential. Right-wing organizations have found this approach more appealing than those on the left, who are usually either poorly organized on the local level or disdainful of electoral politics. An exception to this are gay Democratic clubs, which have used heavy campaign activity to win support from many public officials who might not otherwise favor their cause.

The Democrats are trying to strengthen the financial base of the national party though they remain behind the Republicans.[35] But even if the party were to have the same financial resources it would still be a very different party with a different organizational style. Any organization that is polycentric, pluralistic, and in which power flows upward will require greater attention to internal matters and be more contentious than one which is hierarchical, unitary and in which power flows downward. The latter will be able to use more of its resources for attaining its goals and direct them more efficiently.

Nonetheless, it does not follow that the Democratic style lacks any advantages over that of the Republicans. In the short run it appears disruptive, but in the long run it is more stable. Once a consensus develops about the desirability of a particular course of action, whether it be programmatic or procedural, it is accepted as right and proper and is not easily thwarted by party leaders, even when one of them is the president. Except for its core values, the Republican party is more likely to change directions when it changes leaders. If it were to change directions too drastically, it could undermine both its credibility and its programs. Thus the contest for the 1988 Republican nomination for president may send reverberations throughout the party, while that for the Democratic nomination will reflect in part what has happened in the party.

Dissent and Disloyalty

One of the most common observations of the Democratic party is how much more fractious it is than the Republican party. Although there are bounds on dis-

[35] In the 1983–84 election cycle the Democrats raised $98.5 million and the Republicans $297.9. This was up from $26.4 and $84.5 respectively in the 1977–78 cycle. Federal Election Commission press release of 5 December 1985, 2.

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sent, one can say things about the Democratic party leaders and candidates, publicly, that in the Republican party would be deemed disloyal. Only the Republican party has an eleventh commandment—thou shalt not criticize a fellow Republican. Thus during the 1984 conventions, such Republican adversaries as liberal Senator Lowell Weicker (Conn.) and conservative Representative Trent Lott (Miss.) curbed their criticism of each other in public while leading figures in the Democratic party, whose mutual disagreements were comparatively minor, let their complaints be constantly quoted in the press. Republicans do fight, sometimes viciously, but by and large their fights are not public, and even in private take place on more limited terrain. When they do occur, the ill feelings they create last a lot longer. Democratic sparring partners are more willing to kiss and make up.

The difference in the bounds of dissent can be seen in the different ways the parties have treated those who had fundamental disagreements with their party's presidential candidates. In 1980 the National Organization for Women (NOW) voted not to endorse Jimmy Carter and at the convention led a floor fight for a minority plank strongly disliked by the candidate. Despite this opposition in an election year and the fact that no one thought NOW would possibly defect to the Republicans, NOW President Ellie Smeal was invited to meet with President Carter that fall and was subsequently (after Carter's defeat) hired as a consultant to the DNC. Indeed, refusal to toe the line and leadership of a successful floor fight strengthened NOW within the party because it had demonstrated clout.

In the Republican party many, though certainly not all, prominent Ford supporters, found themselves eased out after Reagan was elected, including ones who professed loyalty to the President but disagreed with some aspects of his program. Feminists who criticized Reagan for his opposition to the ERA have been virtually read out of the Republican party. Although George Bush was selected to be Reagan's running mate despite many well known disagreements, it was a practical decision that was not completely accepted by Reagan's own supporters. The opposition to Bush was much greater and runs much deeper than that of Democrats to Lyndon B. Johnson as John F. Kennedy's running mate or to Hubert Humphrey as Johnson's. Even after several years of total subservience to Reagan policies, Bush is still viewed with great suspicion by hardcore Reaganites.

This exclusionary attitude is not restricted to the Reagan administration. After Barry Goldwater's devastating defeat in 1964, he and his supporters were ostracized to the point that Goldwater was no longer wanted as a speaker in even conservative areas and his former staff members could not get jobs with any Republican officials.[36] In contrast, although George McGovern's supporters were blamed for the Democrats' 1972 loss, and there was some retrenchment in the delegate selection rules that made his nomination possible, they were not cut out.

[36] White, *Making of the President—1968*, 31–2.

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Several got jobs in the Carter administration, though no one thought of Carter as an heir to McGovern's policies or people.

Another illustration is the attitude toward delegates in 1984 who voted for someone other than the expected victors for president and vice president. The delegate who refused to vote for Reagan and the two who refused to vote for Bush were treated by their own delegations as apostates, even though there was no crisis mandating a loyalty test. Illinois delegate Susan Catania, a former state senator, was asked by liberal Governor Jim Thompson to give up her vote to an alternate rather than vote an abstention in the nomination tally. In contrast, the Democrats don't expect all their delegates to vote for the expected winner, as long as it doesn't deprive the candidate of a first ballot victory. Even Jesse Jackson's appeal to his supporters to deny Mondale a first ballot victory was tolerated, if not appreciated. Nor is the vice presidential vote the loyalty test it is for the Republicans; rather it is an opportunity for delegates to express themselves. At the 1972 Democratic convention over seventy people, six of whom were formally nominated, received vice presidential votes (including three for Mao Zedong).[37]

The extensive contentiousness of the Democrats can be traced to their different structure. Coalitions are inevitably more conflict-ridden than unitary organizations, because group leaders are accountable to their members as much or even more than to the coalition. Furthermore, the more people who can legitimately claim consideration of their views, the more legitimate viewpoints there are. This in turn legitimates expression of different views, even by participants who are not powerful enough to merit consideration on their own. This situation is exacerbated for the Democrats, because they tend to value change and experimentation in and of themselves. Thus each new idea has to be discussed and fought out on every level and in every power center of the party until a consensus is finally achieved. As a party more enamored of tradition than change, the Republican party would have fewer issues to fight over even if it had as many places in which to fight them.

The self-perception of the Democrats' constituency groups as perennial outsiders adds another twist. Winners are expected to concern themselves with the welfare of the losers. Republicans have more of a winner-take-all attitude. If you support the wrong candidate, you have no claim on the spoils. Access to the leaders, appointments, or other indicia of inclusion are commodities whose value is increased through scarcity. The Democrats view access as much more of a right to which everyone, including the losers, are entitled. Leaders should represent and listen to all the people in the party, not just those who supported them.

This attitude makes it more difficult for Democratic party leaders to punish those who disagree. Since coalitions generally involve shifting alliances, the relatively powerless may combine with others to become relatively powerful at some future date. Thus it is unwise to completely shut anyone off, or out. Even party

[37] White, *Making of the President—1972*, 185.

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leaders who would like to ignore those whose opinions they find obnoxious rarely find it worthwhile to do so. Since legitimate power flows upward, personal connections with and access to the leadership don't have the same value they have in the Republican party. Severing access doesn't so much punish dissidents as it portrays the leaders who do so as unwilling to listen. Those subunits of the Democratic party that have had bosses like the Chicago Democratic party under Mayor Daley have not been noted for their tolerant attitude toward dissidents. Local Democratic party leaders who are powerful enough to command obedience, generally do so.

Another consequence of the coalition structure is that mulitple loyalties are normal. While many Democrats are party people first and foremost, many others are not. The idea that one should juggle competing loyalties is unexceptional, as is the possibility that one might seek to resolve conflicting agendas by getting the party to adopt the positions of nonparty groups. The Republican party frowns on multiple loyalties. Indeed it looks with great suspicion on anyone susceptible to conflicting agendas as potentially disloyal. A major reason Republican feminists have had so much more trouble rehabilitating themselves into the Reagan party than others who did not initially support him is because they are assumed to have a major or even primary loyalty to feminism and feminist organizations. Even in 1976, when Republican feminists were aligned with party leaders, one organizer commented that because the GOP is not "an interest group party . . . the RWTF is viewed with skepticism. Party regulars have a hard time adjusting to the presence of an organized interest."[38] The current leadership views feminist organizations as Democratic party front groups. Thus it is virtually impossible to be both an accepted Republican activist and an outspoken supporter of feminist goals. Since the party discourages people from identifying themselves as members of a group with a group agenda, it minimizes the possibility of multiple loyalties. But should the Republicans succeed in recruiting substantial numbers of potential party activists from other groups that do have specific agendas (for example, Jews), both will experience some discomfort.

The party's emphasis on being a team player does not mean that there can be no debate. When the party is out of power, different factions or different candidates with different visions to sell will back their visions vigorously. Even when it is in power, not all issues are decided by the president and his staff. But he and other party leaders have the power to decide them if he chooses. This has been clearly evident in the three Congresses with which Reagan has dealt, even though legislators are not as compliant in their public official roles as they are in their party roles. Not all issues have required party line votes. But on those for which Reagan has asked for support, it has been remarkably uniform. In December 1985 Reagan initially lost the vote on his tax reform bill due to Republican defections,[39] but he was able to turn that around within one week. Minority

[38] Pressman, "Groups and Group Caucuses," 680.

[39] According to the *New York Times* this was because House Republicans felt they had been taken for granted and left out of the negotiations between the White House and Democratic Ways and

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whip Trent Lott (R.–Miss.), a critic of tax reform, apologized with tears in his eyes. "Mr. President," he said emotionally, "I wouldn't hurt you."[40]

Conversely, room for disagreement in the Democratic party is not unlimited. Indeed, there are certain issues and attitudes that constitute a party line. These protected issues are ones that are important to powerful groups within the party. Once a group has been accepted as a legitimate player, it acquires a certain amount of sovereignty over a policy territory and can usually designate those issues and positions within it that are to be part of the party line. If there is disagreement within a group, or there is no recognized group representing a particular issue, a subject can be debated within the party. But otherwise a recognized group has sovereignty over issues within its territory.

This does not give a group sovereignty over issues outside its territory. For example, women's organizations would not be able to dictate the party's position on the nuclear freeze; establishing a party line on this issue would require a consensus of all concerned groups. Sometimes there are disputes between groups over territory. Disagreements between blacks and Jews over the party's positions on affirmative action and the Mideast are in this category. The argument is as much over which group has the right to determine party policy on these issues as it is over what that policy should be.

Cohesion and Commitment

Since dissent does exist in both parties, albeit to a different extent, there must also be some glue to hold them together. Obviously one source of cohesion is the desire to win, but this by itself is not sufficient to hold either party together between campaigns or after divisive primaries. Although the desire to win is mutual, the primary sources of cohesion are peculiar to each party.

Different factions of the Republican party are held together by their common ideology, but this is not what holds the party as a whole together. The fact that the party is not ideologically homogenous is a potential source of fragmentation. Instead the party is held together by social homogeneity.[41] Party activists share membership in common social strata, with common rules of behavior and a common definition of who is acceptable. These rules of behavior or acceptability create an informal language and style that is hard for outsiders to learn and thus operates as a barrier to their assimilation. Some aspects of this

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Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D. Ill.). "Not only did Reagan not ask nicely," the *Times* quoted an unidentified first-term Republican as explaining, "he didn't ask at all, and I really resented that." *New York Times*, 22 December 1985.

[40] *Newsweek*, 30 December 1985, 16.

[41] Analyses of convention delegates and party officials have shown that the Republican party elite is heavily white, Protestant, and of English or northern European stock. See Charles W. Wiggins and William L. Turk, "State Party Chairman: A Profile," *Western Political Quarterly* 23 (1970): 332; Jeane Kirkpatrick, *The New Presidential Elite: Men and Women in National Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1976), chap. 3.

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homogeneity are easily visible. A crowd of traditional Republicans can be identified by their common dress and their unspoken understanding that someone who dresses differently is not one of them. A crowd of Democrats cannot be identified by a common appearance; indeed they are so diverse that a few Republicans in their midst would not even be noticed.[42]

While Republicans have much in common, their style and the rules of social acceptability vary somewhat by geography. An "Eastern Establishment" Republican is not the same as a "Midwestern Mainstreet" or "Western conservative" Republican. Thus an active Republican in one part of the country who relocates can have trouble being accepted as an active Republican in another, as illustrated by George Bush's constant battle to be viewed as a Texan rather than a scion of Connecticut.

Similarly, entire groups seeking to become Republican activists who do not share the common style find acceptance difficult because their presence threatens the social homogeneity that holds the party together. A frequent reaction by traditional Republicans to the New Right supporters of Reagan is to assert that they are "not real Republicans" and thus do not deserve to exercise power within the party. This claim was first made at the 1976 convention. When Reagan delegates dominated the 1980 convention it was muted, but still there. Reagan's political success curbed the expression of this sentiment, but not its existence. The 1984 convention saw many traditional Republicans present as Reagan delegates, but in eight years their opinion of the newcomers there with them had not really changed. One reporter described the women delegates as coming "in two main flavors: Ultrasuede and polyester."

> The Ultrasuedes . . . look down on the polyesters. . . . Some Ultrasuedes are feeling outnumbered by the polyesters this year as though their party has been taken over by people they would never allow to join the country club. Not the right sort. . . . As though someone had let some tacky girls into a Kappa chapter.
>
> I guess it is a simple class distinction, but along with having more money, the Ultrasuedes tend to be more sophisticated and also more liberal on social issues than the polyesters. They are frankly embarrassed, if not mortified, by the party's Jerry Falwell connection, but only in a social sense.[43]

Democrats would not seriously accuse someone of not being a real Democrat, because a Democrat is anyone who claims to be one. Mondale tried it during the 1984 primary in an attack on Hart, but reaction to this charge was so negative it was quickly dropped. As a party with neither a common ideology nor a

[42] Despite this proclivity for sartorial conformity, Republican convention delegations show much more originality and creativity than Democrats when indulging in the personal expressionism that the convention atmosphere permits. Delegates to both conventions often wear costumes and/or hats decorated with political paraphernalia. Those worn by Republican delegates are considerably more numerous and picturesque.

[43] Molly Ivins, "The Fabrics that Define Republican Women," *Dallas Times Herald*, 27 August 1984.

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common social base, there is no real basis for erecting standards. Indeed, an essential characteristic of the Democratic party is its heterogeneity.

The greater sense of boundaries that Republicans have, of knowing who's acceptable and who's not, serves an important social function. It facilitates trust. People normally trust those who are like them to think like them and do what they would do. People understand others who are like themselves. Organizations or communities whose members trust each other function more smoothly and take direction more willingly than those where trust is more limited. Republicans trust their party and their leaders to do what they think is right more than Democrats do, because they are socially homogenous.

Heterogeneity facilitates misunderstanding. People with different backgrounds, different values, different styles, and different modes of expression interpret the world differently and often misinterpret each other. A great deal of communication, clarification, and reassurance is necessary to maintain working relationships among diverse allies. In a highly heterogeneous organization people with one group identity are reluctant to trust those with another to act as their leaders or adequately represent their interests. Instead they demand consultation, representation, and participation. The heterogenous nature of the Democratic party requires that time and energy be devoted to intraparty relationships and that identifiable groups feel they have as much say as they want.

The glue that holds the Democratic Party together is pluralism. The fundamental principles of pluralist theory were spelled out by James Madison in *Federalist No. 10*. He argued that a large and diverse republic would best check majority passions and "factious combinations." Although Madison was more concerned with curbing power than with creating unity, diversity is the secret to cohesion under certain conditions. These conditions occur when individuals are members of many groups, no combination of which encompasses all of their members' primary interests. When there are many cross-cutting memberships, each of which have a claim on individual loyalties, the urge to put one issue or group ahead of all others at any cost is restrained. Face-to-face discussions and the need to ally with different people in one group or on one issue tempers the tendency to view people as "enemies" because there is disagreement.

The caucus structure of the Democratic party facilitates pluralism. A delegate to the conventions will attend numerous state caucuses, candidate caucuses, and often one or more group caucuses. The three biennial miniconventions increased the opportunities for these kinds of contacts.[44] The opportunity to both listen to and talk with different people from different parts of the country, who are members of different groups, increases awareness and understanding of diverse positions. The need to work with other people to achieve common goals increases receptivity to their particular concerns. Some political commentators have often marveled that a party so fractious, heterogeneous, and seemingly dis-

[44] It was abolished by the DNC Executive Committee in May 1985. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 June 1985, 1287.

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organized can remain intact. As long as a particular group does not become insular, with its members having no participation in or concern for other caucuses, the diversity of the Democratic party is its strength, not its weakness.

Does Difference Make Any Difference?

This article has argued that there are significant differences in the political culture of the major political parties—differences that manifest themselves in different organizations, styles, attitudes, and approaches. These differences have been commented on only in passing by students of political parties. Instead, the literature has viewed the parties as possessing the common goal of putting together a winning coalition by being "all things to all people."[45] There has been an implicit assumption, untested by field studies, that this common goal requires similar political strategies by similar political organizations. Although it has never been explicitly stated, the model behind this assumption appears to be the Democratic party, because the descriptions in the literature of how a political party operates "fit" the Democratic party. Until the Republican party scored significant successes in the 1980 elections, it was assumed to be merely a pale imitation of the majority party, striving unsuccessfully to put together a winning coalition. Since then, there has been a tendency to view the operating style and approaches of the Republican party as "the party of the future."[46]

I would argue that the Republican party is *not* a poor imitation of a normal coalition-building party, but a different type of political organization that does things in different ways. The differences in its political culture have put the Republican party at a disadvantage in its competition with the Democratic party for most of the New Deal era. However, the roads to political success have been changing rather rapidly in the last fifteen years, and the new roads are ones that the Republican party is well equipped to travel. Thus, their strategies are now becoming the new model, which is not necessarily an appropriate one for the Democratic party. Before asking what these changes portend for either party, let us first look at how the political cultures of the parties have molded their responses to the pressures of the last two decades.

Nationalization

For several years political scientists have been bemoaning the decline of political parties and trying to analyze why this has occurred.[47] A few years ago some

[45] Ladd and Hadley, *Transformations*, 305.

[46] Kayden, "Nationalizing of the Party System," 263; Larry Sabato "Parties, PACs, and Independent Groups," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The American Elections of 1982* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 73–74.

[47] The better known analyses include Burnham, *Critical Elections*; Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Dismantling the Parties: Reflections on Party Reform and Party Decomposition* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); William J. Crotty and Gary C. Jacobson, *American Parties in Decline* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).

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began to notice that while parties were supposedly declining, the national party committees were asserting more control over state and local parties both by changing the structure of the party and by increasing the services the national committees have to offer candidates and party organizations.[48] Indeed, the most recent work argues that even state and local party organizations are no weaker, and are possibly stronger, than they used to be.[49] It now appears that the fabled and much-analyzed party decline is restricted to party identification of the electorate. Both parties have been strengthening their national organizations in the last ten years, and neither has completed this task. But they have gone about it very differently.

The Republican party has drawn upon modern technology to create a highly sophisticated direct mail operation and uses the money raised to implement candidate recruitment and training programs and provide resources to campaigns. It also channels money and staff to the state party organizations to develop voter registration efforts, a solid financial base, and a permanent staff. However the money is not given away. The RNC analyzes what local party projects can best meet its long-term goals and restricts its largesse to those. Its resources have enabled the RNC to build up the state parties and solidify their loyalty, while the Democrats are still wrestling with a collection of independent and diverse entities.[50]

The Democratic party's drive toward nationalization has focused inwardly. Although it has developed some support programs for local parties and candidates, much of its energy and money has gone into reform commissions to rewrite the party rules, compliance review commissions to implement them, and midterm conferences (abolished in May of 1985) to facilitate internal debate.

The different approach by the Democrats to pressures for nationalization was partially a consequence of being the majority party and of having fewer financial resources than did the Republicans. But it also reflected the party's different political culture. This difference was summarized by DNC Chair John R. White when he told one interviewer that "politics is an emotional experience" and campaigns are not merely a matter of polls and organization. "Timing is the most important thing in politics. Everything else is just a tool to get a wave going or to catch the wave."[51]

[48] Kayden, "Nationalizing of the Party System"; Cotter and Bibby, "Institutional Development"; Austin Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1975).

[49] Cornelius P. Cotter, James L. Gibson, John F. Bibby and Robert J. Huckshorn, *Party Organizations in American Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

[50] Sabato, "Parties, PACs, and Independent Groups," 73–82; David Adamany, "Political Parties in the 1980s," in Michael J. Malbin, ed., *Money and Politics in the United States* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984), 78–85; Gary D. Wekkin, "The New Federal Party Organizations: Intergovernmental Consequences of Party Renewal," paper given at the 1985 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[51] Adamany, "Political Parties," 87–88.

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Professionalization

Despite its laissez-faire ideology, the Republican party has much more central control than the Democratic party has ever contemplated. A spin-off of its efforts has been the creation of a community of professional political managers who rotate among state party staff positions, national party staff positions, campaigns, and other political jobs. People in this community generally know each other and rely on their mutual connections through the national party to promote their careers. They have developed a cosmopolitan attitude and a loyalty to the national Republican party greater than to any state organization. This in turn makes those in this community who are in state staff jobs more amenable to national party direction. As this community becomes self-sustaining, the strings the national party attaches to its state aid become less important, because the state staffs in effect become agents of the national party.

Although the Democrats also have many professional political organizers, they aren't part of a self-identified community and don't look to national party networks for job assistance. Each state has its own cadre of political activists, and there is very little exchange between them except during presidential campaigns, which are separate from party work. Campaign and party work is less likely to be a career than an occasional diversion. Those for whom it is a career often work their way up to a position in Washington, but once no longer employed by a national party or campaign organization, return to their own states, obtain jobs in Congress, or occasionally become political consultants or political directors of interest groups. The consequence is a more parochial attitude in which staffs are the agents of their employers and not the national party.

Renewal

In order to survive and flourish, both parties must constantly renew themselves. They must recruit new supporters while retaining the loyalty of old ones. In the last few decades the political landscape has changed considerably. New groups, who identify their interests by their common demographic characteristics, have organized. The influence of older ones has altered. Federal campaign laws have made it relatively easier for national party committees to raise and spend money and harder for local ones to do so.[52] Mass media bring the message of parties and candidates directly to the voters and organized interest groups bring the message of the voters to public officials. Technological developments have altered the kinds of political expertise necessary to win elections.[53]

The Democratic and Republican parties have different recruiting styles. The Democratic party has always co-opted groups. Theodore H. White wrote of the prereform party that "the old power brokers understood what gave the

[52] Jo Freeman, "Political Party Expenditures Under the Federal Election Campaign Act: anomalies and unfinished business," *Pace Law Review* 4 (Winter 1984): 267.

[53] Kayden, "Nationalizing of the Party System," 265–67.

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Democratic party its unique power—its ability to absorb new groups."[54] This understanding had not changed by the time John R. White became chair during the Carter administration. He too felt that a primary purpose of the Democratic party was to "absorb new movements" and bring people into the party.

> That is why the Democrats continue to be the majority party. The Democrats spent money for ERA and to develop women's issues. The women's equality issue is the new issue which brings people, men and women, into the Democratic party. This is like civil rights was in the 1950s. The party needs to be continually reborn by bringing new people in.[55]

Republicans seek to recruit new people on a one-to-one basis, rather than through groups, and primarily by the force of ideas, rather than by supporting programs with specific benefits. At the end of his book on the 1972 campaign, White recounts an interview with President Nixon in which he said he "wasn't putting groups together in a coalition the way Roosevelt had—he was trying to cut across groups, binding people in every group who had the same ideas."[56] Current RNC chair Frank Fahrenkopf has expressed similar sentiments. "[W]here we seek to build coalitions, we build them on a commonality of interests which is greater than a belief in special benefits legislated for special interests. Whether we talk to white collar workers, Blacks, Hispanics, bank presidents, spot welders or astronauts . . . we concentrate on points in common rather than *why* they, as a distinct group, should feel different and in need of different treatment."[57]

These different recruiting styles have both advantages and disadvantages in the shifting political sands. The Democratic strategy of recruiting groups is advantageous when there are identifiable groups to recruit whose members have specific interests and can be mobilized by their leaders. Such groups have been growing on the national level, though their ability to mobilize their members for campaign work and to influence their vote has yet to be established.

The Republican strategy for renewal is more expensive but less problematical. As students of social movements know, individual recruiting is more costly than bloc recruiting. The latter can utilize pre-existing networks of like-minded people, who reinforce each others' changing beliefs. Individual recruiting requires a heavy expenditure of time and energy both to get and keep each recruit. Most incipient social movements don't have the resources to do this, but the Republican party does. It has invested a great deal of money in developing mailing lists of potential contributors of money and votes. However, impersonal recruitment is most effective when what is wanted is not actual participation but superficial indexes of support such as money and voting. That is currently what the party wants from its followers. As long as the party can recruit and market attractive candidates, it should increase its base.

[54] White, *Making of the President—1972*, 158.
[55] Quoted in Adamany, "Political Parties," 88.
[56] White, *Making of the President—1972*, chap. 12.
[57] Fahrenkopf, "Campaign 84," 174.

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However, the Republican party will face problems should its new recruits want to do more than just contribute money and votes. The social homogeneity of the party's primary base has served as a barrier to full participation by people from other social strata. The we/they attitude of traditional Republicans toward the New Right reflects a tension in the party that may seriously divide it in 1988. Since social homogeneity is the basis for cohesion, it is extremely difficult for the party to absorb a large group of newcomers sufficiently different from the traditional party activists without threatening homogeneity. The newcomers in turn pick up this hostility and reflect it back. The Republican party by and large is not receptive to new groups. It may work with them, albeit uncomfortably, and it may even assimilate them. But the price of assimilation is similarity, and that is hard to achieve.

Should the Republican party strengthen itself to the point of becoming the majority party it will attract many newcomers, including organized groups who have not previously thought it worth their time to join. It will discover that the price of success is that everyone wants a share, even when they have not made a contribution. Coping with increased demands, rapid expansion, and inadequate assimilation has destroyed many developing organizations. Styles and approaches to problems that are compatible with being a minority faction or underdog are not appropriate to being a majority party. Whether the party can anticipate and prepare for these problems sufficiently to preclude them, remains to be seen.

As the majority party the Democrats face different prospects. The reformation of the coalition from one of independent state and local parties, each with its own ethnic balance, to a national coalition of constituency groups has created constant turmoil and diverted resources from technological modernization. Furthermore, party activists who do not clearly fit into one of those groups feel left out.

Both parties, and the political scientists who study them, should reconsider the assumption that there is only one route to political success, and the party that loses an election must adopt the other as a model to follow in the future. Each party, for reasons peculiar to its own tradition and the social base from which it draws, has a different organizational style uniquely adapted to its particular circumstances. While each party must bend with the political winds, particularly in times of rapid change, an attempt to deny their differences will deprive them of the opportunity to recognize and build upon their strengths.*

* The author would especially like to thank Aaron Wildavsky and James Reichley for their assistance and encouragement in the preparation of this paper and the Brookings Institution and the Brooklyn Public Library for use of their facilities. In addition, thanks are extended to the following people for useful comments made on an earlier draft of this manuscript: David Reisman, Mark Cohen, Carol Koch, Norma Zane Chaplain.

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Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

The Camp David Accords, signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on 17 September 1978, were a significant turning point in recent Middle East history. Praised by some for laying the foundations for peace between Egypt and Israel, the accords have also been criticized for failing to achieve a comprehensive settlement, including a resolution of the Palestinian question. But supporters and critics alike recognize the importance of what happened at Camp David, and both groups acknowledge the vital role played by the United States in reaching an agreement.

As time passes it becomes easier to assess the legacy of Camp David, though no final verdict can be rendered. For example, the essence of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel has been respected by both sides, but the full promise of peace and normal relations has not been achieved. A cold peace best describes Egyptian-Israeli relations in the mid-1980s, and some still fear that a resumption of a cold war cannot be precluded.

It is also clear that Camp David had a profound effect on inter-Arab relations, resulting in strains between Cairo and many Arab capitals. But Egypt cannot be isolated from the mainstream of Arab politics for long, and by the mid-1980s Egypt had resumed diplomatic relations with some Arab countries and had expanded its informal ties with others, without having to renounce the peace with Israel.

With hindsight, one can also see that the Camp David Accords were successful

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only in resolving the bilateral dispute between Egypt and Israel, and even there some minor problems remained unsettled. The elaborate formula for addressing the Palestinian question through the establishment of an autonomous regime for the West Bank and Gaza has remained a dead letter, even though the general principle of establishing transitional arrangements that would allow Palestinians to join in negotiating a final agreement with Israel has been widely accepted.

At the time of Camp David it was generally believed that Egypt was the key to war and peace in the Middle East. If Egypt chose peace, other Arab states would eventually follow. If they did not, at least there would be no further wars. But the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 showed the limits of the slogan of "no more wars" that had grown out of Anwar Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977.

Furthermore, the three main architects of the Camp David Accords, Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, and Jimmy Carter, all became disillusioned by some of the events that took place after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Sadat was frustrated by the lack of progress in carrying out the provisions of Camp David concerning the Palestinians. He also confronted staggering domestic problems for which peace was supposed to have been a solvent. On 6 October 1981, while commemorating the 1973 war with Israel, Sadat was gunned down by Islamic extremists. Among their many charges against him were the Camp David Accords. Sadat's successor was considerably less enthusiastic about peace with Israel.

Menachem Begin had every reason to believe in 1981 that his vision of a powerful Israel, in permanent control of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, would be the historical legacy of Camp David. But the Lebanon war of 1982 created great controversy within Israel and raised questions about Begin's leaderhsip and his dream. The casualties were high, and the effect on the fragile economy was devastating. Political cleavages deepened. Begin's health was poor; his wife, and lifetime companion, died; and in late 1983 Begin announced that he felt obliged to relinquish the office of prime minister.

The once proud and feisty Israeli leader, who had fought for every word of the Camp David Accords as if his country's survival depended upon it, retreated into seclusion, making no effort even to ensure the victory of his party in the 1984 elections. In the end the Labor party returned to power on a platform that rejected much of what Begin had fought so hard to achieve. Although Prime Minister Shimon Peres presided over an awkward coalition that included many Begin supporters from the Likud bloc, clearly Labor, if able to rule without Likud, would be willing to cede control over some of the West Bank in return for peace with Jordan.

Jimmy Carter's fate was less dramatic than that of the other two Camp David protagonists. Carter received wide praise for his achievement in promoting peace between Egypt and Israel.[1] Even his harshest domestic critics gave him high

[1] A *New York Times* poll conducted in February 1985 found that the Camp David peace negotiations were viewed as the most successful American foreign policy initiative in recent years. Both

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marks for Camp David, and history will probably remember his role in promoting peace between Israel and Egypt as his finest achievement. But this apparent success was not enough to ensure his reelection in 1980, nor was it sufficient to maintain a strong bipartisan commitment to the Camp David Accords. By the mid-1980s few Americans seemed to feel that a solution to the Palestinian problem was either possible or necessary, and few showed concern that the Egyptian-Israeli peace might unravel.

American indifference to the Middle East may not, of course, mean that progress toward peace in the region is impossible. It may be that Israel and its Arab neighbors can reach agreements without help from the United States. Indeed, this would be a welcome development in Washington. But the experience of Camp David provides little evidence that the American role can be diminished without jeopardizing the prospects for future negotiations.

Looking at the Camp David record, some have argued that by 1977 Egypt and Israel were well on their way to making peace without the assistance of the United States. They cite as evidence secret meetings between Egyptians and Israelis that the Americans did not participate in and supposedly knew nothing about. And they also point out that both parties periodically ignored American advice.

Others maintain, however, that peace between Egypt and Israel was only possible because of the role played by the United States. Of the four agreements negotiated between Egypt and Israel from 1974 to 1979, each involved intense participation by the United States at the highest levels. No formal agreements were reached in this period or subsequently through any other means.

Neither of these perspectives is adequate. Successful Arab-Israeli negotiations clearly require more than an act of American will. Certain preconditions are needed, especially a predisposition on the part of the Middle East parties to settle their differences through negotiations. At the same time there apparently needs to be an intermediary between Israel and its neighbors to help overcome deep distrust and historically rooted antagonism. And the United States, with its vast economic and military resources, can help to change the calculus of benefit and risk for the parties to the conflict by making bilateral commitments to them.

For Egypt and Israel, it is fair to say that peace was possible, but not inevitable, after the October 1973 war. Each party saw merit in resolving the dispute through negotiations under American auspices. But the two sides still had fundamentally different approaches to peace. Left to themselves, they would probably not have found their way to agreement.

The U.S. role became crucial because both Egypt and Israel wanted American involvement and hoped to win Washington to their point of view. Neither wanted

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Democrats and Republicans gave Camp David a high rating. See Adam Clymer, "Camp David at Top in U.S. Policy Poll," *New York Times*, 1 April 1985.

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the United States to be an entirely neutral intermediary. Neither expected the Americans to content themselves with the role of postman. Both hoped that the United States would advocate their views in their adversary's capital and would be generous in rewarding any of their concessions made in the course of negotiations. This expectation gave the United States considerable influence, but Washington was never in a position to impose terms of settlement on either Egypt or Israel.

In the course of the negotiations that led first to the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and then to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979, the United States did not resort to heavy-handed pressure on either side. Threats were rarely uttered. On most issues the United States did not have clear preferences. Whatever the parties could agree on would generally be acceptable to Washington. But the Americans did have judgments about what might be acceptable to each side, what tradeoffs were possible, and what the reactions of other regional parties might be. As a result, the Americans were not shy about putting forward ideas of their own, though they were rarely wedded to them as matters of principle.

The Camp David negotiations involved the president and his secretary of state, Cyrus R. Vance, to an almost unprecedented degree. The closest comparison was former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in 1974–75, also in pursuit of a Middle East accord. Why the Americans were prepared to devote so much time and energy to this issue is still something of a mystery, but the memories of the October 1973 war, the threats of Soviet intervention, and the oil price shock of that year were still vivid in 1977. Although Carter did not have to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict as an actual crisis, he was aware it could quickly become one.

The United States found itself in an unusual role as a broker for an Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Only on rare occasions was Carter called on to commit the United States to a specific course of action. Mostly he was trying to urge two very strong-minded men, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, to make commitments to each other. To this end, Carter found himself in the role of psychotherapist, gently trying to explain to each man the problems of the other in the hope of overcoming fears and distrust. He also acted as messenger, conveying positions and impressions back and forth. On other occasions he was more the arbitrator, pressing for agreement along lines that he had determined were fair. In the end Carter tried to persuade Sadat and Begin, and through them their respective political systems, to reach a peace agreement.

All the while Carter had to pay heed to the effect his Middle East diplomacy was having on his own political position. Perhaps more than any other foreign policy issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict can take its toll on the standing of a president. Domestic politics quickly becomes intertwined with strategic analysis. Presidents rarely tackle Middle East issues with much enthusiasm, knowing they will invariably be controversial, and often intractable as well.

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Carter and the Legacy of Camp David

Jimmy Carter was unique among American presidents in the depth of his concern to find a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. More than any other foreign policy issue, the Middle East occupied his time and energies. At the beginning of his administration, he knew little about the intricacies of the problem. But he felt the challenge of tackling an issue that had eluded solutions in the past. And he no doubt felt that American interests would be well served if peace could be brought to the Middle East.

As time went on, Carter came to know many of the leaders in the Middle East, and he turned his extraordinary capacity for mastering detail to the negotiations between Egypt and Israel. He pored over maps of Sinai to identify lines for the interim withdrawal. He personally drafted the first version of the Egyptian-Israeli framework agreement at Camp David. And twice he put his political reputation on the line by engaging in summit negotiations that could easily have failed.

In the end, Carter was able to preside over the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, perhaps the most noteworthy foreign policy achievement of his administration. Yet he gained little in domestic political terms for these efforts, and some would argue that he even weakened his political base.

It does nothing to diminish Carter's achievement in the Middle East to acknowledge that he built on firm foundations laid by Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and especially the remarkable diplomatic efforts of Henry Kissinger in brokering three Arab-Israeli agreements during 1974–75. Carter was also ably served by his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, who deserves much of the credit for patiently shaping the Camp David Accords and the text of the peace treaty.

Carter's initiatives would have come to naught had the leaders of Egypt and Israel been unwilling to accept American mediation and to make peace between their two countries. At no point did Carter forcefully impose American views on either side, though often he was able to change the positions of either Prime Minister Begin or President Sadat, especially Sadat. American leadership was certainly a necessary condition for the success of the negotiations, but it was not sufficient. The parties to the conflict had to be ready for agreement.

Unfortunately, in the course of working for the Egyptian-Israeli peace, the negotiators lost the objective of a broader Middle East settlement. Lebanon, for example, slid even more deeply into conflict after Camp David, culminating in the Israeli invasion of 1982. Many observers, including Egyptians, have argued that the war in Lebanon would never have happened on the scale it did if Egypt and Israel had not been at peace. The assault on Lebanon, after all, was "war of choice" for Israel, and it would probably not have launched such an operation if it had still been obliged to keep a good part of its army on the Egyptian front. The Israelis were so confident that the treaty with Egypt would hold that they

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never fully mobilized for the war in Lebanon. All this suggests that many Lebanese and Palestinians, as well as many Israelis, may have paid a high price for the peace between Egypt and Israel.

Lebanon, however, was never the central concern of the Camp David negotiations. The Palestinian question was. And on that score the record shows that Camp David did little to bring about a settlement. Camp David alone cannot be blamed for the lack of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The intractability of the conflict is such that no formula has been found to bring the parties toward mutual recognition and some reconciliation of their competing national claims. Nonetheless, Carter's efforts to resolve the Palestinian problem were stymied by more than the intrinsic complexity of the issues and the unwillingness of the parties to talk directly with one another.

Carter dealt extensively with Sadat and Begin and often took their advice on how to address the Palestinian issue. Carter's reliance on the views of his Camp David partners no doubt led to many misperceptions, such as his belief that King Hussein would eventually join the Camp David process. Carter had a hard time understanding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in its full complexity, in part because he had few opportunities to talk with Palestinians or with Israelis who did not share the views of Begin and his colleagues on how the conflict should be resolved. Not until he visited the West Bank as a private citizen in 1983 did Carter become aware of many of the realities of the situation.[2]

Besides understanding the Palestinian issue less well than the Egyptian-Israeli dispute, Carter also found that the constraints of the American political system came into play whenever he tried to deal with the Palestinian question. Even to refer to Palestinian rights or to a Palestinian homeland could set off shock waves within the American Jewish community. These would be instantly felt in Congress and relayed back to the White House. Before long Carter learned to say less in public, thereby giving the impression that he was backing down under domestic pressure.

Finally, when Carter turned his attention from the Middle East after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, both Arabs and Israelis knew that American attitudes and priorities had changed. However talented his special negotiators might have been, they had little chance of succeeding once Carter no longer seemed to be personally involved in the negotiations.

Camp David and the Palestinian Question

Throughout the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations, Sadat maintained he needed to demonstrate that he had achieved something for the Palestinians. He repeatedly said he was not prepared for a "separate peace." What he wanted from Begin was a simple statement that Israel was willing to return Arab territory captured in the 1967 war in exchange for peace, recognition, and security from the

[2] See Jimmy Carter, *The Blood of Abraham* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 115–29. See also his interview with Helena Cobban, *At-Tadamoun* (in Arabic), 29 June–5 July 1985, 9–14.

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Arabs. Also, he hoped for some form of commitment from Israel to Palestinian rights, including the right of self-determination. This commitment, of course, Begin would not give.

Because of Begin's refusal to give Sadat the cover he wanted, the Americans became involved in the much more cumbersome exercise of trying to blend elements of the Israeli proposal for self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza with Sadat's desire for a set of general principles to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. The result was an elaborate agreement at Camp David on three stages of negotiations. First Egypt would launch the process by reaching agreement with Israel on a transitional period. Then Jordan would be invited to join the talks, and toward the end of the transitional period the Palestinians would also be included in the negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

In retrospect, it is clear that Sadat and Carter both overestimated the role that Egypt could play in laying the groundwork for a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian issue. Both misread the attitudes of King Hussein and the Palestinian leaders. Both misjudged the part that the Saudis might be willing to take in the negotiations. Neither took Syria sufficiently into account.

Even with these errors, it might have been possible to carry out the provisions of the Camp David Accords if the idea of self-government for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza could have been given real content. For example, if Carter had succeeded in getting Begin's agreement to a freeze on settlement activity; if the self-governing authority had been given control over land and water resources; if genuinely free elections, including the right to vote for Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, had been promised; and if the military occupation authority had been abolished, then it might have been possible to attract Palestinians into the negotiating process.

But none of these measures proved feasible while Begin was prime minister, and thus the concept of autonomy was devalued in the eyes of those who were most crucial in determining its viability. When Begin refused to budge on these matters, neither Sadat nor Carter could find a way to persuade him to change his mind.

Carter was slow to recognize the depth of Begin's attachment to the West Bank and Gaza.[3] He was also slow to understand the linkage issue.[4] Once Egypt and

[3] In an interview with me on 22 May 1985, Carter referred to the cyclical nature of his relationship with Begin. On some occasions Begin would take a very hard-line position, and then later would appear to have softened. In retrospect, Carter believed that Begin never changed his basic commitments, but he would sometimes give an impression of flexibility, often by simply remaining silent. Carter felt Begin did make some genuine concessions at Camp David, but ran into a "firestorm" when he returned to Israel. As a result, he pulled back from the concessions he had made. Only then did Carter begin to conclude that Begin would never budge on the Palestinian question.

[4] Carter later showed that he understood the linkage issue quite well. In *Blood of Abraham*, 45, he wrote: "From Begin's point of view, the peace agreement with Egypt was the significant act for Israel; the references to the West Bank and Palestinians were to be finessed. With the bilateral treaty, he removed Egypt's considerable strength from the military equation of the Middle East and thus gave the Israelis renewed freedom to pursue their goals of fortifying and settling the occupied territories and removing perceived threats by preemptive military strikes against some of their neighbors."

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Israel were at peace, Begin had few remaining incentives to deal constructively with the Palestinian question. Sadat did feel strongly about the need for linkage, and for many months he tried to establish some explicit connection between what would happen in bilateral Egyptian-Israeli relations and the Palestinian negotiations. But when put under pressure by Carter, in the face of Begin's intransigence, and when confronted with hostility from other Arab leaders, Sadat resigned himself to the separate agreement that he had hoped to avoid when he first set off for Jerusalem in November 1977.

Assessing Carter's Role

No one can ever be sure whether Carter could have done more to build the foundations for a broadly based Middle East peace. Hindsight opens vistas that were not so apparent at the time. Still, having participated in the negotiations and having subsequently reflected on them, I think there were avoidable mistakes made along the way.

A judgment on Camp David must begin with what Sadat and Begin, given their views and political constraints, might have been persuaded to accept. And from an American perspective once must ask how well the results served U.S. interests.

Gains for Egypt and Israel

By these standards the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty looks very good. Egypt recovered its territory and oil fields, and was able to turn some of its energies from the planning of war to the challenge of development. The minor territorial dispute over Taba, a tiny spot of Sinai that the Israelis sought to hold onto, does little to cloud the total achievement.

For Israel, too, the treaty has been valuable. On the strategic level Egypt today poses no military danger. This means that most of Israel's formidable arsenal can be aimed at deterring Syrian threats. A one-front war is a much less alarming prospect for Israel than a two-front war.

Israel has also been able to meet its oil needs by purchasing Egyptian oil, though in the soft oil markets of the mid-1980s that is only a marginal advantage, since ample supplies exist at comparable prices. Elsewhere on the economic side there has been little exchange between the two countries. This lack, as well as the paucity of contact at the human level and the cool state of diplomatic relations, has disappointed many Israelis who had hoped for a warm peace with Egypt. Still, few Israelis would choose to return to a belligerent relationship with Egypt.

U.S. Interests

From the U.S. perspective, peace between Egypt and Israel has been a major

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achievement. The relations of the United States with both countries have expanded. Compared with the ten years from 1965 to 1975, when U.S. interests suffered from Arab-Israeli tensions and the attendant superpower rivalry, the subsequent ten years, during which Egypt and Israel have been involved in negotiations or formally at peace, have been considerably better for Americans in the Middle East.

But the question still arises of how durable the Egyptian-Israeli treaty will prove to be and whether even more might have been achieved. And that in turn raises the question whether Jordan and the Palestinians might have been brought into the Camp David process as Carter had originally hoped. Few would question that a broader peace, especially one that included the Palestinians, would have been an important buttress for a lasting Egyptian-Israeli peace.

Many would say that nothing more could have been done to open the way for accommodation between Israel and its neighbors to the east. After all, Begin was adamant about never yielding the West Bank and East Jerusalem to anyone under any circumstances. And he had the Israeli cabinet and Knesset fully behind him. As for Sadat, with the best will in the world he could not speak for the Palestinians or make binding commitments on their behalf. He was a staunch advocate of general principles in a situation in which details mattered mightily to the Israelis—and to the Palestinians.

Finally, Carter was also unable to do much for the peace process after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. He felt obliged to turn his attention to other unfinished business, and in 1980 the hostage crisis in Iran closed in on him, and he lost his bid for reelection. Carter almost certainly had hoped to work on the Palestinian question in a second term, but he never had the chance.

Avoidable Mistakes

Despite these sobering realities, some significant mistakes could have been avoided and a serious bid for Jordanian and Palestinian involvement in the peace process might have been made in 1978. Their rejection of Camp David had not been immediate, total, or inevitable.

To have improved the prospects for a broader peace, Carter and his aides would have needed to keep their eyes carefully on the political clock. If real headway was to be made, especially after the false starts of 1977 (many of them instructive but politically costly), it had to take place in 1978, the sooner the better. Presidents simply run out of time if they get well into their third year without a big head of steam behind their foreign policy initiatives.

Carter wasted several precious months in 1978, one could argue, with the arms package for Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt. Although he won the fight in Congress, it was a costly and time-consuming battle. The Saudis could have been told in early 1978 that their request was being placed on hold, along with those of Egypt and Israel, until the United States had achieved a breakthrough in the peace negotiations. In retrospect, there is no reason to believe the Saudis would

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have reacted strongly to such news. And in any event, the sale did not result in their active support for Camp David, nor could it have been expected to do so.

Carter also spent several more months in 1978 on a sterile exercise in diplomacy by questionnaire—which produced little more than a sense of frustration. It probably would have been more useful if Secretary Vance had made one or two trips to the Middle East in the spring of 1978 to explore with the Egyptians and Israelis various formulations for dealing with the West Bank and Gaza. Sadat was ready to work closely with the United States after February 1978, but he needed to remain in almost constant touch with Carter or Vance or he would fly off in new, and often unproductive, directions.

Once Carter had Sadat and Begin with him at Camp David, he should have aimed for a simpler, cleaner document on the issues of the West Bank and Gaza. By following Begin into endless legalistic formulations, Carter and Sadat lost sight of the intended audience, the Palestinians and the Jordanians. For them the details did not disguise the fact that the Camp David Accords avoided all reference to eventual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, self-determination, or a freeze on settlements. Instead, the details made it seem as if everything had already been worked out before Jordan and the Palestinians were even invited to join the negotiations. A more general and open-ended set of formulations, followed by serious consultations by Carter and Sadat with King Hussein and with Palestinian leaders, might have had a better chance of success.

No doubt Begin would have resisted any clear-cut statement on Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and self-determination for the Palestinians. But the Americans might have been able to convince Begin to agree that negotiations over the future of the West Bank and Gaza would take place as soon as possible among Israel, Jordan, and representatives of the Palestinians, the only precondition being an acceptance of all the principles of UN Resolution 242 and respect for the rights of all the other parties to the negotiations.

Having little more than a formula of this sort, Egypt and Israel, with help from the United States, could have undertaken to develop guidelines for a transitional period for the West Bank and Gaza. The key elements could have been to end the Israeli military government; to hold elections for a Palestinian self-governing authority whose initial powers and responsibilities would be generally defined; and to get an Israeli agreement not to build more settlements in the West Bank and Gaza during the period set for completing negotiations between Egypt and Israel to establish the Palestinian self-government, namely one year from the time of signing the agreement.

None of these elements would have been out of the question for Begin. He would have continued to interpret UN Resolution 242 as he always did, but Carter, Sadat, and perhaps eventually Begin's successor could have upheld the conventional interpretation of "territory for peace" on all fronts. Begin would have been reluctant to agree to a freeze on settlements, but he had already accepted a de facto freeze for most of 1978, and it would not have been a great hardship for him to accept a freeze for one more year. In his Saturday night talk

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with Carter at Camp David, Begin saw his choices as a permanent freeze on Israeli settlements in the West Bank or a three-month freeze. No one tried to obtain a one-year freeze, tied to what became the target date for Egypt and Israel to complete negotiations for establishing the transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza. It might have been worth the effort to do so.

Begin's concern, after all, was that Jews should have the right to live anywhere in Eretz Israel, not that a given number of settlements be established each year. During the interim period, and even beyond, Israel would have been able to hold out for a continuation of some Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Even PLO leaders seemed to understand that it was impossible to insist on all Jews leaving the West Bank and Gaza.[5]

Had such a set of guidelines been included in the Camp David Accords, and had Carter and Sadat both made a serious effort to win Jordanian and Palestinian support, a broader peace process might have been launched. But it must be recognized that in 1978 Jordan and the PLO were not on good terms and that Syria would have been strongly opposed to the entire process. So the alternative approach described here would have been a gamble. Still, the odds would have been less daunting than they were for the actual Camp David Accords.

Developments Since Camp David

Since the signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978, much has happened to change the prospects for eventual accommodation between Israel and the Palestinians. Some trends lead to the pessimistic conclusion that a negotiated settlement is impossible. Others suggest that a slim opportunity still exists.

By 1985 all the architects of the Camp David Accords had passed from the scene. Israel was governed by a coalition led by Shimon Peres, a man who had spoken openly of the possibility of a "territorial compromise" that would return at least some of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordanian-Palestinian authority.[6] His coalition partners, however, included the Likud, whose leaders were still wedded to the idea that Judea and Samaria must remain permanently under Israeli control.

Egypt, too, had changed leaders, and President Hosni Mubarak made it clear

[5] See Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 18, where she quotes Khalid al-Hassan of Fatah as saying that some Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza could remain after Palestinians established their authority.

[6] The prospects for "territorial compromise" were clouded by the fact that by 1985 some 40,000 Israelis lived in settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, over 80,000 lived in what had been Arab Jerusalem before 1967. See Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1984); and Usamah Halabi, Aron Turner, and Meron Benvenisti, "Land Alienation in the West Bank: A Legal and Spatial Analysis," (Jerusalem: The West Bank Data Base Project, April 1985).

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that he had no desire to negotiate an autonomy agreement for the West Bank and Gaza with Israel. Instead, he favored bringing Jordan and the Palestinians directly into a dialogue with the United States and eventually with Israel. Egypt was prepared to assume the part of impresario, but preferred not to be at center stage when the play began.

Somewhat ironically, those who shunned Camp David in 1978 were still in positions of authority in the mid-1980s. King Hussein, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad were all part of the diplomatic scene and remained as opposed as ever to Camp David. Jordan and the Palestinians, however, had moved closer to agreement on the idea of a joint role in any future negotiations, and both favored an eventual confederation of Jordan and a Palestinian state. But any negotiations would have to be based on the principle of "territory for peace," not autonomy.

Syria, with a major political victory to its credit in Lebanon in 1983–84, was determined to block any negotiations over the Palestinian issue that did not have the prior approval of Damascus. Asad had declared Arafat persona non grata in Syria after 1984, and the PLO seemed deeply split between the factions allied to Syria and the Fatah leadership of Yasir Arafat and his colleagues. From most indications the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were largely behind Arafat in this debate, but above all were looking for someone who could help bring the Israeli occupation to an end.

American policy, too, had evolved since 1978. After the trauma of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, President Reagan made a speech on 1 September 1982, that followed the broad lines of Camp David, but with some notable additions. In his initiative Reagan emphasized the "territory for peace" formula and the need to bring Jordan and the Palestinians into the negotiating process. In subsequent clarifications Reagan implied that the transitional period of autonomy could be short, and that negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza could begin immediately. Furthermore, the president undertook to get Israeli agreement to a freeze on settlements if Jordan and the Palestinians would enter negotiations. American views on autonomy also became more precise. The U.S. position was that during the interim period autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinians should be given substantial control over land and water, and the Palestinians in East Jerusalem should be allowed to vote for the self-governing authority.

None of these developments during the Reagan administration was inconsistent with Camp David, but each had the virtue in Arab eyes of coming with a new label. Unfortunately, the creativity shown by Reagan in repackaging Camp David did not extend to figuring out how to press the peace process forward. By mid-1983 the Reagan initiative seemed to have succumbed, at least for the moment, to the mounting violence in Lebanon. During much of 1985 another round of talks took place involving the Reagan administration and Arab and Israeli leaders, but with little prospect for a breakthrough.

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CAMP DAVID: MODEL OR OBSTACLE?

Whatever one may think of the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, few would deny that they changed the course of events in the Middle East. With Israel and the largest and most powerful Arab country at peace, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue took on a fundamentally different character.

Until Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, most Arab leaders would have accepted the proposition that there could be no war or peace with Israel without Egypt. In return for their acceptance of Egypt's leadership in the conflict with Israel, other Arab countries expected Egypt not to break ranks and make a separate agreement with Israel.

The leaders of Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians feared that a separate Egyptian-Israeli accord would leave the Arab side so weak that it could never negotiate successfully with Israel, or mount a credible military threat. The prospect of such a separate deal aroused Arab anxiety when the Camp David Accords were first published. The details of the arrangements for autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza added to the concern, but it was Egypt's final defection from an Arab consensus that was most alarming.

For most Israelis, by contrast, the idea of separating Egypt from the other Arabs was a long-held objective. Without Egypt as a belligerent, Israel could manage to cope with threats from other Arab states. Some Israelis also hoped that Egypt's move toward peace would have a sobering effect on other Arab leaders, convincing them that the best course of action would be to seek their own bilateral accommodation with Israel.

Those on the American side who were most optimistic about Camp David genuinely believed it could be a model for future negotiations between Israel and its other Arab neighbors. First, Camp David proved that negotiations under American auspices could produce an agreement based on the "territory for peace" formula. Second, some thought that peace between Egypt and Israel would gradually reduce Israeli fears and security concerns, thus opening the way for more flexible positions in negotiations with other Arab parties. Third, Carter felt that moderate Arab leaders would see they had no choice but to negotiate with Israel once Egypt had concluded a peace treaty.

Given enough time, some of these assumptions might still be shown to have merit. It is still conceivable, though not likely, that negotiations between Israel and its neighbors may take place and that some elements of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement could be reflected in future peace treaties. If this were to happen, Camp David could be seen as something of a model for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. American and Egyptian officials have tended to speak of Camp David in those terms.

Other, less optimistic Americans maintained that Camp David would reduce the chances of ever achieving a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.

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With Egypt at peace, Israel would have little incentive to make further territorial concessions. Without return of territory, other Arab leaders would have no incentive to make peace with Israel.

One can also argue that Sadat set a very high standard by which other Arab negotiators will be judged. He recovered all of Sinai, with the insignificant exception of Taba. No other Arab leader is likely to be able to recover all the territory his country lost to Israel in the 1967 war. And as time goes on, the amount of territory that Israel might return as the price for peace will diminish. Since the signing of the Camp David Accords, Israel has formally annexed East Jerusalem, extended Israeli law to the Golan Heights, and increased its civilian presence in the West Bank and Gaza. None of these actions will be easy to reverse.

Nor is it easy to imagine other Arab leaders following Sadat's example of dramatically offering Israel peace and fully aligning themselves with the United States. The relatively weak positions of other Arab leaders makes such a course of action risky. In the Arab world Egypt is almost alone in being fairly immune to pressure from other Arab countries. Jordan is much more vulnerable. King Hussein must therefore be much more careful in his dealings with Israel than Sadat was.

This analysis suggests that the Camp David Accords do not provide a model that can be easily copied in future negotiations. The legacy is more complicated. By removing Egypt from the military conflict with Israel, Camp David greatly strengthened Israel's bargaining position vis-à-vis Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians. So for the foreseeable future, no Arab leader can expect to gain as much from negotiations as Sadat did. This result is precisely what Begin hoped to achieve with Camp David.

Nonetheless, to hold the Camp David Accords primarily responsible for this imbalance between Israel and the Arabs is a mistake. From 1974 on, Sadat had clearly demonstrated that he would not be bound by an Arab consensus. He was moving toward a negotiated agreement with Israel, and it was always an open question whether other Arab leaders would follow in his footsteps. Syria did follow the Egyptian lead with the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement of May 1974. But Egypt's leadership in the Arab world was on the wane.

Camp David formalized an existing reality: Egypt, under Sadat's leadership, was not prepared to sacrifice its own national interests for the sake of the other Arabs. Despite a change in style and rhetoric, Sadat's successor has continued the same policy. If one acknowledges that Egypt is unlikely to revert to the pan-Arab policies of the 1950s, and if the Egyptian-Israeli treaty holds, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians will not be able to count the weight of Egypt in the scales of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This weakens the Arab position. But does it make negotiations with Israel impossible?

The answer, it would seem, is that any future negotiations between Israel and an Arab partner will be even more difficult than those that resulted in the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. The balance of power between Israel and the other Arabs

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indicates that the outcome of negotiations with be heavily to Israel's advantage. Nonetheless, the Camp David experience holds out some hope. Negotiations do create a new political dynamic, sometimes opening avenues that are not apparent at the beginning; the American role can help to tip the balance toward a "territory for peace" outcome; and skill, an adroit sense of timing, and a strategic perspective are important, besides the more objective balance of power, in determining the outcome of negotiations. The cards one is dealt do matter, but so does the talent of the player.

In brief, from the perspective of the mid-1980s, it is too simple to label Camp David as either a model for, or an obstacle to, further Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. One can say, however, that the easiest part of the Arab-Israeli conflict was resolved with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The rest will be more difficult, perhaps impossible. If and when those negotiations are attempted, some parts of the Camp David approach will be found to be of value, while others will be irrelevant or in need of revision.

A Realistic Approach to Peace

Certain elements of both Camp David and the Reagan initiative are likely to have enduring influence on any future negotiations. For example, the idea of aiming first for an interim agreement is realistic, given the enormous gap between the parties over the possible terms of a final settlement. At the same time an interim agreement needs to be placed within a framework of some basic principles that will govern a final settlement. At a minimum, the "territory for peace" equation of UN Resolution 242 and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation will have a part in any ultimate agreement. In return, the Jordanians and Palestinians will have to accept specific security arrangements and explicit recognition of Israel.

Jordan and the Palestinians will have to assume the primary responsibility for the details of any negotiation with Israel on the future of the West Bank and Gaza. Egyptian support will help, but Egypt alone cannot go beyond articulating general principles. Somehow Syria's opposition will have to be dealt with. At the least, the Syrians should understand that the future of the Golan Heights could also be addressed in negotiations—though this does not appear to be the highest priority of the regime in Damascus. But to grant the Syrians a veto over negotiations on the Palestinian question would vastly complicate matters and lead to an impasse.

If negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation over the West Bank and Gaza are to have a chance of success, there will have to be some blending of the ideas of "territory for peace" and genuine self-government during a transitional period. Emphasis will have to be given to ending the Israeli military occupation as part of the interim agreement, while at the same time providing for legitimate Israeli security concerns. Cosmetic changes will not be

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enough to attract Palestinian support. And during both the negotiations and the interim agreement, limits must be placed on Israeli settlements.

As for the Arabs, they will have to recognize that certain objectives are not attainable. Full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines is not a realistic goal; a physical division of Jerusalem is not acceptable to any Israelis; and the dismantling of all existing settlements is not possible. In brief, Jordan and the Palestinians cannot hope to achieve as much as Egypt did. Consequently, many Arabs will feel that negotiations are a trap best avoided.

The only way to bridge the gap between the Israeli and Palestinian positions will be with creative political ideas for which no clear precedents exist. Classical concepts of sovereignty will have to be modified if there is to be a negotiated agreement. Ideas of shared authority, overlapping sovereignty, and mixed regimes will be needed. Citizens of each party will have rights and claims within the other's political systems. Borders will almost certainly have to remain open to the movement of goods and people. The key to finding solutions to these problems will lie with the Israelis, the Palestinians, and their Jordanian partners. With or without a formal agreement, they are fated to live with one another.

If most Israelis or Palestinians are opposed to a peace settlement along these lines, no outside power is likely to be effective in promoting negotiations. But if both communities are divided between "rejectionists" and "moderates," then the role of outsiders, especially the United States, could help to tip the balance one way or the other. It is for this reason that the American role is worth examining, not because the United States can design and impose a blueprint of its own.

The American Role

Can the United States still play a part in helping to solve the Palestinian conflict? Many would argue that it cannot and that a posture of benign neglect would be best for all concerned. Most Americans, in any case, do not see a clear link between their national interests and the Palestinian question. What would change if the problem was solved?

The Question of National Interests

In the past the answer to the question of how the United States would benefit from a peace agreement seemed obvious. Without progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, there would probably be another round of war between Israel and a group of Arab states. In one way or another, the wars of 1948–49, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 all grew out of the unresolved Palestinian question. The last four involved some degree of U.S.–Soviet confrontation. In each instance, moderate Arab regimes felt on the defensive and were moved to curtail their relations with Washington, if only briefly. In 1973 the Arabs used oil as a political

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weapon, as an adjunct to the war, and the economic consequences were enormous.

In the mid-1980s, however, the only Arab-Israeli war on the horizon involves Syria, and few think that a step-by-step approach to solving the Palestinian question will lessen the dangers of that war. Moreover, the oil weapon is no longer credible. And the Soviets seems to be having little success in turning the frustrations of the Palestinians to their advantage within the region. As a result, few Americans see much reason to spend time and energy on finding a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian question.

To find a compelling reason for American leadership requires a longer perspective than most American administrations seem to have. For example, one has to look at the consequences for the Egyptian-Israeli-American triangular relationship if there is no further movement toward peace. At a minimum, the Egyptian-Israeli relationship would remain cool, which would make it difficult for the United States to maintain close ties to Egypt. Among other things, Congress would see little reason to be generous to Egypt unless the promise of peace with Israel was being fulfilled. If at some point Egypt and Israel reverted to a position of belligerency, the United States would see its substantial investment in Egypt quickly dry up. At stake is not only peace in the Middle East and the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation there, but also the strategic advantages that the United States has gained from access to Egyptian territory and facilities as it seeks to protect interests elsewhere in the region.

Another concern for Americans should be the growth of political extremism in the Middle East. This phenomenon is not exclusively Shiite, though the most impressive political successes of Muslim militancy have come in Iran and Lebanon among the Shia. But in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Sunni Muslim extremists have also challenged the prevailing political order. Insofar as the current regimes appear to have failed to deliver on their promises of development, social justice, and an equitable settlement of the Palestinian question, they become vulnerable to domestic criticism. A solution to the Palestinian question will not guarantee a moderate political order in the Arab world, but it could be a positive development.

Finally, short-term realities with respect to oil and Soviet influence should not blind Americans to longer-term dangers. By the mid-1990s oil from the Gulf could again be in great demand. And even sooner, under their new leadership the Soviets might begin to regain influence in the region by playing on genuine Arab grievances associated with the Palestinian question and the conflict with Israel.

Admittedly, this line of reasoning rests on many assumptions. There is no way to prove that American interests will or will not be well served by seeking a solution to the Palestinian question. Diplomats are not allowed the luxury of such certainties. So unless the sense of crisis becomes compelling, no president will find it easy to explain to the American public why he is spending time and resources on this problem.

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Credibility on the Line

There is, however, an intangible consideration that should be taken into account in assessing the consequences for the United States of doing nothing to settle the Palestinian question. The reputation of the United States, its credibility, is involved because of the promise it made in the Camp David Accords to be a full partner in seeking a fair solution to the Palestinian question. Needless to say, great and small powers ignore such promises regularly, but a price can be paid for doing so. After the disasters for American policy in Iran in 1979 and Lebanon in 1983, the United States badly needs to refurbish its credentials in the Middle East. Walking away from the Palestinian question will simply reinforce the impression of American weakness and inconsistency, the legacy of recent debacles.

Middle East realities, of course, combined with the facts of American politics, make it difficult for any president to play a positive role in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But the United States is inevitably involved in the region because of the more than $5 billion in economic and military aid that flows to Egypt and Israel each year, in addition to vast quantities of military equipment. Americans cannot be bystanders. They can try to buttress, and sometimes change, the status quo in the region by their policies. They can also try to resolve some of the outstanding sources of tension in the region. But they cannot maintain that they are uninterested and without any means of influence.

Lessons from Camp David

If progress can still be made on the Palestinian question, clearly the American role will be important. But the parties to the conflict will themselves have to assume a major burden in any negotiations. This is one lesson of Camp David. The key decisions are not made in Washington. The Americans can, however, help to make it easier for those decisions to be made. The record shows that direct negotiations, without American involvement, have had little success.

A second lesson of Camp David is that only the president and the secretary of state have much clout with the Middle East parties. Special envoys rarely produce results. No one in the Middle East will show his cards to anyone on the American side other than the highest authority. Kissinger and Carter may have spoiled Middle Easterners by lavishing attention on them. Now nothing less seems to produce results. If the Americans are to get involved, it cannot be half-heartedly or without full presidential attention.

Jimmy Carter has shown that commitment, tenacity, and sincerity can count for much in the diplomacy of the Middle East. These are qualities that will have to be brought to bear in any future negotiations if the American role is to be played well.

One can draw other conclusions from Carter's experience. For instance, a president must look after his domestic political constituency. If he loses support in Congress and in public opinion, he cannot be an effective mediator in com-

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plex foreign policy issues. No president has unchallenged authority in foreign affairs, but the room for maneuver can be affected by the skill with which the president tends to his political base. Carter was generally inattentive to that base, and in the end was unable to win reelection. Even before that, however, his authority had been badly eroded, and he was unable to pursue the Camp David Accords with full vigor.

A third lesson of Camp David is that negotiations require strategic thinking. Much more is involved than simply encouraging reluctant parties to talk to one another. Real influence has to be wielded in order to get Arabs and Israelis to modify their positions. Power is at the core of negotiations. A skillful blending of inducements and pressures is central to playing the role of mediator. Timing is of the essence.

Carter was not a particularly good strategist. He had trouble setting priorities. If something needed doing, he wanted to get directly involved immediately. He did not always recognize the connections among issues. He was overambitious at the start of his presidency; he took on too many problems; and he had trouble delegating authority. He was also impatient for results, which was understandable given his political calendar, but consequently he showed his hand too readily and was too quick to shift gears if one approach was not working. His moves were therefore sometimes poorly planned. His diplomacy had an improvised quality, especially in the first year.

The Problem of Time

For any president a structural problem grows out of the cycles of the American political system. Since time is short to produce results, priority is often given to immediate problems, to the appearance of rapid progress. It is difficult for an activist president to accept the advice that the time is not ripe for a new initiative, that the parties are not ready. This impatience to show results is often a diplomatic liability, one that weakens the hand of a president who must constantly be able to justify his policies before a critical Congress and public opinion. Foreign leaders who are less constrained by the political calendar, who can afford to be more patient, or who have steadier nerves can exploit this feature of the president's position to their advantage.

The president needs to combine a realistic appreciation of the limited time available, to create a proper sense of urgency, while simultaneously appearing to be steady and patient, as if time did not matter so much after all. Carter could not find this balance, and that reduced his effectiveness as a mediator, especially in dealing with the Israelis, for whom time was not such a problem. When he felt that the entire Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty could be negotiated within two weeks, he said so. Begin, for one, would not be rushed. He realized that Carter's impatience signaled a willingness to pay a high price to reach an agreement, including added pressure on Egypt for concessions if that proved to be the only way to clinch the treaty.

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Carter's impatience seemed to stem from his beliefs that conflicts were the result of misunderstandings and that the solution lay in building trust more than wielding power. He had a hard time accepting the fact that some issues could not be resolved through reason and compromise. He had seen a massive social change take place in the American south in his own lifetime, and he was unwilling to believe that comparable change could not take place in the Middle East. It was an appealing vision, but it made him feel frustrated when things moved slowly. At such moments he would talk as if he were ready to abandon his involvement in Middle East diplomacy. The result was mixed signals: sometimes Carter conveyed a sense of immediacy; on other occasions he seemed to have little time for the complexities of the Middle East.

Carter's experience in office confirms the point that time is short for a president to make his mark on Middle East diplomacy. Because of the workings of the American political system the first two years of a presidential term are about the only period when complex initiatives can be launched. By the third year pressure is mounting on the president to turn his attention to domestic issues and to bring foreign policy efforts to a conclusion one way or the other. Inevitably, this undermines the president's leadership in foreign policy in the last part of his term.

Qualities of Leadership

In summary, then, an American president, if he is to tackle the Arab-Israeli conflict with hope for success, must combine some remarkable qualities. Carter brought the necessary sense of dedication, determination, and decency, and he achieved impressive results. His willingness to become personally involved in the negotiations was important to the outcome.

President Nixon, with Henry Kissinger's assistance, brought to the task a strategic perspective that Carter often lacked. Although some serious mistakes were made, especially in the 1969–71 period, after the October 1973 war this strategic perspective, coupled with skillful negotiating technique, launched the process that ultimately yielded the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

But Carter and Nixon, in quite different ways, were both flawed as politicians, and their careers were cut short as a result. Unless a president can preserve his domestic base, unless he can explain his policies to the American people, and unless he can bring Congress with him, his dedication, his strategic insight, and his knowledge of the issues will count for little. It is in this area of communicating to the American public and maintaining popular support that Ronald Reagan has proved himself a master.

Presidents do matter, and they can leave their mark on history, including the tangled history of the Middle East. But to do so in the future, given the intractability of the issues, they will have to combine qualities of leadership that rarely come together in one person. And if Americans aspire to play a major role in the world, they will have to choose leaders with vision, political skill, and a sense

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of diplomatic strategy. Without all three qualities, the president will be unable to overcome the constraints imposed by both the American political system and the realities of Middle East politics. Foreign policy will then most likely be reactive, lacking in consistency, disjointed, and geared to the immediate rather than the important. This would ensure, among other things, that the promise of the Camp David Accords would remain a dead letter.

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The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Populist Instinct in American Politics

STEVEN METZ

In the 1960s a group of individuals and organizations interested in encouraging greater American opposition to South Africa's policy of apartheid coalesced into a distinct political movement. Since then the anti-apartheid movement has remained remarkably persistent in its efforts, and has grown and developed both in size and political skill. At the same time this group has faced tremendous opposition to its program from a variety of sources, and has yet to fully redirect American policy toward South Africa in the desired direction.

Since the shooting of sixty-seven black demonstrators by white police at the Sharpeville Township south of Johannesburg in 1960, there has been little real change in the content of this policy. While every administration has condemned apartheid and called for its end, cordial diplomatic contacts with South Africa have been retained and the United States has not fully utilized its major source of potential leverage—economic sanctions. While the movement has had a major impact on many state and local governments, on U.S. businesses with South African operations, and on universities and other institutions that invest in these corporations, it has had much less success in changing official American policy.[1] While there have been shifts in the level of rhetorical condemnation of

[1] For a discussion of the role of American corporations in South Africa, see Kevin Danaher, *In Whose Interest?* (Washington, D.C.: Institute For Policy Studies, 1985); David Willer, "The Disinvestment Debate," *Africa Report*, September-October, 1982, 45-49; Lawrence Litvak, Robert DeGrasse,

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South Africa—especially between the Carter and Reagan administrations—overall official policy has been characterized by continuity. On the important issue of economic sanctions, for instance, the Carter administration was as vigorous an opponent as the Nixon or Reagan administrations.

In some ways this lack of success is perplexing. Trends in the past twenty years would seem to have created the proper political environment for the attainment of the goals of the anti-apartheid movement, most importantly the tremendous increase in black political power and the growing concern for global human rights reforms. There are several explanations for this paradox. To a large extent the lack of concrete American action on the apartheid issue is a reflection of the general propensity to "let sleeping dogs lie" in foreign policy. Because the U.S. is a global power with a myriad of interests, the tendency is only to pay full attention to situations that cannot be ignored—to pursue "crisis diplomacy." South Africa has not yet reached the stage of a full-blown crisis. Another possible explanation is the deep value conflict that pervades the issue. While stability, the containment of communism, and the encouragement of human rights are all goals of American foreign policy, when these goals collide the usual result is a sort of ad hoc attempt at compromise followed by policy paralysis. Or, to put it another way, when faced with a choice between equally attractive or unattractive alternatives, the easiest solution is to make no decision at all.

While these factors undoubtedly compose an important part of the explanation for the lack of an active American opposition to apartheid, another sort of explanation deals with the actions of the anti-apartheid movement itself. Specifically, the anti-apartheid movement has often relied on ineffective methods of influence. Rather than exclusively pursuing what Nelson Polsby has labeled "inside" strategies of influence, which utilize compromise, bargaining, and structural power to gain results within the "standard operating procedure" of the pertinent unit of the government, the anti-apartheid movement has frequently resorted to "outside" strategies of influence stressing publicity and public mobilization.[2] Outside strategies of influence are seldom effective on foreign policy formulation for three reasons. First, since world events are so far removed from the daily experience of most citizens, it is very difficult to generate the amount of public mobilization necessary to influence policy formulation. Second, because one of the essential elements of political power—information—is much more concentrated in foreign policy formulation than in most forms of domestic

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and Kathleen McTigue, *South Africa: Foreign Investment and Apartheid* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978); Desaix Myers III, *U.S. Business in South Africa: The Economical, Political, and Moral Issues* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); and Desaix Myers III, Robert Hecht, and David M. Liff, *U.S. Business and South Africa: The Withdrawal Issue*, Special Report 1977-D (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1977).

[2] Nelson W. Polsby, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, 3d ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), 324–354. See also Steven Metz and Kenneth T. Kato, "The House of Representatives and South Africa," a paper presented at the 1985 meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C.

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policy formulation, the foreign policy system tends to be one of the least susceptible to this sort of pressure. And third, the government officials such as congressmen, who are most open to outside strategies of influence, have only limited impact on official U.S. foreign policy not requiring the appropriation of funds. This means that outside strategies of influence are usually less successful on foreign policy issues than on domestic ones.

The important question then becomes: if this particular approach to influence tends to be ineffective, why has the anti-apartheid movement relied so heavily on it? The best answer seems to be that the structure and composition of the anti-apartheid movement has often caused it to utilize an inapplicable paradigm of the formulation of American public policy.

The Populist Instinct

Beginning with Andrew Jackson and continuing through William Jennings Bryan, Huey Long, and Robert La Follette, Americans have long shown a propensity to resort to populism.[3] In a more modern context, the presidential campaigns of George Wallace and Jesse Jackson exhibited strong populist tendencies. For a variety of historical and social reasons, a deep and pervasive populist instinct runs throughout American political culture.[4] While the openness of the American political system makes unadulterated populism uncommon, many of the beliefs and approaches of populism periodically reappear on the American political scene. There is, in fact, an important distinction between populist strategies and tactics: even groups that do not rely totally on populist strategies of influence do, when the occasion demands, resort to populist tactics.

While no successful American politician or interest group is wholly without populist propensities, the degree to which these dominate varies greatly. The natural tendency is to attempt the "inside" approach first, since it is apparent that this is the most effective and direct way of changing public policy. If an inside approach fails to generate the desired or expected results, the next tactical step is to improve the group's power position and try again. One way to do this is by forging new alliances within the political system, usually by reformulating the issue or striking deals or compromises on other issues of interest to potential allies. The populist tactic, however, is to increase the power base by taking the appeal directly to the public.

What is crucial is the ease or the frequency with which a group resorts to populist tactics. In some instances, this may be a last resort when the group is intensely frustrated with inside approaches. For other sorts of groups, though,

[3] See John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961); and Lawrence Goodwyn, *Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

[4] For a solid analysis of the populist instinct in the U.S. see Edward Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (London: Heinemann, 1956).

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the resort to populism may come easily, before inside approaches have been fully exhausted. The quickness with which a group resorts to populism is determined by the composition of the group and by the nature of the issue at hand. Obviously, groups whose constituency is largely excluded from political power will be more likely to resort to populist tactics. In terms of issue type, reliance on populist tactics comes most easily on issues whose essence is moral. While compromises and bargains, which are essential characteristics of inside approaches to political influence, may be struck on simple distributive questions of who will get how much, on ethical ones compromise is intrinsically immoral. As Peter Wiles has noted, "Populism is moralistic rather than programmatic."[5]

For the populist, the civil rights movement was the ultimate proof that inherently immoral public policy (even one whose sin was of omission rather than commission) could be changed through mass mobilization. One effect of the civil rights movement was a resurgence in populist thinking in general. As in the 1890s and 1930s, the rise in populism seemed to both accompany and ease deep social change, as an increase in political participation helped to force long overdue reforms. Where the populist *fallacy* originated, though, was in the tendency to conclude that the civil rights movement could serve as a general model or paradigm of public policy formulation. It was easy to believe that because moral appeals and mass mobilization worked once, they could do so again. This was exacerbated in the early 1970s when the success of the anti-war movement seemed to prove that public mobilization could alter faulty foreign policy as well as domestic policy.

The anti-apartheid movement has always been closely connected to the civil rights struggle. Many of the early leaders of the anti-apartheid movement participated in desegregation, and even those who were not actively involved were inspired by the civil rights struggle. Because of this, the anti-apartheid movement has been especially susceptible to the populist interpretation of policy formulation and to populist tactics of influence. This is especially true of the cadre of activists who determined the strategies and tactics of the movement.

Like most political movements, the anti-apartheid movement consists of a core of activists who spend all or much of their time on the issue at hand and a periphery composed of rank-and-file members and allied groups who lend support from time to time. Among the periphery groups are many religious organizations, some of which have committees or task forces that work full time on African issues; student groups, most of which concentrate on their schools' investments in companies that do business in South Africa; mainstream civil rights organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Urban League, and the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE); some academic organizations (especially the Association of Concerned African Scholars); and organized labor.[6] In addition, there is a large number of

[5] Peter Wiles, "A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine," in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 167.

[6] Among the important religious groups involved in anti-apartheid efforts were the World Council

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smaller anti-apartheid organizations, many of them adjuncts of other groups. Many of these are specialized in function and often exhibit relatively short life spans. Examples are the Palo Alto-based South Africa Catalyst Project, which was an information center for student efforts to end university support for corporate investment in South Africa, and the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, which was formed in the early 1960s.[7]

The core of the anti-apartheid movement consists of two parts: a group of congressmen interested in American policy toward South Africa; and a trio of Africanist lobbying organizations: the American Committee on Africa (ACOA); the Washington Office on Africa (WOA); and TransAfrica. Of these the New York-based American Committee on Africa is the senior one. This was formed in the early 1950s by civil rights activists as a response to government repression in South Africa growing out of what was called the "defiance campaign."[8] Under the leadership of Reverend George Houser, the American Committee on Africa was instrumental in the first major anti-apartheid effort in the U.S. – a campaign in the 1960s to end an open line of credit provided to the South African government by a consortium of American banks.[9] Throughout its history the American Committee on Africa has been extremely active in public organization on the apartheid issue and has formed and supported many other groups. As a general rule, the ACOA has taken a radical stand on South Africa (it was an early supporter of full American economic withdrawal) and couches its appeals in ideological and moral terms.

The Washington Office on Africa was founded in the early 1970s, primarily through the sponsorship of religious organizations.[10] Since that time the Washington Office on Africa has broadened its base of support, especially among organized labor. As is indicated by the location of WOA offices a few blocks from the Capitol, the purpose of this group is less public organization than direct lobbying. The leaders of the anti-apartheid movement had recog-

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of Churches, the National Council of Churches, the United Presbyterian Church, the United Methodist Church, the U.S. Protestant Episcopal Church, and the United Church of Christ. See Paul Deats, "U.S. Religious Institutions and South Africa," in Alfred O. Hero, Jr., and John Barratt, eds., *The American People and South Africa: Publics, Elites, and Policymaking Processes* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1981), 103–122; and Anthony Lake, "Caution and Concern: The Making of American Policy toward South Africa, 1946–1971," Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1974, 237–257.

[7] C. Eric Lincoln, "The Race Problem and International Relations," in George W. Shepard, Jr., ed., *Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 51–52.

[8] See George M. Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge: The Story of the American Committee on Africa," *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion* 6 (Summer/Fall 1976): 16–26; and Michael Maren, "Building A Constituency Against Apartheid," *Africa Report*, May-June 1984, 57. The founders of the group included A. Philip Randolph, Donald Harrington, Charles Trigg, and George Houser. Houser, who became the American Committee on Africa's director, was also one of the founders of the Congress On Racial Equality (CORE).

[9] See American Commitee on Africa, *A Summary Report on the Bank Campaign* (New York: American Committee on Africa, n.d.).

[10] Ken Zinn, Associate Director of the Washington Office on Africa, interview with the author, 6 April 1984, Washington, D.C.

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nized the need for a permanent presence in Washington from an early date. In 1969 the American Committee on Africa opened a Washington office under the direction of Gary Gappert, but this closed a few years later.[11] Since its formation, the Washington Office on Africa has performed the dual roles of a lobbying organization: providing pertinent information and persuasion for policy makers, especially in Congress; and providing information on South Africa-related decisions to interested groups and individuals.

TransAfrica was formed in 1977 by members of the Congressional Black Caucus to lobby for black interests in American policy toward Africa and the Caribbean. Like the American Committee on Africa and Washington Office on Africa, the membership of TransAfrica is not large (about 10,000), but it is staffed by a cadre of dedicated activists.[12] Its director, Randall Robinson, is an articulate and influential figure on Capitol Hill and around the nation. Like WOA, TransAfrica does attempt to keep its constituency informed on African issues in Washington through a variety of publications, but the focus of its efforts are on direct lobbying.

In addition to these organizations, a group of congressmen interested in U.S. policy toward South Africa has played an important role in anti-apartheid efforts. Two events during the Nixon administration signaled the beginning of serious congressional activity on the South Africa issue. The first was the assumption of the chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa by Charles C. Diggs, Jr. of Detroit.[13] Diggs's political skill, his seniority on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and his deep knowledge of Africa made him one of the most important voices on U.S. policy toward Africa during the 1970s.[14] His control of the House Africa Subcommittee, which had long been a moribund organization, brought, in his own words, "a new stimulus to it."[15] The second event was the formation of the Congressional Black Caucus in 1971.[16] While the Black Caucus has focused its efforts on domestic issues, it has on many occasions acted as a vocal proponent of anti-apartheid initiatives in Congress.

In addition to black members of Congress, a number of white liberals have also been involved in anti-apartheid efforts. In one of the earliest examples of this, Senator Edward Kennedy led several attempts to have the South Africa quota for sugar imports to the U.S revoked.[17] Later in the 1970s, several other

[11] John Joseph Seiler, "The Formulation of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1957–1976: The Failure of Good Intentions," (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1976), 251.

[12] Michel Marriott, "TransAfrica in the Eye of the Storm," *Washington Post*, 12 December 1984; see also David Remnick, "Randall Robinson: From Boyhood Pain to a Crusade Against Apartheid," *Washington Post*, 5 February 1985.

[13] See Bruce Oudes, "A Man To Watch," *Africa Report*, November 1971, 11.

[14] Interview with the Honorable David D. Newsom, 1 June 1984, Washington, D.C. Newsom was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Affairs during much of the Nixon administration, and Under Secretary for Political Affairs under Carter.

[15] Telephone interview with the Honorable Charles C. Diggs, Jr., 15 May 1984.

[16] See Julian C. Dixon, "The Congressional Black Caucus and U.S. Policy on Southern Africa," *Africa Report*, May-June 1984, 12.

[17] See Steven Metz, "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formulation of American Policy To-

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white liberals became active opponents of apartheid. Among the more important were Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, who chaired the Senate Subcommittee on Africa from 1972 to 1978; Stephen Solarz of New York, who chaired the House Africa Subcommittee from 1979 to 1980; and Howard Wolpe of Michigan, who chaired the House panel after Solarz.

The anti-apartheid movement, both within the government and outside of it, has consistently failed to gain acceptance of its political program. This has been especially evident when the executive was inherently opposed to the anti-apartheid program during the Nixon and Reagan administrations. One way of dealing with this would have been to attempt to broaden the base of support within the government through compromises and political deals. In most instances, however, the tendency of the anti-apartheid movement was to go public with the issue. The belief permeated almost all anti-apartheid efforts that if the public could be made fully aware of what was involved, the ensuing outcry would force the adoption of the anti-apartheid platform. In effect, the populist tendencies of the anti-apartheid movement, which had been reinforced by the civil rights and antiwar efforts, dominated during periods of failure. There are several clear illustrations of this.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 1970s

During the first year of the Nixon administration, a full reevaluation of American policy toward southern Africa took place under Henry Kissinger's guidance. The outcome of this study was the now-famous National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39.[18] Kissinger's conclusion, which Nixon adopted, was that the status quo in southern Africa would continue into the foreseeable future and thus the best approach for the protection of tangible American geostrategic and economic interests in the region was to gradually improve ties with the white regimes. The ensuing policy was officially labeled "communication," but is more generally known as the Nixon "tilt."

Although the tilt was kept confidential in order to preclude any sort of public or congressional outcry, the basic contours of the new policy quickly became evident.[19] Charles Diggs spearheaded efforts to alter or limit the extent of the tilt.

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ward South Africa, 1969–1981," (Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1985), 163–171; and Metz and Kato, "The House and South Africa," 20–22.

[18] NSSM 39 is reprinted and analyzed in Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1976). See also Edgar Lockwood, "National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the Future of United States Policy Toward Southern Africa," *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion* 4 (Fall 1974): 63–70; and the testimony of Roger Morris in United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "South Africa," hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 94th Congress, 2d session, 1976, 188–189.

[19] There were some rather cryptic hints that something had changed in U.S. policy toward South Africa. See, for instance, U.S. Department of State, "United States Options in Southern Africa," an address by Assistant Secretary of State David D. Newsom at Northwestern University, 8 December 1970, *Department of State Bulletin*, 18 January 1971, 80–84. The tilt was leaked by Ken Owen, the

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In the 1970–72 period he held a number of subcommittee hearings whose purpose was to reveal the nature of the Nixon policy and to provide a rallying point for anti-apartheid efforts.[20] But Diggs's "inside" approach brought few, if any, tangible gains. Following his subcommittee hearings on American investment in South Africa, Diggs shifted his focus from attempts to influence official policy to the activities of U.S. corporations operating in South Africa. He introduced legislation that would have prevented American corporations that did not follow nondiscriminatory practices in their South Africa operations from bidding on U.S. government contracts.[21] Although this was periodically reintroduced throughout the 1970s, it was never reported out of committee. In general, this process was frequently repeated as the anti-apartheid movement concentrated on targets such as corporations and institutional investors that were often easier to influence than the White House and the foreign policy bureaucracy.

By 1971 Diggs had also lost important allies within the executive branch. The State Department's bureaus of African affairs and international organizations had consistently supported anti-Pretoria positions in the past, but by this time Nixon and Kissinger had begun to weed out opposition to communication. At the same time Diggs was under increasing pressure from the more radical elements of the anti-apartheid movement and the Black Caucus over his inability to stem the Nixon tilt. In December of 1971 Diggs responded in classical populist fashion by taking his appeal to the public.

The first evidence of this was the release of what was known as the "Action Manifesto." While this document, which was the culmination of exhaustive subcommittee hearings, included detailed proposals for American policy toward South Africa, what was most startling was his endorsement of the use of violence against the white regimes in southern Africa. He wrote:

> Our government, at present, decries violence as a means of liberation, without condemning the violence which the South African government uses to enforce the subjugation of the majority of the people in the region. The United States must recognize that any means are legitimate so long as the recalcitrance of the South African government continues.[22]

Washington correspondent for the *Johannesburg Star*, beginning in 1970. See Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 132. The contents of NSSM 39 were finally revealed in 1972 in Terence Smith, "U.S. Widens Ties to African Whites," *New York Times*, 2 April 1972.

[20] These included "U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa" (3 parts), 92d Congress, 1st session, 1971; and, "Policy Toward Africa For the Seventies," 91st Congress, 2d session, 1970. During this period before the congressional reassertion on foreign policy, which occured during the mid-1970s, the use of investigatory power to "criticize, intimidate, and reform the middle-echelon bureaucracy" was one of the primary methods for congressional influence on the foreign policy process. See Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy By Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 83.

[21] On 29 March 1972 Diggs introduced HJ Res 1138. On 1 April a similar measure was introduced by Bella Abzug as HJ Res 1149.

[22] This is reprinted, inter alia, in *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion* 2 (Spring 1972): 52–60; and in *Congressional Record*, 18 January 1972.

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What was especially relevant was Diggs's attempt to place this recommendation within the context of the American creed. He argued that the U.S. must acknowledge the "sacred right" of nonwhites to use violence "in reaffirmation of the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence—principles which gave birth to the American revolution and to the United States of America."

Three days after the introduction of the Action Manifesto Diggs called another press conference to announce his resignation from the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. According to Diggs, the motivation for this was the "stifling hypocrisy" of the Nixon policy toward Africa.[23] Since Diggs was the first American delegate to the United Nations to resign over policy differences, this act was widely publicized. Again what is pertinent is the attempt to circumvent normal channels of policy influence and to overcome political obstacles by taking the appeal to the public.

As the election of 1972 approached, the populist propensities of the anti-apartheid movement became even clearer. The best indication of this came in May of that year during the first African-American National Conference on Africa, which was held at Howard University in Washington, D.C. This meeting, which was organized by the Congressional Black Caucus and chaired by Diggs, brought together over four-hundred delegates from a wide variety of backgrounds. In addition to such mainstream black leaders as Congressmen Diggs and Conyers and Reverend Ralph Abernathy, radicals such as Owusu Sadaukai, Imamu Amiri Baraka, Angela Davis, H. Rap Brown, Huey Newton, and Stokley Carmichael also participated.[24] After framing a set of recommendations for U.S. policy in southern Africa, the group kicked off the annual African Liberation Day march in Washington, which attracted 10,000 demonstrators.[25]

This had two important implications. First, the fact that the Conference brought together mainstream leaders and radicals with little inclination to pursue inside strategies of influence illustrated the deep populist propensities of the anti-apartheid movement. It was clear that the movement was dominated by the belief that the 1970s would be, as Daniel G. Matthews, president of the Washington Task Force on African Affairs, had argued in testimony before Diggs's subcommittee, "an era of substantial grassroots awareness of African issues in this country."[26] The second important lesson of the conference and march came from the size of the demonstration. While 10,000 demonstrators could not be totally ignored by the administration, it was quite a small number compared to civil rights and antiwar demonstrations that had taken place in Washington. There is a law of diminishing returns during periods of populism: while 10,000 demonstrators might have attracted widespread and immediate at-

[23] *New York Times*, 18 December 1971.

[24] Philip V. White, "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940–1980," in Hero and Barratt, eds., *The American People and South Africa*, 91–92; and Seiler, "Formulation of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa," 302–303.

[25] *Washington Post*, 27 May 1972.

[26] Testimony in "Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies," 55.

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tention in 1952, by 1972 they failed to make the front pages of most newspapers outside of Washington. It thus becomes clear that even at this point the anti-apartheid movement was operating with the tactics and assumptions of the civil rights and antiwar movements, but without the same ability to mobilize the truly massive public support.

As the Nixon administration continued and the civil rights and antiwar movements receded, the ability of the anti-apartheid movement to mobilize even 10,000 marchers also declined. During the same time the White House succeeded in fully eliminating members of the State Department whose affinity with the anti-apartheid program had made them useful inside allies of the movement. In the face of these obstacles, the populist tendencies of the anti-apartheid movement became even clearer. This took place in two ways. First, there was an increased emphasis on public mobilization as a tool of political influence; and second, radical community-based, grassroots organizations played a more important role in anti-apartheid efforts.

On this second point the Washington Conference was seminal. Several moderate, white-dominated organizations, which had been active in anti-apartheid efforts, either withdrew altogether or shifted to a lower-profile position. For example, the United Auto Workers decreased their anti-apartheid activity, and the radical, but white-dominated Africa Research Group, which was based at Harvard, closed down and turned over its files to a black group headquartered in New York.[27] In the spring of 1973 the annual demonstrations held on African Liberation Day did spread. While these had taken place in only two cities in 1972, there were nearly thirty marches in 1973.[28] These efforts were coordinated not by the Congressional Black Caucus or any of the other mainstream black leadership groups, but by Owusu Sadaukai of the African Liberation Support Committee. This trend toward increased radical action within the anti-apartheid movement continued throughout 1973 as the National Anti-Imperialist Conference in Solidarity with African Liberation, which was held in Chicago in October, included both Oliver Tambo, the leader of the African National Congress—the main anti-apartheid group in South Africa—and American radicals such as Angela Davis. Among the demands that emerged from this conference was the development of a massive program for educating the public on the "U.S. role in financing the oppression of African peoples."[29]

During the Carter administration the radical, grassroots element of the movement remained active, and in some ways even increased. Radicals such as Bill Sales argued that:

> The Congressional Black Caucus, the Committee of Concerned Black Scholars, and the Black political pimps, like Charles Evers and Jesse Jackson, have complemented

[27] *Southern Africa*, March 1973, 20.
[28] *Southern Africa*, May 1973, 42.
[29] *Southern Africa*, January 1974, 25.

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imperialist propaganda by suggesting that the South African's struggle is a reformist one along "civil rights" lines.[30]

Sales's solution was to bypass the mainstream black leadership—which he felt was infatuated with the tactics and strategies of the civil rights movement—through community and grassroots organization.

Another source of grassroots anti-apartheid organization was college and university campuses. For instance, the Palo Alto-based South Africa Catalyst Project began to play an active role in organizing anti-apartheid groups on other campuses and in providing leadership for student activism based on the experiences of the 1960s.[31] Again, though, these grassroots organizations had little impact on official U.S. policy and largely concentrated their efforts on easier targets like corporations and institutional investors.

In general, though, the early part of the Carter administration witnessed a resurgence of inside strategies of influence. The increase in the number, seniority, and political skill of black congressmen, along with the affinity of the Carter administration for the anti-apartheid program, appeared to create the proper conditions for inside strategies.[32] To some degree this proved accurate: in 1976 and 1977 the Carter administration supported new anti-Pretoria sanctions in the UN and enacted its own slate of actions, while in Congress a limitation on Export-Import Bank support for sales to South Africa—which was known as the Evans Amendment—became the only anti-South Africa legislation to pass Congress before 1985.[33]

This shift to inside strategies, however, took place under very special circumstances. Not only did the anti-apartheid movement have a valuable ally within the administration in UN Ambassador Andrew Young, but it also had the sympathy of the President and the Secretary of State. And perhaps even more importantly, the Soweto riots of 1976 in South Africa and the government crackdown on black opposition to apartheid in the fall of 1977 greatly increased public awareness of the situation in that nation. This meant that the anti-apartheid movement could spend less time on public education and mobilization and more on direct lobbying and legislative activity. But the retreat from populist tactics was not a permanent step in the political evolution of the anti-apartheid movement, but simply a temporary response to a unique set of circumstances.

The Reagan Administration

As during the Nixon administration, the first Reagan administration was a time of frustration for the anti-apartheid movement. The general political tenor of

[30] Bill Sales, *Southern Africa/Black America—Same Struggle/Same Fight!* (New York: Black Liberation Press, 1977), 62.

[31] See South Africa Catalyst Project, *Organize* (Palo Alto, Calif.: UP Press, 1976).

[32] See Metz and Kato, "The House of Representatives and South Africa," 22-26.

[33] On the UN sanctions and the administration's other responses, see Metz, "The Anti-Apartheid

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the administration plus the absence of strong black support for the Republicans gave civil rights and racial issues in general a low priority. In terms of U.S. relations with South Africa, the Reagan policy of constructive engagement is similar in many ways to the Nixon policy of communication, and it includes a radical decline in the anti-Pretoria rhetoric of the Carter administration. As Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, the primary architect of constructive engagement, has noted, the Reagan policy has sought "to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa, one based on shared interests, persuasion, and improved communication."[34]

Fall 1984 represented a period of conflicting tendencies for the anti-apartheid movement. At that time Representative Stephen Solarz's legislation dealing with American economic links to South Africa did reach a House-Senate conference committee.[35] After long negotiations, in October an agreement seemed close.[36] Eventually, though, the compromise fell through because of the Democrats' unwillingness to accept an amendment unrelated to South Africa, and the measure died. At the same time, the reelection of Ronald Reagan and Senator Jesse Helms, the failure of Jesse Jackson's presidential bid to garner tangible gains for blacks, the Democratic party's attempts to refocus its priorities in an attempt to win back the support of white males, and continuing cuts in the social programs were all counted as political defeats by the black leadership.[37]

It was clear that something was needed to rejuvenate black political morale and activism, and the apartheid issue, because of its emotional impact, provided the perfect opportunity. On 21 November 1984, Randall Robinson of TransAfrica launched the Free South Africa Movement toward this end. The most visible activity of this group was a series of well-orchestrated and publicized arrests outside the South African embassy in Washington and at other sites around the nation. Among those arrested have been many well-known civil rights activists, Senator Lowell Weicker, a number of congressmen and District of

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Movement," 389–405. On the Evans Amendment see *CQ Weekly Report*, 5 August 1978, 31, 35. The amendment is found in Pub. L. 95–143, *United States Code*, 1976 ed., supplement II, Title 12, 635–666.

[34] Chester A. Crocker, "A Regional Strategy for Southern Africa," an address before the American Legion in Honolulu, 29 August 1981, *Department of State Bulletin*, October 1981, 26. For more detail on constructive engagement see "Reagan's Africa Policy: Chester Crocker with Elise Pachter (interview)," *SAIS Review* 3 (Winter-Spring 1983): 83–98. For detailed critiques of the Reagan policy see Robert Fatton, "The Reagan Foreign Policy Toward South Africa: The Ideology of the New Cold War," *African Studies Review* 27 (March 1984): 57–59; and articles by Bernard Magumbane, Deborah L. Toler, and Christopher Coker in *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion* 12 (Fall/Winter 1982).

[35] Solarz's bill was originally introduced in 1983 as H.R. 1693. See his description in *Congressional Record*, 26 May 1983, E2565–67. See also Howard Wolpe, "Africa and the U.S. House of Representatives," *Africa Report*, July-August 1984, 71. Wolpe has chaired the House Africa Subcommittee since 1980.

[36] Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Export Bill Conferees Back Pretoria Curbs," *New York Times*, 3 October 1984.

[37] Juan Williams, "Black Leaders Find a Hot New Issue," *Washington Post*, 12 December 1984.

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Columbia officials, Reverend William Sloan Coffin, Amy Carter, and Robert Kennedy's youngest son Douglas. Edward Kennedy and Jesse Jackson have participated in the demonstrations. After the first five months of protests, there had been over 1,800 arrests at the South African embassy and another 1,000 at other sites around the nation. In a further attempt to link the Free South Africa Movement and the civil rights movement, one of the largest demonstrations, which included 4,000 participants, took place on the 17th anniversary of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.[38] During the Four Days in April, demonstrations and civil disobedience programs, which attracted a crowd of about 26,000 to the gate of the White House, were held as a general protest against the Reagan policies, with opposition to constructive engagement playing a prominent role.[39]

The Free South Africa Movement has proven phenomenally persistent in the face of limited tangible gains. In this it reflects the anti-apartheid movement as a whole. What is even more telling, however, are the tactics and composition of this group. Through the use of demonstrations and passive resistance, Robinson lifted a page directly from the civil rights movement; according to David Remnick of the *Washington Post*, "the Free South Africa Movement is a revival of both the spirit and the tactics of twenty years ago."[40] The choice of the South African embassy as the target of protest illustrated that the goal was less to influence American policy formulation directly than to gain publicity for the cause; this is one of the standard indicators of a populist approach to political influence. Even the choice of November for the start of the demonstrations was crucial since that period, coming between the end of the presidential race and the beginning of the new session of Congress, represents a lull in political news, which helped amplify the attention given the demonstrations.

The Free South Africa Movement has also attempted to recreate the grand coalition of the civil rights movement. While the core remains the black community, prominent liberals such as Edward Kennedy, church groups, the Jewish community, and students have also played a role.[41] Broad public support was also evident as a Washington Post-ABC News survey in January 1985 showed that 70 per cent of those polled who had heard of the demonstrations expressed approval.[42]

[38] Karlyn Barker, "D.C. Workers Protest at Embassy," *Washington Post*, 5 April 1985.

[39] Stephen Engleberg, "Thousands Join Protest in Washington," *New York Times*, 21 April 1985.

[40] Remnick, "Randall Robinson."

[41] A few weeks after the demonstrations began, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations announced support for the protests. See Karlyn Barker, "Protests Grow Against South Africa Policy," *Washington Post*, 11 December 1984. Throughout Spring 1985, protests by student groups sympathetic to the Free South Africa Movement occurred on numerous campuses with the largest occuring on one of the original sources of student revolt—Columbia University. See Larry Rohter, "At Columbia, the Stage is Familiar but the Drama is Different," *New York Times*, 21 April 1985.

[42] Barry Sussman, "Apartheid Protests Supported By Most Who Know of Them," *Washington Post*, 27 January 1985. But at the same time, the impact of the demonstrations on public policy is limited since the poll showed that about two-thirds of the public was unaware of the demonstrations or had not formed an opinion about them.

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Throughout 1985 American concern with South Africa and opposition to apartheid reached new levels. As the level of government repression and violent opposition increased, discussion of events in South Africa and the proper American response dominated the media and other forums of public debate. While the Free South Africa Movement continued its demonstrations outside the South African embassy, the focus of anti-apartheid efforts shifted to Congress. In August the House of Representatives approved a limited package of anti-South Africa sanctions by an overwhelming 380 to 48 vote.[43] Despite opposition from conservatives such as Jesse Helms and Barry Goldwater, sanctions legislation also made headway in the Senate.[44]

Although it is clear that the escalating violence in South Africa was the primary catalyst for the sanctions effort in Congress, it can also be argued that the activities of TransAfrica and the Free South Africa Movement increased support for the sanctions.[45] But the fact remained that public mobilization itself was not sufficient to stir activity within the government: the Free South Africa Movement was not all that different from similar efforts throughout the 1970s and 1980s. What the situation suggested, on the other hand, was that the real impetus for government activity came from events in South Africa itself, with the activity of the anti-apartheid movement serving only to amplify and focus public attention aroused by the violence and repression there.

Thus even in the climate of deep concern for events in South Africa, the anti-apartheid movement faces an uphill struggle in its attempt to consolidate or institutionalize this resurgent American opposition to the apartheid system. As the Washington Office on Africa has noted, "Translating the current grassroots anti-apartheid momentum into concrete policy changes remains the greatest challenge to the movement."[46] But at the same time, the deep populist instincts of the anti-apartheid movement remain. As the WOA also argued, "The voice of the Free South Africa Movement is louder and more unified than ever before. *Now is the time to organize to ensure that popular support for an end to U.S. assistance is translated into law.*"[47]

Conclusion

When a group is frustrated in its attempts to influence policy formulation through normal channels, it has the option of lowering or changing its expecta-

[43] Joanne Omang, "House, 380 to 48, Approves Sanctions Against South Africa," *Washington Post*, 2 August 1985.

[44] See Joanne Omang, "South Africa Sanctions Gain in Senate," *Washington Post*, 12 July 1985.

[45] Barry Sussman, "Activists Stimulate South African Sanctions," *Washington Post*, 24 July 1985.

[46] Washington Office on Africa, "Action Alert: Sanctions Bills Need Support," March 1985. The legislation introduced includes H.R. 997, which would mandate immediate corporate withdrawal from South Africa; H.R. 1460, which would proscribe new investment, bank loans, computer exports, and Krugerrand imports; H.R. 1133, which would ban nuclear sales and cooperation with South Africa; H.R. 1135, which would prohibit coal and uranium imports from South Africa; and S. 635, which was identical to H.R. 1460.

[47] Ibid. (Emphasis in original.)

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tions or pursuing influence by some other means. In a totalitarian system where these other means are absent or severely constrained, the usual route for a frustrated group is apathy. In an authoritarian system, revolution is often the only viable option. In open political systems, though, the failure to influence policy formulation in a desired way is less often interpreted as a permanent closure of the political system than a temporary one. This leaves two strategies of influence: an inside one that stresses the making of new alliances in order to increase political strength and the use of available political power to gain partial or incomplete goals; or an outside one that attempts to increase the group's political strength by adding new supporters. The basic tactics of the first strategy are bargaining and compromise; of the second, publicity and mobilization.

The American political culture has long been conducive to populism. The openness of the political system and the existence of a political ethos that stresses direct public participation and majority rule create the proper context for the operation of populism. Another part of the American political culture that has created a healthy environment for populism is the pervasive distrust of government. Given the attitude that the government and the practice of politics in general is often immoral, it is easy to view mass mobilization and direct citizen participation in policy formulation as cleansing. While in recent decades no populist movement in the U.S. has gained full control of the government, many of them—from William Jennings Bryan's People's Party to George Wallace's American Party—have influenced public policy formulation by illustrating the extent of popular discontent with the political status quo.

In the twentieth century the quantum increase in the mass media changed the nature of populism. Specifically, the mass media have made it possible for a small cadre of true believers to couch their appeal in creedal terms—which is one of the most effective ways to expand the group's following—and to gain attention and influence far out of proportion to their actual numbers. Thus it is no longer necessary to concentrate on the election of members of the group as Bryan's party did, but rather to focus on disseminating the message through the press and television. While the number of supporters still is an important factor—large demonstrations are more likely to make the evening news than small ones—the electronic media have made it possible for small groups to pursue populist tactics with nearly as much success as large ones.

The anti-apartheid movement has shown a marked propensity to rely on populist strategies and tactics when faced with political obstacles. Part of the explanation for this lies in the close connection between the anti-apartheid movement and the civil rights movement. Because of the overlap in membership between the two groups and because they both dealt with racial implications of public policy, the anti-apartheid movement has consistently attempted to replicate the strategies and tactics of the civil rights movement. The problem is that the lessons of the civil rights struggle are not directly applicable to the anti-apartheid efforts. The sort of direct, tangible stake or experience that helped to mobilize those who participated in the civil rights movement is absent. The anti-apartheid movement is, in fact, much more similar to the group of white,

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northern liberals who formed a subgroup within the civil rights movement in that their attraction to the issue is based on its moral or symbolic importance. While political activists of all sorts attempt to influence policy formulation by claiming to represent deep public support, eventually their bluff will be called and they must prove that this support does exist. Although the anti-apartheid movement claims to speak for a majority in the United States, it has never succeeded in mobilizing true mass support. A second reason why the anti-apartheid movement has often relied on populism is derived from the perception of the apartheid issue commonly held by members of the movement. In simple terms, it is seen as a moral issue pitting wrong against right. Since inside strategies of influence require compromise, they are ruled out: ethical questions are not open to bargaining. With inside strategies precluded, the only available option was the outside one—populism.

The tendency to rely on populism has led to both failure and success for the anti-apartheid movement. The failures have arisen because the quickness with which the movement goes outside standard channels of influence and the Manichean way in which it views the whole issue of American policy toward South Africa has tended to alienate policy makers. While populist tactics may influence elected officials such as members of Congress, who must consider whether demonstrations and marches do, in fact, represent wide public support for a position, they can have the opposite effect on the civil servants who make much of American foreign policy. At best, outside strategies may help allies within the bureaucracy in their own struggles with other bureaucratic elements, but more often they may brand the whole movement as irresponsible and irrational. Thus even though the populist tactics of the anti-apartheid movement have, at times, influenced members of Congress, this was not directly translated into a change in official American policy. It is nearly always true that on such issues beyond the direct control of Congress as defense and foreign assistance appropriations, the bureaucracy looks on congressional involvement in foreign policy formulation with skepticism. As Patsy Mink, who has served as both a member of Congress and as a State Department official, has noted:

> To the Foreign Service personnel in State, Congress appears to be the bellwether of public opinion. This is not, however, regarded as a positive trait. Thus, Congress is believed to reflect an amateurish, uninterested, unschooled and mildly xenophobic middle America . . . Individual members of Congress are seen to busy themselves full-time with the domestic agenda, generally taking foreign policy positions only to support their domestic priorities.[48]

The fact that the Reagan administration has itself proven largely immune to the resurgent anti-apartheid efforts and has threatened to veto all but the most watered-down sanctions legislation proves that in lieu of a very broad and deep

[48] Patsy T. Mink, "Misunderstandings, Myths, and Misperceptions: How Congress and the State Department See Each Other," in Thomas M. Franck, ed., *The Tethered Presidency: Congressional Restraints on Executive Power* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 65.

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public consensus, as happened with the antiwar effort, the ability of Congress to alter official American foreign policy is limited. Thus, however effective populist tactics may be in garnering congressional support, their impact on official policy is invariably limited.

But at the same time, the anti-apartheid movement has succeeded in keeping the issue of American policy toward South Africa on the political agenda. This has been especially important during times when South Africa itself was relatively quiet and thus received little media attention. The history of the anti-apartheid movement has shown that while its leaders may have overestimated the degree of public support for their position, they have certainly been correct in their belief that enough public concern exists to keep the apartheid issue on the American political agenda for the foreseeable future. It is likely that the implications of this also hold for other groups interested in changing or redirecting some element of American foreign policy: while an interest group can keep an issue on the political agenda, it cannot, in itself, change a policy that has become institutionalized without some concomitant change in external conditions that are beyond the control of the group.

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Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960–1980

RICHARD WEITZ

The revival of insurgency movements in Latin American during the past few years behooves us to reexamine previous guerrilla operations in the western hemisphere. Much of the contemporary debate concerning these insurgencies is taking place in an historical vacuum. Analysts of current events in such countries as El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru fail to examine past outcomes of similar developments in this region. Unfamiliarity with the history of earlier insurgencies in postwar Latin America contributes to faulty observations about the present situation in these countries.

This article examines four past guerrilla operations in Latin America with the intention of determining what conditions have been associated with successful insurgencies in the region. In two of these case studies—Cuba in the 1950s and Nicaragua in the 1970s—the guerrilla operations proved effective. In the other two cases—Venezuela in the 1960s and Bolivia in 1967—the governments defeated the rebels. By isolating the key variables that led to rebel triumphs in Cuba and Nicaragua and government victories in Bolivia and Venezuela, we should be able to determine what conditions may be required for a successful guerrilla operation in Latin America.

This is not to suggest that there is necessarily a causal relationship between a given variable and the outcome of an insurgency. The nature of these variables themselves is indeed difficult to define precisely. But, as Max Weber pointed out, there can be a close connection among factors whose interrelationship, though clear, cannot be precisely explained. In this sense, one speaks of variable X be-

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ing favorable to outcome Y, rather than the normal logical statement that X makes Y inevitable.

Inconclusive Factors

Four variables appear to have had some influence—but no consistent impact—on the success or failure of the insurgencies in the four countries under study: the performance of the economy at the time of the insurgency; the existence of ethnic cleavages in these nations; the geographic location of the guerrillas' main base of operations; and the quality of the insurgents' leadership.

Some scholars have suggested that political instability is associated with absolute poverty.[1] Others argue that challenges to established political authority are more likely in countries where depressions occur after long periods of increasing economic prosperity.[2] Neither of these hypotheses holds valid for the cases under study. In terms of absolute poverty, it was in Bolivia where the per capita gross national product (GNP) was lowest, but here the rebels were most easily defeated. In terms of relative economic performance, it is true that Cuba and Nicaragua experienced depressions in the year preceding the success of the insurgencies. But these downturns were more a symptom of the guerrilla operations than a cause. During the early period of the insurgencies both countries experienced slow but steady growth, with only minor and short-lived slowdowns, in terms of absolute GNP, per capita GNP, and private consumption. Inflation was not a major problem until the insurgents gained the upper hand in the military arena. These economic indicators were similar for Venezuela and Bolivia, where the guerrilla operations failed. The outcome of the insurgencies in all four countries was not associated with any particular level of economic performance.[3]

Ethnic divisions within the four countries also had only a minor impact on the outcome of the insurgencies. In Cuba and Nicaragua, social class differences appear to have had a greater influence on an individual's decision to support or oppose the rebels than ethnic considerations. Members of the lower and middle classes showed a much greater propensity to participate in antigovernment activities than did members of the upper class.[4] And, in Venezuela and Bolivia,

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor, 1963), 27–63.

[2] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Norton, 1965), 28; and Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 69–79.

[3] *International Financial Statistics*, January 1962, vol. XV, no. 1, 31, 96; United Nations Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Latin American, (UNESC, ECLA) *Economic Survey of Latin American, 1967*, II-22, II-23, II-211; UNESC, ECLA, *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981*, 565; and James W. Wilkie and Stephan Haber, eds., *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, vol. 22 (Los Angeles: University of California Latin American Center, 1983), 282–283, 285–286.

[4] Adrian H. Jones and Andrew R. Molnar, *Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, 1966), 66: and Thomas W. Walker, *Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), 71–74.

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where the rebels were defeated, ethnic divisions appear to have had little effect on the outcome.[5]

Another factor that had no reoccurring effect on the success of the attempted revolts was the geographic milieu in which the insurgents operated. Experts in insurgency believe the best location for guerrilla operations is in areas that are not readily accessible to government forces, but which are not too far from the nation's urban centers.[6] With respect to the four countries under discussion, it appears that while in some cases geographic factors were very important, in others they had little impact.

In Cuba, Fidel Castro and his followers benefited from the fact that they established (not by choice) their main base in the Sierra Maestra, a region distant from the army's base of operations and whose inhabitants were dissatisfied with the Fulgencio Batista regime. Here they could gradually strengthen their forces among a supportive population and wait until they had weakened the government before challenging the army in a less favorable environment.[7] Conversely, in Bolivia the location of the insurgency also effected the course of the insurgency campaign, but in this case it was largely a negative one. The guerrilla base was so remote from Bolivia's urban centers that the rebels had little impact on political developments outside the rural areas in which they operated. Regis Debray and Robert Lamberg note that once hostilities began the isolation of the guerrilla base prevented the insurgents from coordinating their operations with their urban or foreign allies.[8] Debray subsequently wrote that the rebels' decision to commence hostilities in such an isolated area "was, in my view, so unfortunate that, though not the determining cause of the [campaign's] failure, it was a decisive factor in producing the difficulties encountered by the guerrilla force from the first."[9]

In Nicaragua and Venezuela, however, geographic factors appear to have had little influence on the outcome of the insurgencies. In both countries the rebels continually shifted their main base of operations, sometimes fighting in the countryside, sometimes in the cities. Other factors made a greater contribution to their success than their changing bases of operations.

[5] John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1965), 56; Jones and Molnar, *Internal Defense Against Insurgency*, 78; and Band E. O'Neill, "Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis," in Richard G. Head and Edwin J. Rokke, eds., *American Defense Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 203.

[6] Ernesto Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Random House, 1969), 12–13; Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 317, 393; and Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (Frogmore, St. Albans, England: Paladin, 1970), 136–138.

[7] Jaime Suchlicki, *Cuba: From Columbus to Castro* (New York: Scribner's, 1974), 172–173; and Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: or the Pursuit of Freedom* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971), 904–906.

[8] Regis Debray, *Che's Guerrilla War*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (London: Penguin, 1975), 88–89; and Robert P. Lamberg, "Che in Bolivia: The 'Revolution' that Failed," *Problems of Communism* 19 (July–August 1970): 30.

[9] Debray, *Che's Guerrilla War*, 87. See also Richard Harris, *Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara's Last Mission* (New York: Norton, 1970), 77.

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The quality of the guerrillas' leadership also had a varying influence on the insurgencies. Of the four movements under examination, only Castro in Cuba appears to have—independent of other variables—benefited the cause of the rebels. In Nicaragua and Venezuela the personalities of the guerrilla leaders appear to have had little impact on the outcome. The insurgencies in these countries were led by several leaders who controlled different factions, not by one dominant personality as in Cuba. And in Bolivia, the fact that such an important figure as Ernesto Che Guevara led the rebels seems to have actually harmed their cause. Guevara acted as a magnet to draw the United States into the conflict on the Bolivian government's side. In addition, Guevara's foreign origin made it difficult for the guerrillas to rally indigenous support.

Having examined those factors that had no consistent influence on the outcome of the four insurgencies, I shall now analyze those variables that did repeatedly benefit one side or the other. For the sake of clarity, we shall group these variables into two sets. First, those factors that affected the performance of the insurgents themselves. Next, those variables that influenced the effectiveness of the government's counterinsurgency operations.

Factors Affecting the Insurgents

The strategy and tactics of the guerrillas is the first variable that had a reoccurring impact on the insurgents' performance. In Cuba, Castro's forces gained support by declaring that their objective was only to restore equality and justice to the nation. On several occasions Castro said he merely wanted to restore the democratic regime that had existed before Batista's 1952 coup. In 1958, he even signed the Declaration of Caracas, which provided for unity of action among the anti-Batista groups and called for Batista's replacement by centrist Manuel Urrutia. The guerrillas greatly benefited from these public professions of moderation, as well as from the inability of the moderate opposition to depose Batista themselves. As time passed, more and more Cubans supported the insurgents because it appeared that only they could oust Batista and because few people feared that they would suffer more from a guerrilla victory than from Batista's continued tenure in office. The rebels also took care to avoid operations that produced large numbers of civilian casualties, thus alienating as few people as possible.[10]

In Nicaragua two factors make it difficult to determine what effect, if any, the strategy and tactics of the guerrillas had on the uprising. On the one hand, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National (FSLN) continually altered its tactics

[10] Robert J. Alexander, *Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders* (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 275; Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1978), 129; Edward W. Gude, "Batista and Betancourt: Alternative Responses to Violence," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, vol. II, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 583; Harris, *Death of a Revolutionary*, 50–51; and Suchlicki, *Cuba*, 171–172, 174.

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during the early 1960s and 1970s, repeatedly shifting from a rural-oriented strategy to an urban-oriented one. In addition, during the 1970s the Nicaraguan insurgents were divided into three "tendencies," each of which pursued different strategies and tactics. Nevertheless, it appears that after 1977 the Nicaraguan guerrillas benefited from their use of the same tactics that had aided their Cuban counterparts two decades earlier: public professions of moderation designed to win popular support, combined with the selective use of force against their opponents.[11]

In Venezuela the insurgents initially pursued a policy of urban terrorism in the futile hope that they could engender a military coup against the popularly-elected government of Romulo Betancourt. A military takeover would have alienated Betancourt's supporters and facilitated the insurgents drive for power.[12] In order to precipitate such a coup, the guerrillas in 1962 alone killed or wounded more than eighty police officers, burned seventy-five buses, and tried several times to sabotage operations at the country's vital oil installations. They also robbed banks and indiscriminately planted bombs in public buildings. The failure of this urban terrorist strategy became evident in 1963 when the insurgents' call for a boycott of the national elections was disregarded by over 90 percent of the registered voters, despite prior guerrilla warnings that anyone who went to the polls would be shot. The rebels then shifted their operations to the countryside in an attempt to wage a protracted guerrilla war. They proved just as unsuccessful at gaining rural support as they had at acquiring urban followers, however, and soon abandoned their struggle.[13]

In Bolivia the insurgents were overly preoccupied with their ultimate desire of spreading revolution throughout Latin America. It seems that Guevara's main objective was not to seize power in Bolivia itself, but to encourage the formation of additional *foci* (units) in Argentina, Peru, and elsewhere in Latin America. The United States, Guevara reasoned, lacked sufficient resources to suppress all

[11] George Black, *Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua* (London: Zed Press, 1981), 116–117; James A. Booth, *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 139–145; Ricardo E. Charvarria, "The Nicaraguan Insurrection: An Appraisal of its Originality," in Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Nicaragua in Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 28; Edward Crawley, *Dictators Never Die: A Portrait of Nicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 128ff.

[12] Robert J. Alexander, *The Communist Party of Venezuela* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), xix, 81ff.; Gude, "Batista and Betancourt," 585; Jones and Molnar, *Internal Defense Against Insurgency*, 74; and John D. Martz, *Accion Democratica: Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 113–114.

[13] Alexander, *Communist Party*, 81–82, 89–98; David E. Blank, *Politics in Venezuela* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 119–120; Laqueur, *Guerrilla*, 341; Edwin Lieuwen, *Venezuela*, 2d. ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 190; John D. Martz, "The Evolution of Democratic Politics in Venezuela," in Howard R. Penniman, ed., *Venezuela at the Polls: The National Election of 1978* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), 9; John D. Powell, *Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 102; and Jose Antonio Gil Yepes, *The Challenge of Venezuelan Democracy*, trans. Evelyn Harrison I., Lolo Gil de Yanes, and Danielle Salti (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981), 52.

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these movements and would exhaust itself in trying to do so. "Bolivia will sacrifice itself so that the conditions [for revolution] can be created in neighboring countries," a fellow guerrilla records Guevara as declaring. "We have to make [Latin] America another Vietnam, with its center in Bolivia."[14] But Guevara drew the wrong lessons from his experiences in Cuba, and this led him to overestimate the capacity of a guerrilla *foco* (unit) to survive against the Bolivian government's counterinsurgency operations.

The level of popular support for the guerrillas also had an important impact on the insurgents' performance. Many theorists of internal war believe that to succeed the rebels must enjoy at least the passive support of a large percentage of the population. The attitude of the inhabitants, asserts Robert Taber, "is the key to the entire struggle."[15] Guevara himself observed in 1961 that "the guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition" for his success.[16] In the four case studies under examination it appears that popular support for the guerrillas, though a precondition for their success, was not a sufficient factor in itself to guarantee victory. What was more important was whether the insurgents were able to link their rural support with the operations of the governments' urban opponents.

The Cuban rebels received increasing support from the country's rural population, particularly the inhabitants of the Sierra Maestra. The main factor behind Batista's collapse was not the operations of the insurgents in the countryside, however, but the activities of the regime's urban opponents. As Edward Gude explains, while Castro's forces presented a severe problem for the Batista government, it was actually the urban underground "that became the backbone of the revolutionary movement."[17] These forces were linked to the guerrillas through various organizations such as the underground cells of the 26th of July Movement and of the Civic Resistance Movement.

A similar pattern emerges in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1960s and especially during the 1970s, the FSLN received the support of the peasants of the north-central region of Nicaragua.[18] Nevertheless, it was not until four other developments took place that the insurgents gained sufficient support to topple Anastasio Somoza. First, the rebels established underground units in Nicaragua's cities. Second, government repression radicalized groups and individuals who had originally pressed for moderate reforms. Third, the non-FSLN opponents of the government proved unable to oust Somoza. And fourth, the Sandinistas showed themselves—with their daring hit-and-run raids like their 1978 seizure of the National Palace—capable of effectively challenging the re-

[14] Debray, *Che's Guerrilla War*, 72–79; Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971), 397; Harris, *Death of a Revolutionary*, 72–79; and Daniel James, ed., *The Complete Diaries of Che Guevara, and other Captured Documents* (New York: Stein & Day, 1968), 16.

[15] Taber, *War of the Flea*, 22.

[16] Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 4.

[17] Gude, "Batista and Betancourt," 582

[18] Booth, *End and the Beginning*, 141.

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gime.[19] By the time of the FSLN's final offensive in 1979, the rebels were able to combine their traditional military operations with a national strike and a popular insurrection in the cities, creating a situation that compelled Somoza to resign.

By comparison, in both countries where the insurgents were ultimately defeated, the rural guerrillas were unable to coordinate their operations with the regime's urban opponents. In Venezuela there was always much popular hostility to the Betancourt government within the cities. In the 1959 presidential elections, for example, while Betancourt gained majority support throughout the rest of the country, he received fewer votes in Caracas than any of the other three major party candidates, and the announcement of his election was greeted by two days of rioting by its residents.[20] University students were especially hostile to the regime. In the university student elections, Betancourt's Accion Democratia (AD) regularly received less than 15 percent of the vote, while the radical coalition normally obtained absolute majorities. The students also established armed camps within the universities and, protected by a university autonomy statute, they initiated acts of terrorism against the regime.[21] Similarly, the lumpenproletariat inhabiting the slums surrounding Caracas and the other Venezuelan metropolises strongly supported the actions of the extreme left (and right).[22] The insurgents, however, were unable to use their support among these groups to create an urban base to assist their rural operations. The guerrillas' call for a national strike, for example, was continually ignored by the bulk of the population, as was their plea for a boycott of the 1963 elections.

There was also strong urban opposition in Bolivia to the military government of Rene Barrientos. The workers in the mines surrounding the cities violently opposed the regime, especially after the government cut the miners' wages by almost 50 percent. In a 1968 opinion poll, fully 69 percent of the miners questioned agreed that "Bolivia would be better off without the activities of the national government," while 84 percent of the miners (as well as 68 percent of a cross section of factory workers) believed that "in Bolivia the difference between the rich and the poor is getting larger."[23] Furthermore, students and

[19] Black, *Triumph of the People*, 110–117, 126–130; Booth, *End and the Beginning*, 108–114, 123–125, 135; Crawley, *Dictators Never Die*, 149–152; and Chavarria, "Nicaraguan Insurrection," 36–37.

[20] Robert J. Alexander, *The Venezuela Democratic Revolution*, 57–58; and Gott, *Guerrilla Movements*, 128–129.

[21] Alexander, "Communist Party," 82; Black, *Triumph of the People*, 50; Blank, *Politics in Venezuela*, 50, 117, 121; Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), 172–174; and Yepes, *Challenge of Venezuelan Democracy*, 49–51.

[22] Alexander, "Communist Party," 51; and Blank, *Politics in Venezuela*, 66–68.

[23] Cited in Christopher Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1977), 100. See also Herbert S. Klein, *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 248; and James M. Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," in James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., *Beyond the Revolution* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 144–148.

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teachers held large demonstrations in La Paz and elsewhere during the time of the guerrilla operation. But as Debray ruefully observed, the insurgents were unable to benefit from the disorders in the cities because they lacked means to coordinate their operations with these urban opponents of the regime.[24]

The Bolivian rebels were also unable to gain much support among the peasantry. "The inhabitants of the region are as impenetrable as rocks," Guevara wrote in this diary. "You speak to them, but in the depths of their eyes you can see that they do not believe you."[25] The insurgents' inability to rectify any of the peasants' grievances was a major reason for their lack of rural support. Guevara wrote in his treatise on *Guerrilla Warfare* that "the peasant must always be helped technically, morally, and culturally" and that the insurgent must be "a sort of guiding angel who has fallen into the zone, helping the poor always and bothering the rich as little as possible in the first phases of the war."[26] But as Gueverra's close ally Debray notes, in Bolivia the peasants already possessed land as a result of the 1952 revolution and hence were not interested in the rebels' promises of agrarian reform. "The peasant 'problem,' in so far as existed here, was not the problem of land, or even of land-tenure;" he observes. Rather, "it was a whole mass of scattered demands varying from one locality to another (the selling price of produce, costs of transport, profiteering of middlemen, difficulty of getting loans, lack of equipment, etc.)." As a result, "the guerrilla force had no concrete proposals for improving living conditions, which might have caught people's imagination by touching the sensitive points of their immediate social lives."[27]

Paradoxically, whether the pro-Moscow Communist party within the country aided the guerrillas had little impact on the outcome of the four insurgencies. In Cuba the Communists opposed Castro's operations against Batista and denounced such actions as his 1953 attack on the Moncada barracks as "crazy adventures sometimes hatched out on the university campus."[28] The party instead declared that it intended to force Batista—through strikes, demonstrations, and civic protests—to hold elections. Communist leaders advocated the establishment of a Democratic Front of National Liberation which, upon the ouster of Batista, would form a coalition government of workers, peasants, and bourgeois. It was not until 1958 that the Communists publicly proclaimed their support for the insurgents.

In Nicaragua the pro-Moscow Socialist (Communist) party called the Sandinistas "leftist adventurers" and accused them of playing into the hands of the government. Almost until the end of the Somoza regime, the party called for a

[24] Debray, *Che's Guerrilla War*, 20.

[25] Cited in Harris, *Death of a Revolutionary*, 141.

[26] Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 33.

[27] Debray, *Che's Guerrilla War*, 92.

[28] Cited in Suchlicki, *Cuba*, 164. See also Alexander, "Prophets," 275; Booth, *End and the Beginning*, 90, 116; and Thomas, *Cuba*, 922, 980–981.

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government of "national unity" under bourgeois leadership. The Communists believed that such a government was needed to create the preconditions required by Marxist-Leninist theory for a successful socialist revolution. It was only after a FSLN triumph appeared inevitable that the party and the USSR decided to join the bandwagon and support the rebels.[29]

With respect to the insurgency in Bolivia, Richard Harris argues that Bolivia's pro-Moscow Communist party leaders betrayed the guerrillas in at least four ways: they provided Cuban officials with misleading information about the political situation in Bolivia and about the willingness of their party to undertake guerrilla operations; they prevented Bolivian Communists from joining the insurgents; they failed to fulfill their promises of support for the rebels; and they supplied the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Bolivian government with important information about the guerrilla movement.[30] Guevara's diary also shows that once the rebels indicated to the Bolivian Communists their intention of conducting their military campaign free from party control, the Communists became increasingly cool towards the guerrillas and reneged on some of their earlier offers of support.[31]

Only in Venezuela did the Communists support the insurgency, and even in that country the party was quick to abandon the rebels once it became evident that the movement would fail. The Communist party of Venezuela (CPV)'s initial decision to support the guerrillas was due to three factors. First, the successful insurgency that had just ended in nearby Cuba convinced many CPV members that they too could seize power through force. Second, many recently-recruited CPV members—most of whom were either pro-Chinese or were radical deserters from the reformist parties—called on the old-guard leadership to adopt a harder line toward the government. Third, from almost his first days in office Betancourt showed hostility toward the Communists and made it clear that he wanted nothing to do with them. Concluding that they had little to lose and much to gain from launching an insurrection, the CPV leadership decided to wage a campaign of terror against the government.[32] After the failure of the boycott against the 1963 elections, however, many CPV leaders concluded that their strategy had been a mistake. By early 1967 the CPV Central Committee was denouncing terrorism on the grounds that it had "nothing to do with either the revolution or the defense of the popular cause." When later that year three Cuban military officers were apprehended while landing with a group of Venezuelan guerrillas on Venezuela's coast, the CPV went so far as to accuse the Cuban government of interfering in Venezuela's internal affairs.[33]

[29] Black, *Triumph of the People*, 72; Booth, *End and the Beginning*, 115; and Henri Weber, *Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution*, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1981), 59.

[30] Harris, *Death of a Revolutionary*, 159.

[31] James, *Complete Diaries*, 62–65.

[32] Alexander, "Communist Party," 70–75; and Gott, *Guerrilla Movements*, 21–23.

[33] Alexander, "Communist Party," 105, 116.

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Factors Affecting Counterinsurgency Operations

Besides examining those variables that affected the insurgents' operations, we must analyze those factors that influenced the performance of the government's counterinsurgency campaign. One of the most important of these was whether the regime received support from another country. Such assistance tends to have a Janus-like effect. In the short term a government's capacity to defeat an insurgency can improve if it is receiving foreign assistance. In the long run, however, such assistance can greatly harm the government, because it leads people to question the patriotism and independence of the regime. In the four case studies the impact of the former greatly outweighed that of the latter. In fact, what becomes readily evident from an analysis of these four insurgencies is the tremendous influence that one country—the United States—has on the success or failure of a guerrilla campaign. Whenever the American government firmly opposed the insurgency, the rebellion failed. When the administration declined to support the government, the guerrillas triumphed.

In Cuba the American government refused to fully back the Batista regime. Throughout the insurgency U.S. officials remained divided about the appropriate American response toward developments in Cuba. The two U.S ambassadors to Cuba—Arthur Gardner and Earl Smith—advocated total support for Batista; leading officials in the CIA and the State Department urged neutrality.[34] Because these disputes were not resolved, the administration managed to pursue policies that simultaneously antagonized both Castro and Batista. The latter was upset with the American decision to impose an arms embargo against his government in March 1958. And Castro became angry when the United States attempted to find a non-rebel replacement for the collapsing Batista government, a strategy he correctly interpreted as an American attempt to rob his forces of their imminent victory.[35]

Similarly, during the Nicaraguan insurgency the Carter administration refused to grant Somoza total support and instead suspended American economic and military aid and called on the Nicaraguan government to curb its human rights abuses. These policies harmed Somoza's counterinsurgency operations by reducing the amount of repression the National Guard could employ against the guerrillas and creating severe financial problems for the government.[36] Nevertheless, American policy was not always consistent, a reflection of the conflicting pressures influencing the Carter administration at the time. The White Huse refused to suspend the delivery of previously-allocated American aid to the Somoza government, for example, and did not oppose the International Mone-

[34] Domínguez, *Cuba*, 64; Thomas, *Cuba*, 947–949.

[35] Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), 23, 26–27; Domínguez, *Cuba*, 64–65; and Thomas, *Cuba*, 1015–1059.

[36] Jeane Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Security in Latin America," *Commentary*, January 1981, 35–40; and William M. LeoGrande, "The United States and the Nicaraguan Revolution," in Walker, *Nicaragua in Revolution*, 64, 111–112.

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tary Fund (IMF) decision to provide Nicaragua in 1979 with a $66 million loan, much of which was subsequently used to purchase arms from Israel and other countries. At one point Jimmy Carter—under pressure from Somoza's supporters in Congress, who threatened to derail the Panama Canal treaties unless the President showed less hostility towards the Nicaraguan leader—even wrote a letter to Somoza praising improvements in his human rights record. After it became apparent that Somoza's days were numbered, moreover, the American government again attempted to achieve a political settlement that, while removing the government from office, would nevertheless prevent the insurgents from gaining undisputed control. And, as in Cuba, the administration managed to antagonize both the besieged government and the insurgents.[37]

In contrast to its actions in Cuba and Nicaragua, the United States wholeheartedly supported the counterinsurgency operations of Venezuela and Bolivia. During the early 1960s the U.S. military mission in Venezuela was the largest in South America. Once the guerrilla campaign began, American advisers were attached to each tactical unit of the Venezuelan air force and with the two principal army counterinsurgency battalions. These advisers instructed Venezuelan soldiers about operational tactics and civic action programs. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., President John F. Kennedy took a personal interest in the survival of the Betancourt government. This assistance greatly helped the Venezuelan government maintain popular support during the guerrilla campaign.[38]

The Bolivian government had benefited from American backing ever since Milton Eisenhower convinced his brother that the 1952 Bolivian national revolution was not communist-inspired and did not represent a threat to American interests in the region. During the early 1960s the Kennedy administration significantly increased U.S. military aid to Bolivia as part of a general effort to combat communism in Latin America. In 1965 Americans began instructing Bolivians in counterinsurgency tactics. Once the guerrilla campaign started, the United States increased the size of its military mission in Bolivia and sent a Mobile Training Team to instruct the Second Bolivian Ranger Battalion in the latest "Internal Defense and Development" techniques. It was this Ranger battalion that succeeded in destroying the guerrilla *foco* later that year.[39]

A related variable concerns the nature of the aid the guerrillas received from other countries. Such assistance was provided in all four insurgencies. In two of the cases, however, the support was proffered in such a way as to allow the government concerned to depict the help as constituting foreign interference in its foreign affairs. Such an image harmed the insurgents' efforts to portray themselves as indigenous movements.

[37] Booth, *End and the Beginning*, 128–130; LeoGrande, "United States and Nicaraguan Revolution," 67; and Walker, *Nicaragua in Revolution*, 36, 38.

[38] Blank, *Politics in Venezuela*, 121, 218; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1967), 701–704.

[39] Cole Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," in James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, *Beyond the Revolution*, 87, 94; Gott, *Guerrilla Movements*, 479; Harris, *Death of a Revolutionary*, 172–175; and Mitchell, *Legacy of Populism*, 91, 101.

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Castro's forces, for example, greatly benefited from the sanctuary provided by Mexico and (unintentionally) the United States. The rebels received supplies from supporters in both countries, and Mexico served as a convenient point of departure for Castro's 1956 invasion. In addition, favorable coverage in the American press—especially by *New York Times* correspondent Herbert Matthews—helped Castro's movement gain much international support. The FSLN likewise received important assistance from several Latin American governments. The Cubans provided the Nicaraguan rebels with aid, particularly toward the end of the conflict when the guerrillas' victory appeared inevitable; but help also came from Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. The first three governments defended the insurgents before various international fora—such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN—and supplied the FSLN with money and arms. The Costa Rican government led the effort to provide the Sandinistas with international recognition and permitted the guerrillas to use its territory as a sanctuary. In these two cases the affected governments were unable to persuade their citizens or the international community that the insurgency was initiated or directed by foreign governments. This allowed the guerrillas to obtain the benefits of external support without incurring its possible costs.

Although the rebels in Bolivia and Venezuela also received foreign assistance, this support proved extremely costly in that it allowed the governments concerned to claim that the guerrillas were merely the instruments of foreign powers. For example, when a three-ton arms cache from Cuba was discovered in Venezuela in late November 1963, President Betancourt, claiming that his country was the target of foreign-initiated subversion, immediately brought the matter before the OAS, which later supported his accusation. Similarly, the Bolivian insurgents suffered from the fact that close to half their members came from outside Bolivia. The government was able to portray itself as the victim of foreign-sponsored aggression and played on the nationalist sentiments of the Bolivian people. After the first successful guerrilla ambush, for instance, the government issued a communique declaring that "the national territory has been invaded by an armed group made up of diverse nationalities, the majority adhering to the Castro-Communist line. They have been joined by a number of extremist political sectors within the country."[40] Guevara's diary indicates that he too had been concerned that so many of his recruits came from outside Bolivia.[41] In these countries direct foreign intervention on the rebels' behalf proved more beneficial to the governments concerned than to the intended beneficiaries.

The strategy and tactics of the government under assault also helped determine whether the insurgency succeeded. Most experts in counterinsurgency warfare agree that a government's strategy should be designed to win popular support and thus isolate the insurgents. They recommend that government forces avoid tactics that result in large civilian casualties and instead perform "good

[40] Cited in Gott, *Guerrilla Movements*, 448.
[41] James, *Complete Diaries*, 35.

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deeds" for the people such as building bridges and supplying food and basic health care. They also recommend that government troops engage the guerrillas immediately before they have had the opportunity to consolidate their influence in any geographical region.[42]

In Cuba the government failed to pursue these policies, with disastrous consequences. In retrospect it appears that Batista made two major mistakes in his campaign against the guerrillas. First, during the early phases of the insurgency the President underestimated the threat posed by the rebels and waited too long before committing the bulk of his army to counterinsurgency operations. Second, Batista permitted government troops to indulge in the excessive use of terror, even when they were not fighting the guerrillas. While the government's countermeasures appear to have been effective in the cities, the excessive use of terror cost the government much popular support and rapidly demoralized the army. The regime compounded its errors by using only enough terror to antagonize its opponents but not enough to destroy them. In 1955, for instance, Castro left his prison cell—where he had been placed only a year before after his assult on the Moncada barracks—because of a government-sponsored amnesty law. He immediately fled the country and plotted his successful 1956 invasion. Press censorship was so lax that Castro's subsequent guerrilla campaign received wide coverage throughout the country. As a result of these government policies, the rebels carried out their operations in the Sierra Maestra with little interference and much publicity.[43]

The Nicaraguan government made some of the same mistakes during its campaign against the FSLN. Unlike Batista, Somoza did not hesitate to send his troops against the insurgents, and during the first fifteen years of the FSLN's existence (until 1974) the government had little difficulty containing the insurgency. After the rebels severely embarrassed the regime by seizing several important Nicaraguans as hostages at a private party in 1974, however, Somoza responded with such brutality that he was strongly condemned by human rights and religious groups. Upon President Carter's inauguration in 1977, the American government also began to condemn Somoza for human rights violations. In response, the Nicaraguan ruler lifted the state of siege that he had established in 1974 and reinstated freedom of the press. When this occurred, Nicaraguans openly began to flaunt their hatred of the regime. Students demonstrated and the anti-Somoza newspaper, *La Prensa*, published articles documenting government corruption and human rights violations. When unidentified gunmen assassinated the editor of *La Prensa*, riots broke out throughout the country. Although Somoza now attempted to repress the newly-aroused populace, he only succeeded in driving people into the ranks of the Sandinistas. From this point

[42] McCuen, *Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, 60–62; and O'Neill, *Insurgency*, 208–209.

[43] Domínguez, *Cuba*, 126, 131; Gude, "Batista and Betancourt," 582–583; Jones and Molnar, *Internal Defense against Insurgency*, 65, 69, 71; Suchlicki, *Cuba*, 167, 173; Taber, *War of the Flea*, 39; and Thomas, *Cuba*, 959.

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on, the government was never able to bring sufficient strength to bear to quiet the regime's opponents.[44]

In contrast to the policies of Batista and Somoza, the governments of Venezuela and Bolivia used strategies and tactics designed to maximize their popular support. While President Betancourt did suspend some civil liberties, he always waited until the Venezuelan people themselves demanded such harsh measures. The Accion Democratica party also avoided repeating the mistakes it had made during its first period in power, mistakes which led to its overthrow by the military in 1948. This time Betancourt regularly conferred with the leaders of Venezuela's other major parties (except the Communists) and avoided taking actions that antagonized the military. In addition, the Betancourt regime—unlike its counterpart in Cuba or Nicaragua—introduced reforms designed to win popular support, particularly among the peasants. The government financed improvements in education, housing, and other areas using Venezuela's growing oil revenues. It also carried out a land reform program that—while less far-reaching than originally intended—nevertheless visibly aided many peasants. Partly as a result of these reforms, most peasants supported the regime.[45] Subsequently, Betancourt's successor established an amnesty program, which facilitated the government's counterinsurgency campaign by bringing many insurgents back into the arena of constitutional political action.[46]

In Bolivia, Guevara based his plans on the mistaken assumption that the government would overreact to the presence of his guerrilla *foco* and would alienate the peasantry. With American assistance, however, the Bolivian army adopted a strategy that emphasized civic action and rural development. The Bolivian government also waited until troops specially instructed in counterinsurgency had finished their U.S. training before employing the bulk of their forces against the guerrillas, thus preventing the insurgents from destroying the Bolivian army piecemeal, as occurred in Cuba. In addition, President Barrientos actively cultivated peasant support, spending roughly half his time on helicopter trips to the countryside where he would dedicate new rural schools or open minor public work projects. The Bolivian government also profited from the reforms that had been initiated after 1952 by the revolutionary government. The reforms' beneficiaries continued to be grateful to the regime long after the initial revolutionary leaders had left the political scene. As in Venezuela, the peasants responded by aiding the Bolivian army in its campaign against the insurgents.[47]

[44] Alexander, "Prophets," 273–274; Black, *Triumph of the People*, 136; Booth, *End and the Beginning*, 94, 140–143; Crawley, *Dictators Never Die*, 152–153; and Chavarria, "Nicaraguan Insurrection," 32–35.

[45] Alexander, "Venezuelan Democratic Revolution," 6–9, 103, 106–107, 159–193, 246–296; Blank, *Politics in Venezuela*, 44–47, 62, 117, 121; Gude, "Batista and Betancourt," 586; Lieuwen, *Venezuela*, 193; Martz, "Accion Democratica," 81–87, 96, 113, 315–337; Martz, "Evolution," 4–9; Powell, *Political Mobilization*, 106–112; and Yepes, *Challenge of Venezuelan Democracy*, 49–51.

[46] Gott, *Guerrilla Movements*, 172; and Martz, "Evolution," 9.

[47] Alexander, "Prophets," 204, 207–209; William Carter, *Bolivia: A Profile* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 55–56, 65–68; Gott, *Guerrilla Movements*, 478–479; Harris, *Death of a Revolutionary*,

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It was also very difficult for the insurgents to gain the support of the people in those countries where established and broad-based political parties existed. In the two countries where the guerrillas succeeded, the established political parties were weak and ineffective. In Cuba, for instance, the major political parties were either leaderless or disorganized or both. None were able to present a constructive program of action. Corruption was rampant and the parties were riddled with factionalism. Batista's 1952 coup, moreover, removed what little political equilibrium remained in pre-revolutionary Cuba. Castro's forces easily marched into a political vacuum.[48]

Similarly, the Somoza family thoroughly subverted Nicaragua's major political parties through its efforts to create a rigged democracy. The Liberal party became a tool of the Somozas, who regularly chose the party's nominees, and the Conservative party was usually bought off by government-sponsored electoral pacts that guaranteed the party a fixed number of legislative seats. Whenever the Conservatives refused to agree to such a deal, Somoza would establish a National Conservative party whose function was to divide the opposition vote. After the campaign, the National Conservatives quickly disappeared and their candidates returned to their regular nonpolitical jobs.[49] Because the established political parties in Cuba and Nicaragua were unable to present a credible alternative to the governments in power, discontented citizens were left with no alternative but to support the rebels.

By comparison, the governments of Venezuela and Bolivia used their political parties' mass organizations as instruments to limit the appeal of the insurgents. In Venezuela, the governing AD party, together with its coalition partner COPEI (Christian Democrats), maintained control over most peasants and workers through these organizations.[50] During the 1940s and 1950s Accion Democratica had incorporated—in a process similar to what Samuel Huntington has called a "Green Uprising"—the peasantry into Venezuela's political system in alliance with its organizations. As a result, AD was able to draw considerable support during the rebellion.[51] In Bolivia the military government likewise used the Movimento Nacional Revolucionaria (MNR) mass organizations and the ties that existed between the conservative peasantry and the peasant-dominated army to limit the insurgents' support.

The final variable affecting the performance of the government is perhaps the most important: whether the regime is considered legitimate by those it governs.

173–175, 177; James, *Complete Diaries*, 20, 54–55, 59; Klein, *Bolivia*, 231–236, 246–247; Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," 142, 146; and Mitchell, *Legacy of Populism*, 97–98.

[48] Domínguez, *Cuba*, 110, 123; John D. Martz, "The Political System: Toward Institutionalization," in John D. Martz and David J. Myers, eds., *Venezuela: The Democratic System* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 95; and Suchlicki, *Cuba*, 101ff., esp. 146–149.

[49] Black, *Triumph of the People*, 32, 58; Booth, *End and the Beginning*, 63, 89–90; Crawley, *Dictators Never Die*, 145–146; and Chavarria, "Nicaraguan Insurrection," 28.

[50] Alexander, "Venezuelan Democratic Revolution," 76–86; Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela*; and Martz, "Accion Democratica," 146, 255–299.

[51] Powell, *Political Mobilization*.

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A government's legitimacy is a product of its origins, its methods, and its performance. In those countries where the insurgents succeeded, most inhabitants believed that the government had come to power through improper ways, used inappropriate methods, and ran the country poorly. Conversely, when the government came to power through traditionally-accepted means, acted with propriety, and performed well in office, the regime normally had little difficulty in controlling the country. As Guevara himself noted, "Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted."[52]

At the time of the insurgencies in Cuba and Nicaragua, the two governments were widely perceived as illegitimate by large segments of the population. Batista, for instance, had come to power through a military coup, and his rule was noteworthy for the degree of corruption it experienced. Furthermore, none of the other Cuban political institutions—such as the Congress or the courts—performed sufficiently well to compensate for the executive branch's problems. And, when the U.S. government imposed an arms embargo on Cuba in March 1958, Batista lost one of his last pillars of support. It appeared that even the United States questioned the legitimacy of his rule. The widespread feeling in Cuba that Batista was illegitimate goes far to explain why it was so easy for Castro's small band of insurgents to overthrow him.

The Nicaraguan government suffered from many of the same problems as its Cuban counterpart. To start with, Somoza was a political upstart; his father seized power through an unconstitutional coup in the 1930s. In addition, because he was unable to create a political party independent of his personal rule, Somoza had to rely on the National Guard to maintain control of the country. His periodic holding of fraudulent elections—in an unsuccessful attempt to provide his regime with a modicum of legitimacy—only succeeded in reminding people how illegitimate his rule actually was. Moreover, after Nicaraguan officials illegally diverted international relief and reconstruction assistance following the 1972 Managua earthquake to pay for improvements on the Somoza family's private estates, many Nicaraguans lost all faith in their government's ability or even desire to care for them.[53]

By comparison, most Venezuelans and Bolivians did not challenge the legitimacy of Betancourt's and Barrientos's leadership. Betancourt's legitimacy resulted from his popular election and from his policy of infringing as little as possible on Venezuelans' civil liberties. Similarly, the Bolivian government drew its legitimacy from the popular perception that it was the genuine heir of the 1952 revolution. President Barrientos's repeated efforts to enhance his popularity among the peasantry reinforced the peasants' perception of him as

[52] Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 2.

[53] Black, *Triumph of the People*, 58–60, 104; Crawley, *Dictators Never Die*, 133, 146–149; and Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Nicaragua in Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 16.

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a benevolent ruler. With popular acceptance of their leadership, Barrientos and especially Betancourt were able to resist their opponents with relative ease.

Conclusion

The four case studies suggest that four variables are indispensable prerequisites for a successful insurgency in Latin America. First, the guerrillas must coordinate their rural operations with the activities of the government's urban opponents. As Huntington points out, while urban instability is a universal characteristic of developing countries, rural disorders are not.[54] If the insurgents are able to coordinate their operations with the urban opposition, there is a high probability that the guerrilla campaign will succeed. In all four cases, the government confronted an active urban opposition. But it was only when the rebels were able to link their activities with those of the urban opposition that they succeeded.

Second, the guerrillas have done best when they have appeared least threatening. In Cuba and Nicaragua the insurgents repeatedly affirmed their intentions of establishing a broadly-based democratic regime. They also used violence only against their opponents and avoided tactics that would have resulted in many civilian deaths. In Venezuela and Bolivia, however, the common perception was that the rebels desired to establish Communist-dominated regimes based on force. The Venezuelan guerrillas' resort to urban terrorism enhanced this view and further tarnished their image. The insurgents' strategy and tactics have thus been very important insofar as they have influenced popular beliefs concerning rebel motivations.

Third, since 1945 no insurgency has succeeded against a regime that has enjoyed the full and unqualified backing of the American government. The only two occasions when the United States did not unambiguously support the existing regime—in Cuba during the 1950s and in Nicaragua during the 1970s—were the only two occasions when the counterinsurgency campaigns failed.

Finally, when the government ruled with the assistance of a mass-based political party and adopted tactics that avoided producing indiscriminate civilian casualties but yet involved combat with the guerrillas at an early stage in the insurgency, the rebels were unable to gain sufficient popular support to present a serious threat to the survival of the regime. One repeatedly sees that the contemporary mass-based political party represents an excellent tool for channelling and controlling political conflict in developing countries. Where such parties existed, as in Venezuela and Bolivia, the insurgents were easily defeated. Where such parties were lacking, as in Cuba and Nicaragua, the guerrillas ultimately triumphed.

[54] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 77.

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Reindustrialization, Liberal Democracy, and Corporatist Representation

ROBERT C. GRADY

For nearly a decade the role of the state in the economy has been controversial. Numerous public figures and scholars have challenged the adequacy of government's mid-century role as regulator of conditions for market competition or free enterprise. Their challenges have produced a debate over the reindustrialization of the American economy and the need for some form of industrial policy. At the center of this debate is the proposition that the state must be an active participant in, and guarantor of, specific types of investment and productivity decisions for specific firms or sectors of the economy.

Since the New Deal, the ground rules for the regulated but competitive economy have been virtually unquestioned.[1] Public consensus for the role of the state was explained by the pluralist or interest-group liberal theory of politics. Pluralism stressed that bargaining and accommodation among the various interests affected by public policy encouraged consensus and legitimated the role of the state. This explanation reached its peak of acceptability during the period immediately preceding the Great Society years. During those eras, potentially divisive issues of who pays, who benefits, and who represents whom in the pro-

[1] In certain respects the current controversy is similar to one during Roosevelt's first New Deal, but that one was set aside (or at least its significance obscured) by the second New Deal's shift from a "concert of interests" to the regulated but competitive economy. For an overview, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1959) and *The Politics of Upheaval* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1960); R. Jeffrey Lustig, *Corporate Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); and Thomas K. McCraw, ed., *Regulation in Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

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cess of sustaining economic productivity were muted because certain public-interest criteria concerning social welfare, equity, and group accommodation were sustained.[2]

The basis for consensus, however, has broken down in the past decade. The United States's economic leadership of the world has waned. Declining and emerging industries have scrambled for various governmental supports. Citizens have increasingly become disaffected because of unemployment, inflation, and taxes. In short, problems such as these have called into question the possibility of realizing both economic growth and equity. Productivity and equity are now divisive issues, not goals believed achievable within the regulated but competitive economy. The reindustrialization debate has emerged as the consensus has fallen apart.

Leading intellectual proponents of reindustrialization are self-described liberals. They range from people like Robert B. Reich, who urges a systematic national industrial policy guided by democratic planning, through Felix Rohatyn, who advocates resurrection of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to Lester C. Thurow, who proposes a mix of policies to encourage investment in new technologies and to mitigate the effects of declining industries—"sunrise" and "sunset."[3] Taken together, these liberals go beyond the consensual ground rules for the regulated but competitive economy. They believe that attempts by the state to adjust to or improve upon market limitations have proved to be inadequate. In place of the regulatory state they propose a general framework for a managed capitalist economy. At the same time, they claim that their values, or normative ideals, are consistent with the traditional normative assumptions of liberal democratic thought.

Socializing Risk and Corporatist Representation

This article assesses the liberal approach to reindustrialization and its implications for certain norms or requirements for liberal democracy. Specifically the paper is concerned with the problem of *representation.* The thesis is twofold: The liberal approach to reindustrialization provides for a managed capitalist economy in which the state assumes major responsibility for capital accumulation. That is, reindustrialization requires the socialization of risk. The approach necessitates some form of functional or corporatist representational arrangements, which are highly problematic given the ideal of popular representation articulated in traditional liberal democratic theory.

[2] Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1979).

[3] Reich, Rohatyn, and Thurow have published numerous articles and essays on the American economy. Most relevant are Robert B. Reich, *The Next American Frontier* (New York: Times Books, 1983); Felix Rohatyn, "The Coming Emergency and What Can Be Done About It," *The New York Review of Books*, 4 December 1980, 20–26; and Rohatyn, "Reconstructing America," *The New York Review of Books*, 5 March 1981, 16–20; Lester C. Thurow, *The Zero-Sum Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

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Two qualifications should be noted at the outset; the first, terminological, the second, substantive. First, to assert that the liberal approach to reindustrialization requires the socialization of risk is simply to supply a rubric that encompasses the various policy proposals of the approach. Socialization of risk refers to governmental assumption of responsibility for the continuation or the development of firms, sectors, or markets and for the success of decisions and policies that traditionally have been viewed as private-sector functions in an otherwise entrepreneurial society. The key referents are two: *governmental*—or public—*assumption of responsibility* and activities *traditionally believed to be* private sector.

Ordinarily the socialization of risk has pejorative connotations. For instance, Theodore J. Lowi, in his criticism of interest-group liberalism, argues that the liberal state is reduced to "buying" its legitimacy because policies that socialize risk indiscriminantly guarantee solvency to the highest bidders—to firms and organizations, such as unions, which have well-established political resources. Two conclusions follow. The state's pretensions to democratic legitimacy are eroded. And capitalism loses its moral capital: the entrepreneurial spirit is entrepreneurial no more.[4]

The socialization of risk can be used constructively, however. Lester Thurow's prescriptions in *The Zero-Sum Society* provide examples of this. The zero-sum society resembles the world of interest-group liberalism, and public policy makers do accede to the demands of the major political interests. The main problem, in Thurow's view, is that policy makers simply rely on double standards for economic productivity and for equity. He proposes to rectify the problem with a series of political-economic changes that make criteria for productivity and equity interdependent. His proposals include policies that socialize risk, and they allow the notion to be used without the usual critical connotations.[5]

An immediate, substantive objection to the second part of the thesis should be: Why corporatism? And, if so, so what? The assertion that reindustrialization of the American economy requires functional or corporatist representation may not appear to be particularly novel or even problematic. Well-known arguments by Lowi, Grant McConnell, and others regarding the delegation of legislative authority and the role of private governments demonstrate that, in practice, American liberals have accommodated themselves to functional representation as though it were merely a theoretical inconvenience.[6] There is, however, an

[4] Lowi, *End of Liberalism*, 271–294.

[5] On double standards, see the "doctrine of failure" in Thurow, *Zero-Sum*, 21–22, also 80–82. See also Reich, *American Frontier*, 176–200. On risk socialization, see Robert B. Reich, Lester C. Thurow, Gus Tyler, and Michael Harrington, " 'A Path for America': Three Comments on Michael Harrington's Article and His Reply," *Dissent* 30 (Winter 1983): 25–32; and the remarks of Thurow in *What Kind of Industrial Policy?* (Washington, D.C.: Democracy Project Reports—no. 2, 13 January 1982), 5–12.

[6] Lowi, *End of Liberalism*; Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).

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enormous difference between acknowledging or tacitly accepting the consequences of contemporary practices and proclaiming the need for, and legitimacy of, functional representation arrangements. Affirmative proposals for socializing risk require formal or public recognition of corporatist representation. Such proposals change the terms under which traditional liberal democratic theories of representation have been developed. But in changing the terms for traditional discourse, they amount to a reformulation of legitimation requirements for liberal democracy.

Functional representation has not been a positive component of liberal democratic theory but, to the contrary, a problem for it, the problematic character of which is clearly enunciated in the notion of faction. Writers such as Lowi and McConnell have criticized contemporary political practices not simply because they distort the theory, but because no alternative justification for functional representation has been forthcoming.[7] To avoid this type of criticism, and thus the familiar charge that reindustrialization is simply a new installment in the corporation's battle with democracy, the liberal approach to reindustrialization must contain a justification for corporatist representation that supplements, but does not supplant, the liberal democratic ideal of popular representation.[8] The justification can make corporatism legitimate on grounds of expertise, efficiency, a public interest in economic growth, and so on. But in this reformulation of democratic legitimation requirements, these criteria must be reconciled with the criterion of popular representation.

None of the reindustrialists explicitily attempt to reformulate liberal democratic legitimation requirements and reconcile corporatist criteria with popular representation. This is an understandable shortcoming, since the reindustrialization debate is polemical and proposals are often designed for specific constituencies. An initial step toward overcoming this deficiency is to anchor liberal reindustrialization proposals in a theoretical analysis, which addresses the sorts of problems that must be confronted if corporatism is to be reconciled with democratic ideals. This type of analysis is provided by Charles E. Lindblom in *Politics and Markets*.[9] However, an assessment of his work in conjunction with reindustrialization proposals indicates that arguments for corporatism, at least in the context of American politics and economics, tend to supplant rather than complement popular representation.

By linking the proposals of Thurow in *The Zero-Sum Society* with Lindblom's theoretical analysis, implications of reindustrialization for liberal democracy can be assessed. The linkage does not produce perfect congruence between Thurow and Lindblom, and the Thurow-Lindblom position that results is necessarily

[7] See especially McConnell, *Private Power*; and also Charles W. Anderson, "Political Design and the Representation of Interests," *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (April 1977): 127–152; Lustig, *Corporate Liberalism*.

[8] The advantages for business are assessed in William E. Connolly, "The Politics of Reindustrialization," *Democracy* 1 (July 1981): 9–21; Maurice Zeitlin, "Democratic Investment," *Democracy* 2 (April 1982): 69–80.

[9] Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

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somewhat artificial. It is the necessary, if less than satisfactory, consequence of linking practical proposals with theoretical analysis.[10] Thurow's proposals exemplify the sorts of concrete steps necessary to fill out a highly tentative recommendation put by Lindblom at the conclusion of his book: "Governments might take on the meticulous task of designing a highly discriminating mixture of financial inducement to business with governmental control over them."[11] Thurow and Lindblom differ in many respects. In general, however, they are troubled by the awkward relationship between democratic aspirations for popular control over public policy in a society in which business is, to them, disproportionately influential. They also are troubled with how this relationship between public and private power affects equity or distributive justice. A brief overview of their common concerns provides a useful introduction to the analysis in the remainder of this article.

Theoretically, everyone can be the long-term beneficiary of socializing risk, *if* it is developed properly. But politics operates in the short term, if for no other reason than the truism that the effects of today's decisions affect tomorrow's calculations. In the short term two basic points stand out: Citizens are the ultimate risk takers under policies that socialize risk; businesses and other actors immediately associated with them (for example, unions) are generally the immediate beneficiaries. Consequently, the likelihood of formulating risk-socializing policies in a manner that enhances popular control (let alone distributive justice) at the expense of disproportionate business influence is remote. It is, therefore, on no small paradox that Lindblom concludes *Politics and Markets*: "The large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit."[12]

In one form or another, socializing risk always taps into the system of incentives that motivates businessmen. As Lindblom puts it, answering his rhetorical conjecture about inducements and echoing Adam Smith's view that businessmen normally gravitate to mercantilist protections: "They do so because it pays."[13] Thus if the payoffs or inducements are sufficient, businesses and their associated actors might allow both a measure of public influence over their activities and support equity goals, the approximation of which would make any measure of public influence that much more meaningful.

This overview of concerns held by Thurow and Lindblom is cursory but suggestive. In a sense they adopt a variant of the Marxist analysis of the capitalist

[10] Thurow is emphasized largely for reasons of convenience: his is the most systematically presented reindustrialization position; it is less given to conflicting interpretations than others'; and he is explicit in his commitments to democratic legitimacy and equity. For a useful overview, see James P. Young, "Political Economy & the Democratic Left," *Polity* 14 (Spring 1982): 519–522. Rohatyn's contributions to the reindustrialization debate have come more in the form of policy guidance than publication, and he is more frequently charged with promoting business conservatism than are the others. See, for example, Zeitlin, "Democratic Investment."

[11] Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 349.

[12] Ibid., 356.

[13] Ibid., 349.

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state's "accumulation" and "legitimation" functions. Traditionally, Marxist analysis has held that the capitalist state attempts to balance two contradictory functions. It must sustain capital accumulation as an agent of the capitalist class. Simultaneously, it must maintain legitimacy before a public electorate by appearing to pursue the public interest and to give priority to the demands of citizens over those of special interests.[14] These democratic liberals, however, attempt to resolve the contradiction. They do this by arguing that the liberal democractic state can provide the context for capital accumulation *in return for* its legitimacy by linking economic growth (capital accumulation) to equity or redistributional goals (legitimacy). The conditions for attaining this resolution between capital accumulation and popular control or legitimacy, however, place substantial constraints upon liberal democratic theory.

The following section briefly summarizes relevant arguments and proposals put forth by Thurow. The next section examines in some detail Lindblom's position and its implications. The final section concludes by using the Thurow-Lindblom position to explore the plausible consequences of corporatist policy making for the liberal ideal of popular representation.

Learning to Live With the Socialization of Risk

The Zero-Sum Society contains proposals that flesh out the skeleton of Lindblom's tentative recommendation. Thurow's task is dual: to develop a case for equity and to develop the policy initiatives necessary for restoring U.S. economic productivity. The two arguments should be viewed as a piece. Thurow argues that the United States can establish internationally competitive productivity levels. He further argues that this can be accomplished while meeting domestic societal demands by moving toward a more acceptable range of equity, which itself is essential to worker productivity.

Thurow's major concern is that current economic policies discourage facing up to equity or redistributive issues and, in doing so, exacerbate the problem of attaining appropriate levels of growth. Current policies fail, and their failures are traceable in large part to the ideological predispositions of business and policy elites. They tend to assume that equity flows from productivity—to the extent that they consider equity at all. In effect, with his proposals Thurow asks these elites to repudiate the conventional wisdom.[15]

[14] James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), especially chap. 4; Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in Leon N. Lindberg, Robert Alford, Colin Crouch, and Claus Offe, eds., *Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975), 125–144. Admittedly the point here overgeneralizes since it collapses the distinction between "instrumental" and "structural" Marxism.

[15] On the narrow vision of business elites and their failure to grasp the relationship between business concerns such as growth and productivity and other moral or social issues such as equity, see Leonard Silk and David Vogel, *Ethics and Profits* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), chaps. 7–8, esp. 136–151, 189–197, 232–239; David Vogel, "The Inadequacy of Contemporary Opposition to Business," *Daedalus* 109 (Summer 1980): 47–58.

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The failure of current policies to address equity and growth is nowhere better exemplified than in the prevailing opinion regarding tax policy. The favorable presumption toward growth helps justify tax slashes and accelerated depreciation to spur reinvestment while blinding elites to the interrelationship between growth and equity. Thurow puts the issue succinctly:

> To raise investment it is necessary to improve the characteristics of the labor market. . . . Simply raising the income of capitalists, with tax cuts that must be paid for with tax increases for workers, is unlikely to achieve either more investment or a higher growth of productivity. In generating more profitable investment opportunities, skill acquisition and a cooperative work force are as important as more funds to buy new equipment. Starting a class war is hardly the way to proceed.[16]

Echoing new familiar themes of Fred Hirsch and others, Thurow argues that the promise of economic growth has been a surrogate for addressing distributive justice, since it is widely believed that equity will flow from abundance. In a no growth or low growth economy, however, failure to address equity comes home to roost. Nonetheless, sustaining economic growth (increasing productivity) is essential to establishing economic equity, however defined. The problem is to develop policies that allow for real growth in which the equity demands of former losers (women and minorities) and the gains for former winners (white males) can be accommodated or reconciled.[17]

Thurow calls for a series of policies that are designed to utilize the market allocation system while tapping into the incentive system that informs the behavior of business and policy elites. His proposals for the productivity side of the equation include the establishment of a national investment committee, governmental funding for recapitalization and process research and development (R&D), investment guarantees to encourage moves from sunset to sunrise industries, a socialized sector of employment and a government-funded safety net for individuals. These place the burden of risk squarely upon the government; that is, risk is socialized among the taxpaying public. However, these proposals are designed to discriminate between investments that are productive and consistent with equity and those that are not.[18]

The goals of Thurow's proposals are straightforward. The policies do designate obvious beneficiaries, and that is precisely the point: they are not hidden. The beneficiaries of the policies are articulated in terms of the public purpose behind the policies (productivity and equity, for Thurow), not hidden behind a sentiment that amounts to a generality (maintaining or unleashing free enter-

[16] Thurow, *Zero-Sum*, 84. See also Thurow, "Getting Serious About Tax Reforms," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1981, 68–72; Robert B. Reich, "Beyond Reaganomics: How the Rage for Supply-Side Riches Is Impoverishing Our Politics," *The New Republic*, 18 November 1981, 19–25.

[17] Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe, eds., *The Political Economy of Inflation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), esp. chap. 2; Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 9–12, 117–122, 173–190; Thurow, *Zero-Sum*, 16–24, 178–189, 194–208.

[18] See Thurow, *Zero-Sum*, 78–102, 145–153, 167–211.

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prise, or invoking capitalist ideology as a smokescreen). The policies involve constraints or sanctions—they come with strings attached—to achieve the public ends. In Thurow's view, the adoption of the proposals would avoid the double standard of rescuing one interest at the expense of another or, as critics aver, of attempting to salvage major political interests simply because they control extensive capital investments, established labor pools, and the like.[19]

Thurow's insistence that public-policy goals and equity judgments guide the reindustrialization effort addresses the thrust of Lindblom's proposal in *Politics and Markets* to induce businesses to waive privileges, say by trading productivity guarantees for public controls. But how plausible or viable the proposals are in the context of prevailing economic wisdom—the ideology and incentives of policy elites—is another matter. For example, Thurow recognizes that his proposals threaten vested interests and in the case of the socialized employment program require a restructuring of the economy. His call for responsible political parties acknowledges that the major problem is political but also that his analysis fails to deal adequately with the roles and values of interest groups, particularly business, in policy making.[20] Lindblom's analysis illustrates both the limitations of Thurow's proposals and the sorts of incentives required by them.

The "Pay-to-Waive" Strategy

Politics and Markets delineates the basic constraints that interrelationships between state and market place on policy choices in a liberal democracy. As Lindblom analyzes these constraints, policy makers have a limited range of options, which require essentially that they calculate trade-offs between economic needs and political values in making their decisions.[21] Lindblom's recommendation to combine inducements for businesses with government controls over them is an example of one type of trade-off. It is also the central one in his book. The recommendation bears reiterating, this time in full:

> Clearly governments have not in the past carefully distinguished between two types of privilege: [1] those that directly assure profitability and [2] those that give the corporation autonomy to pursue profits with little constraint. Corporations have insisted on both, hardly distinguishing between the two. A policy based on a fundamental distinction between the two would seem a possibility worth examining.[22]

[19] In effect, Thurow proposes to make systematic the ad hoc policies criticized in Lowi, *End of Liberalism*, 271–294, and Reich, *American Frontier*, 176–186. For debate over Thurow's position, see Barry Bluestone, Harley Shaiken, and Lester Thurow, "Roundtable: Reindustrialization and Jobs," *Working Papers* 7 (November–December 1980): 47–59.

[20] Thurow, *Zero-Sum*, 203–207, 212–214; Young, "Political Economy and the Democratic Left," 520–521.

[21] Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 345–351. For Lindblom, the function of theoretical analysis is to enhance public choice, that is, to link theory with practice. See Charles W. Anderson, "The Political Economy of Charles E. Lindblom," *American Political Science Review* 72 (September 1978): 1012–1016; Stephen L. Elkin, "Market and Politics in Liberal Democracy," *Ethics* 92 (July 1982): 720–732.

[22] Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 350.

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And he suggests, "The key strategy is, in effect, to pay businesses to waive some of their privileges."[23] Hereafter, Lindblom's strategy is termed the pay to waive strategy.

The pay-to-waive strategy is based on Lindblom's argument about "the privileged position of business." Business privilege derives from a dual system of public authority, which, he claims, characterizes liberal democracies. The institutions, practices, and traditions of liberal democratic governments ("polyarchies," in Lindblom's parlance) constitute one form of public authority. The activities of business and the role of the market constitute the other. Business competes with political authority and attempts to dominate democratic politics and its interest groups, parties, and elections. The result of the competition is "to restrict polyarchal rules and procedures to no more than a part of government and politics, and to challenge them even there."[24] Citizens, moreover, accept business values as their own. Certain "grand" issues, as Lindblom styles them, of capital control, the distribution of income and power, and the like, about which challenges to businesses and markets could be made, are sublimated. This civic learning process or indoctrination enables business to win victories on a political battlefield devoted to "secondary" issues of unemployment, welfare, and inflation, which are viewed by the public as functions of government spending and regulations.[25]

The net effect of these various phenomena—the dual system of authority, successful business competition against political authority, citizen acquiescence in business vlaues—is that business influence and success are disproportionately greater than the influence and successes of other political institutions and practices within liberal democracies. Indeed, Lindblom asserts before an American business audience that, since business long ago won the war over the grand issues, public officials simply must make concessions to businesses in order to gain approval for their policies.[26] Therefore, in view of business privilege, two obvious questions stand out regarding the pay-to-waive strategy: Why would business leaders have any incentives to waive any privileges and accede to any measure of popular control? If they did, in return for what?

It is commonplace that American business claims to be averse to government regulations. Research on the attitudes and values of business leaders indicates that American business people have a generalized psychological disposition against regulations, an aversion built around the presumed virtues of the free enterprise system. This disposition enables them as a matter of course to oppose regulations that appear to contravene their activities and strategies, even if such regulations may promise greater gains for them in the future. At the same time,

[23] Ibid., 349.

[24] Ibid., 190. On the dual system of authority and business privilege, see ibid., chaps. 10–14.

[25] Lindblom describes this process of indoctrination as "circularity"; ibid., chaps. 15–16.

[26] Charles E. Lindblom, "Why Government Must Cater to Business," *Business and Society Review* 27 (Fall 1978): 5–6 and fn. 15.

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business people take for granted that the state should encourage productivity and its precondition, profitability.[27]

Business people can rationalize these seemingly contradictory attitudes about regulatory constraints and state-supported productivity because, in their minds, the free enterprise system is natural and integral to a free society. Thus they predict, and often produce, dire consequences both in the aftermath of regulations and in the absence of favorable dispensations. ("If spokesmen for businessmen predict that new investment will lag without tax relief, it is only one short step to corporate decisions that put off investment until tax relief is granted.")[28] Or, in individual cases, they accept or often support favorable regulations or dispensations, such as protections for sunset industries, since these are rationalized as exceptional cases. As David Vogel puts it:

> Industries may be embarrassed by protective regulations or subsidies, but they are not opposed to them. It is rather that they see these policies as exceptional. They do not understand that the American capitalist system requires a large degree of state intervention for its very survivial; they only want to support those policies and agencies that directly benefit their firm or industry.[29]

And they also find acceptable constraints imposed by the state that effectively reallocate responsibility and blame from the firm to the state—labor relations, unemployment compensation, employee drug use, civil rights, affirmative action.[30]

For the pay-to-waive strategy, much turns on the beliefs and perspectives of business people. Several of the reindustrialists criticize business attitudes and practices, claiming that business looks to the short-term (the annual report to stockholders as the measure of managerial success) rather than to the long-term productive status of their firms and industries. They recommend industrial policies that would provide incentives for business to take the longer view.[31] Lindblom suggests, however, that any incentives must be reconciled with the privileged position of business: "Businessmen ask for a great deal. They also

[27] For this and the next three paragraphs, see Silk and Vogel, *Ethics and Profits*, 162–177, 193–217; David Vogel, "Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives," *British Journal of Political Science* 8 (January 1978): 45–78; Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 172–187, 190; Edward S. Herman, *Corporate Control, Corporate Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 5, esp. 172–175; Thurow, *Zero-Sum*, 126–145. This disposition is not monolithic, however. See James O'Toole, "What's Ahead for the Business-Government Relationship," *Harvard Business Review* 57 (March–April 1979): 94–105.

[28] Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 185.

[29] Vogel, "Why Businessmen Distrust," 67–69, at 69. See also Herman, *Corporate Control*, 251–301.

[30] See the insightful comments on affirmative action by Barbara R. Bergmann, "An Affirmative Look at Hiring Quotas," *New York Times*, 10 January 1982. On business advantages under the new regulation, see Herman, *Corporate Control*, 182–184.

[31] In addition to Thurow, *Zero-Sum*, see Reich, *American Frontier*, 140–172.

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routinely protest any proposal to reduce any of their privileges. They are not highly motivated to try to understand their own needs."[32]

How, then, is business to be induced or paid to waive any of its privileges, especially its autonomy? What incentives must government provide and what can be gained in return? The pay-to-waive strategy suggests inducements such as enhanced productivity and profitability in return for public controls. What is at stake, however, are not simply the terms and conditions of productivity, which, as Lindblom suggests, business is not highly motivated to understand. At stake are prerogatives or privileges in seeking these terms. Vogel provides a fair paraphrase of Lindblom:

> What is precious [to businessmen] about the American system is not so much its superior performance but rather the relative autonomy that its managers enjoy. . . . [T]he real relevant meaning of freedom for the American bourgeoise is the ability of those who own or control economic resources to allocate or appropriate them as they see fit—without interference from either labor unions or governmental officials.[33]

The main thing business values is managerial autonomy or, as Lindblom terms it, corporate discretion, and not simply greater productivity and profitability.

Reindustrialization proposals that are designed to improve economic productivity by socializing reinvestment risks are simply unrealistic if, in return for the benefits to business, public policy appears to constrain managerial autonomy. Lindblom emphasizes the practical limitations that business privilege places on the pay-to-waive strategy by outlining an idealized blueprint for the strategy. He suggests: "the hypothetical possibility of a hybrid form of popular control that combines market control over outputs with polyarchal control, weak as it is, over the delegated decisions on which market control is weak."[34] The hybrid helps illustrate how proposals such as Thurow's could be adopted by public officials and reconciled with business privilege. More importantly, it suggests that corporatist policy-making arrangements are necessitated by the pay-to-waive strategy.

First, a planner-sovereignty approach illustrates the market control side of the hybrid. Since business output decisions are determined in part by the market (how much of a good to produce at what price), the state could regulate demand, and thus indirectly production, by purchasing products. By regulating demand, such an approach would provide a general framework for implementing a version of Thurow's proposed shift from sunset to sunrise industries. The practical limitations to this approach are that it offers inducements but no real trade-offs in terms of government controls, and that it does not directly address the issue of managerial autonomy or corporate discretion. ("One of the great misconcep-

[32] Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 179.
[33] Vogel, "Why Businessmen Distrust," 54.
[34] Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 156.

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tions of conventional economic theory is that businessmen are induced to perform their functions by purchases of their goods and services.")[35]

A second approach, for the other side of the hybrid, would require governmental (polyarchal) control over delegated decisions. This approach highlights the role of the pay-to-waive strategy more explicitly than the planner-sovereignty approach does. The market delegates decisions about resource allocation to businessmen—reinvestment, diversification, technological innovation, organization of the work force, plant location, and so on. These decisions shape the contours of the economy's industrial structure and of its abilities to save, invest, and consume; they effectively constrain market controls. In Lindblom's view, decisions about resource allocation are determined chiefly by corporate discretion. Business defends these discretionary decisions on the grounds that it must control all decisions in order to attain least-cost outcomes (efficiency pricing). However, business has little guidance in allocating resources, since market controls are weak and constrained; and at any rate, as Lindblom argues, there is in principle no single least-cost solution in the first place.[36] It follows, he concludes, that

> if enterprises cannot unerringly find least-cost decisions and if in any case there are alternative least-cost decisions depending on corporate strategy [regarding the various resource allocation options] , . . polyarchal regulation need not necessarily result in higher costs.[37]

Lindblom's argument about government controls makes a plausible case for socializing risk. Resource-allocation decisions always incur risk, which business wants to reduce. Policies that socialize risk (assuming that government decision making is no more error prone that that of business) can reduce potential corporate costs. Further, they can provide governmental sanction for such public-interest objectives as environmental quality and energy conservation, unemployment levels and employee retraining, and the like, which involve factors that are external to the firm. Thus Lindblom provides a framework of trade-offs—incentives for business and gains for public concerns—which support, for example, Thurow's proposals regarding reinvestment.

The practical limitations to the second approach are that, when risk is socialized, the trade-offs are limited by the needs of business:

> What, then, is the list of necessary inducements? They are whatever businessmen need as a condition for performing the tasks that fall to them in a market system: income and wealth, deference, prestige, influence, power, and authority, among others.[38]

[35] Ibid., 173; the approach is discussed at 98–103, 147–148. One of Lindblom's critics argues that planner sovereignty is the core of Lindblom's book: Aaron Wildavsky, "Changing Forward Versus Changing Back," *Yale Law Journal* 88 (November 1978): 217–234.

[36] Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 147–148, 152–157. Lindblom dismisses the view that corporate managers have developed a sense of social responsibility, which guides their delegated responsibilities; whatever their values, they exercise discretion: ibid., 155–156 fn.

[37] Ibid., 156–157, at 156.

[38] Ibid., 174.

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The point, however, can be generalized to both approaches. Public officials need to maintain conditions necessary for adequate business performance—"whatever businessmen need"—because business performs functions that officials "regard as indispensable."[39] Policy makers may attempt to utilize the incentives that motivate businessmen, but at the same time they are constrained by them and by the general dispositions of business to maintain and enhance managerial autonomy in a free enterprise system. For their part, business leaders may claim that only exceptional circumstances require supportive public policies. But they consistently ask for and receive appropriate inducements and incentives from public officials. In short, public officials and business elites have shared and reciprocal interests in maintaining an "acceptable" level of economic performance.

When Lindblom's pay-to-waive strategy is examined from the perspective of business privilege and the attitudes of American business, the limitations and requirements of reindustrialization proposals such as Thurow's are clarified. Based on the assessment provided in this section, the limitations are not economic or policy limitations. In a technical sense, of course, such limitations are highly controversial and form part of the current reindustrialization debate. They are attitudinal or ideological—generalized business dispositions against government regulations. However, the assessment here indicates that these limitations can be overcome by two other factors: the interests of public officials in overseeing acceptable economic performance and the interests of business elites in the success of that enterprise. Because both policy and business elites have these shared and reciprocal interests, the pay-to-waive strategy provides a basis for functional representation in the policy process, or for a form of corporatist policy making. This conclusion is not an explicit part of Lindblom's analysis. It is an implication—and a problematic one for his liberal democratic commitments—drawn from his strategy, which demonstrates that the trade-offs for corporatism are both feasible and desirable for business and policy elites.[40]

Liberal Democracy and Corporatist Representation

Numerous scholars of comparative politics have claimed that corporatism provides an explanatory framework that is preferable to the traditional pluralist theory of interest-group bargaining and mutual adjustment. Pluralism, it is argued, gained popularity in the United States because it provides an understandable account of politics in an environment in which the state is comparatively weak, serving as a neutral arbiter or umpire for competing interests. Corporatism, by contrast, provides a fruitful approach for understanding the political process in advanced industrialized nations where patterns of interaction,

[39] Ibid., 175.

[40] Anderson, "Political Economy of Charles E. Lindblom"; Rune Premfors, "Review Article: Charles Lindblom and Aaron Wildavsky," *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (April 1981): 201–225.

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cooperation, and accommodation between the state and key societal actors have emerged. Policy making is viewed as an interactive process between the state and its major functional organizations, which utilizes these organizations as "agencies of mobilization and social control for the state vis-à-vis their members." The corporatist approach can account for the roles of organized interests in public policy making and for the shared and reciprocal incentives that both government and societal elites must utilize for interactive policy making. Advocates of corporatism tend to stress the policy-making process and the mobilization of group members and resources in support of public policy.[41] For the pay-to-waive strategy, however, the emphasis on reciprocal incentives for mutually beneficial exchanges between government and societal elites is the more significant feature of corporatism.

Few scholars would argue that politics in the United States is comparable to the politics of a developed corporatist system, in which "the structured representation of functional interests in the process of policy-making" is formalized and considered to be legitimate.[42] But quite a few have argued that the pluralist theory no longer provides an adequate explanation of American politics. The role of the state in its interaction with major societal interests, especially business, has gone far beyond the idealized role of arbiter or umpire for countervailing interests. To their critics, pluralists do not seem to recognize the significance of reciprocal government-business values or the extent to which quasi-corporatist forms of policy making have come to be an acceptable norm for major areas of public policy. In the context of these criticisms, the pay-to-waive strategy is simply a constructive alternative to the pluralist explanation of politics.

More importantly, however, the pay-to-waive strategy provides the justification for a corporatist form of politics that is highly problematic for liberal democratic legitimation norms. The strategy provides an explicit rationale for recognizing and incorporating major interests such as business within the policy process. Thurow and Lindblom propose the sorts of mutually beneficial exchanges between the state and business that are central to the corporatist explanation of policy making. In effect, corporatist policy making can be claimed to resolve the contradiction between the state's need to sustain capital accumulation and growth for business while maintaining its legitimacy before the public. By examining some of the relevant incentives in contemporary politics for corporatist policy making, the implications and significance of the Thurow-Lindblom position for liberal democratic theory may be explored.

Business, as noted in the preceding section, regardless of its anti-government-

[41] Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (April 1977): 65–66, 74–82; Phillippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (April 1977): 7–38. Panitch prefers the term "quasi-corporatism" for assessing real world cases because corporatist structures are just that, "quasi." Hereafter, references to corporatism have this qualification in mind.

[42] Anderson, "Political Design," 141.

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intrusion sentiments within a free enterprise system, is adept at rationalizing supportive governmental sanctions and subsidies. And public officials, as Lindblom argues over and again, recognizing the need to maintain adequate business performance, give their support. One manifestation of this relationship is the so-called political business cycle in which public officials attempt to avoid blame at election time for poor economic performance (or receive credit for good performance).[43] State inducements to business in the context of electoral expectations cut two ways, however. By adapting to popular expectations, public officials pursue economic expansionist policies that simultaneously benefit business, and its need for an environment of growth, and constrain the autonomy of business elites, whose investment and marketing strategies must be undertaken within the context of policies keyed to electoral returns.

Business elites thus have two strong incentives for seeking corporatist representational and policy-making forums. First, corporatist policy making tends to be insulated from electoral pressure (corporate tax policy, hidden subsidies via regulatory policy, off-budget waivers and guarantees), particularly for the larger organizations and their associated actors. Second, the rhetoric of business may be anti-government, but for the prerogatives necessary to a free enterprise system between policy elites and popular demands, policy elites are the lesser of two evils, particularly as business elites respond to increasing popular distrust of business.[44] Thurow underscores the relevance of the second point in a somewhat different context of hidden benefits of regulatory legislation: "whatever the overt objective, the implicit objective is always the distribution of income and this is almost always the real reason for the existence of any regulation." The advantage of calling something regulatory when it is redistributive is obvious. The redistribution is hidden: "Voters will not put up with large direct subsidies, but large indirect subsidies can be hidden from the voter if rules and regulations are used."[45]

These two incentives, and especially the first, are reciprocated by policy elites, who conceivably could utilize the political business cycle to pursue a classic divide-and-conquer strategy among various sectors of the economy; but they do not consistently do so. The advantages of a corporatist form of policy making often outweigh such a strategy. Corporatism effectively reduces the scope of the electoral agenda. It tends to reduce pressures on elected officials to solve economic problems when these are transformed into technical problems to be dealt with by experts. Additionally it frees policy elites from bearing responsibility for

[43] Edward R. Tufte, *Political Control of the Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[44] On the first point, see Lester M. Salamon and John J. Siegfried, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy," *American Political Science Review* 71 (September 1977): 1026–1043; David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 72 (December 1978): 1243–1261. On the second, see Silk and Vogel, *Ethics and Profits*; Vogel, "Contemporary Opposition"; O'Toole, "Business-Government Relationship."

[45] Thurow, *Zero-Sum*, 123, 145.

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adhering to public representation guidelines and for the use of government coercion or authority insofar as these functions are transferred to the domains of sectors or organizations responsible for performance.[46]

The preceding characterizations of business and policy elites and their reciprocal incentives for seeking the advantages of corporatist policy making should have familiar contours. They describe phenomena with a longstanding history in the literature critical of pluralism—the "delegation of authority" to "private governments," a process through which elective responsibility is increasingly subordinated to the domain of "symbolic politics."[47] Corporatist policy making does not displace key components of pluralism (legislative representation and interest-group lobbying), but it does seriously limit the significance of pluralist explanations for policy making in instances where functional representation is preferred by both business and policy elites. The advantage of a corporatist explanation is that it provides a basis for understanding mutually beneficial exchanges between business and policy elites as just that—initiated for mutual benefit—rather than as by-products of countervailing powers or of accommodations and compromises between contending interests. Moreover, since the explanation stresses the incentives of business and policy elites to reduce electoral constraints on their actions, it also raises a dilemma for democratic theory.

Charles W. Anderson argues that corporatism might account for the political roles of prevailing institutions, but that theories of corporatism have not reconciled the role of functional representation with a theory of legitimacy:

> It is extremely hard in democratic theory to find grounds for investing the interests of capital and labor with the authority to make what are in effect public decisions. This is the flaw in any corporate theory of representation. How can one legitimate the legislative authority of powerful and contending interests over popular consent?[48]

Anderson goes on to sketch the framework for an affirmative response to the question.

Anderson argues that the formal incorporation of powerful interests as actors in policy making presupposes that two criteria are met: First, interest representatives are included in policy making according to whether or not their *roles* are compatible with the stated purposes of public policy. Second, the actual *decisions* taken by corporate or functional representative bodies must be made legitimate on the basis of whether their decisions conform to the criteria of public

[46] On limits of a divide and conquer strategy, see Eric A. Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 138–139. The main point of the paragraph is due to Frank Hearn; see his "The Corporatist Mood in the United States," *Telos* 56 (Summer 1983): 41–57. See also the observations of Panitch concerning the role of the Labour party and the Trade Union Congress in constraining union members to accede to business needs under the guise of the national interest (an incomes policy): Leo Panitch, *Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 246–250.

[47] Lowi, *End of Liberalism*; McConnell, *Private Power*; E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). On the domain of symbolic politics, see Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

[48] Anderson, "Political Design," 143.

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purpose informing the decision-making body and not simply on grounds that they meet the interests of the groups represented. The second criterion bears quoting:

> the decisions taken by bodies structured on functional lines are not rendered legitimate by virtue of the principle of representation on which they are based but by the conformity of their decisions to some substantive criterion of public actions. . . . [P]olicies are not legitimate because they are made by a certain kind of representative body but because they conform to an explicit standard of public decision.[49]

In other words, the legitimate role of the interests under the first criterion is not a sufficient test for public policy. The decisions taken must be conformable to generalized and formal procedures. Anderson cites, for example, Theodore Lowi's proposal for a "rule of law" criterion.

Anderson's criteria for reconciling functional representation with popular representation, like Lindblom's hybrid of popular and market controls, have analytic value but practical limitations. Both Thurow's and Lindblom's proposals approach Anderson's first criterion—especially Thurow's in his insistence that productivity be linked to equity. Thurow may be correct that issues of equity or distributive justice underlie the problem of attaining appropriate levels of productivity. And he forthrightly attempts to reconcile the two in his proposals. But meeting the second of Anderson's criteria is problematic. Recall that the acceptability of proposals such as Thurow's must be keyed to the sorts of trade-offs that Lindblom suggests for the pay-to-waive strategy. And that strategy is informed by a context of business privilege and a political agenda devoted to secondary issues. It is thus quite likely that the actual process of establishing criteria for decision making in the public interest—Anderson's second criterion of public purpose—would be undertaken in conjunction with the needs and aspirations of business. In other words, substantive procedural criteria upon which the decisions of representative bodies are to be grounded would be, roughly, business definitions. One should not expect enhanced public control of policy making to occur at the expense of business autonomy.

Business elites might meet public concerns about equity, however, in a way that constitutes a perverse variation of the pay-to-waive strategy (and which bypasses Anderson's second criterion and ostensibly meets his first one). Business elites might be induced to satisfy equity demands in return for socializing the risks of reinvestment. For example, affirmative action is a case in point of acceptable equity policy; and personal income tax reform, in exchange for investment incentives, is a plausible one (suggested by Thurow). The acceptance of equity demands in return for reinvestment assistance is compatible with the incentives of business and policy elites. The trade-off does not restrict managerial autonomy, and it permits policy elites to appear responsive to popular demands or to explicit public-interest criteria. Far from increasing public control, however, it is a perverse variation on the pay-to-waive strategy, since the equity

[49] Ibid., 143–145, 148–150, quoted from 148–149.

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benefits may be provided with little constraint on business. The public's agenda remains circumscribed as an arena of secondary issues apart from the policy domains of business elites.

The pay-to-waive strategy for socializing risk is conceived with the best of intentions. But in the context informing it—the privileged position of business—it implies a substantially revised role for popular representation in liberal democracy. No one would seriously deny tht the American Founding Fathers were concerned with economic productivity; some might say that Alexander Hamilton was preoccupied with it. But no one would seriously claim either that they envisioned sectorial representation—interest representation—as permissible other than *through* popular representation and its geographic variant, not alongside it or in lieu of it.[50] Proposals to reindustrialize the American economy, however, rely on the reciprocal incentives of business and government elites to develop industrial policies for their mutual benefit. Evidence suggests that these incentives support a form of corporatist policy making that subordinates popular representation to an agenda of largely secondary or symbolic politics.

To incorporate business and its needs in the formulation of public policy is tantamount to making its public authority legitimate. The pay-to-waive strategy for socializing risk provides an explicit rationale for recognizing the reciprocal interests of business and policy elites to engage in quasi-corporatist forms of policy making. The value of the strategy is not that it provides an adequate reconciliation of functional and popular representation—it clearly does not. The value of it is that it articulates that major constraints on liberal democratic ideals that underlie the reindustrialization debate.

The arguments cited and utilized in this section are neither new nor exceptional. They are aspects of the long-standing critique of pluralism or interest-group liberalism. Pluralist theory may not recognize the privileged position of business, and it may have tacitly accepted functional representation, but it did not formally legitimize it. If it is, as critics contend, the "elitist theory of democracy," it is elitist by default, not by design. Given the conflicts between business privilege and popular representation, there may be no practical, let alone theoretical, way to reconcile the needs of functional interests with the requirements of popular representation. But the analysis of Thurow, Lindblom and others, who assess the reciprocal interests of business and policy elites, also make it clear that an appeal for a return to the regulated but competitive economy, as explained by pluralism, can no longer be understood as elitist by default, but by design.*

[50] Scarlett G. Graham, "Government and the Economy," in George J. Graham, Jr. and Scarlett G. Graham, eds., *Founding Principles of American Government* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 312–323; J.R. Pole, *Political Respresentation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), 374–375.

*This paper originated in Eric Nordlinger's National Endowment for the Humanities seminar, Harvard University, 1981; it was presented at the 1982 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. The comments of Charles Anderson, Alfonso Damico, Richard Goff, Frank Hearn, and Lawrence Joseph are appreciated.

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U.S. Policy and German Scientists: The Early Cold War

JOHN GIMBEL

In defending themselves against criticism of Operation Ossavakim—the mass evacuation of German scientists and technicians and their families from East Germany and Berlin during the night of 21–22 October 1946—the Russians accused the Americans and British of having done the same thing in 1945, when their troops withdrew from Thuringia and Saxony late in June and early in July.[1] Reacting to the Russian deputy military governor's statement in private that "everyone knows" that Americans "forcibly removed large numbers of German scientists" when they left Thuringia in 1945, Robert Murphy, the United States political adviser in Berlin, reported to Washington that "I doubted his statement."[2] Murphy's response is interesting and significant for several reasons. First, it carefully avoided a discussion of what Americans had done in 1945, perhaps out of ignorance, possibly to admit to no precedent that would take the heat off the Russians for what they were doing at the time. Second, it followed a precedent set by President Harry S. Truman at Potsdam, when—despite contrary advice from experts in his delegation—he replied to Joseph Stalin's charge that the Americans and British had removed materiel and people from Thuringia and Saxony, saying that "no people had been removed by the

[1] See, for example, Robert Murphy to SecState, 26 Oct 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1946, V, 739–741; Murphy to SecState, 29 Oct 1946, RG 59, Decimal File 740.00119(Germany)/10-2946, National Archives (hereafter NA); and *The Stars and Stripes*, 29 Oct 1946, 1.

[2] Murphy to SecState, 31 Oct 1946, *FRUS*, V, 743.

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American Army."[3] Finally, Murphy's response reflects an uninformed and inaccurate point of view about the American withdrawal from the Soviet zone that has prevailed to this day. I have been impressed by the limited references one finds to the American evacuation of scientists and technicians from the areas designated as the Soviet zone of occupation, by the paucity of references to the application of force during the evacuation and the denial of its use when it is mentioned, and finally, by the lack of knowledge of the event among historians, political scientists, and former participants in the American occupation of Germany. Perhaps that should not have surprised me, as I myself was in Germany as a member of the occupation at the time and subsequently did about twenty years of research in the records of the American occupation of Germany before I realized that there is a story here.

In their campaign to defeat Germany, the British and Americans created a number of special intelligence organizations and units whose function was to identify, secure, guard, and exploit "valuable and special information, including documents, equipment and persons." These included T-Forces, which were special military units whose primary duty was to secure and guard intelligence and

[3] U. S. Delegation Memorandum, 11th Plenary Meeting, 31 Jul 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, Postdam II, 516–517. Stalin's information came from a report submitted to him by Marshal Georgii I. Zhukov, the commander of Soviet forces in Germany, listing town-by-town the types of materiel and the names of people removed by American and British troops in June 1945. (Zhukov to Stalin, trans., attached to Edwin W. Pauley to Harry S. Truman, 29 Jul 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, Postdam II, 905–912). Pauley, Truman's adviser on reparations, had his staff analyze the Zhukov report and concluded that it was "clear that this report is designed as a smoke screen for the unilateral USSR action in shipping to Russia, before the approval of a reparation plan, whole plants, including factories with no war-potential." (Pauley to Truman, 29 Jul 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, Postdam II, 904–905). But Pauley's staff wrote that "the [Zhukov] report is probably largely correct," observing, however, that most of the equipment, documents, and personnel removed were "clearly war booty," and that the people taken "were those suspected of being criminals or of contributing to German war potential." (Memorandum from Robert G. Sproul, attached to Pauley to Truman, 29 Jul 1945, *FRUS*, Postdam II, 905). Truman himself asked General Dwight D. Eisenhower for a full investigation. Based on information gathered by U.S. Forces, European Theater, G-2 Division, Eisenhower submitted an interim report on August 8th, saying that "with minor exceptions, I believe it may be granted that the Russian report is correct," adding that "actually, equipment, documents and personnel exceeding the claims made were evacuated for various reasons . . . " (Eisenhower to Truman, 8 Aug 1945, in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and Louis Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation, 1945*, vol. vi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 259–260. Six weeks later, after completion of the investigation, during which all major commands were required to report (USFET, G-2, to AG, Operations, 14 Aug 1945, RG 332, ETO, USFET, G-2 Section, Operations Branch, Correspondence, 1945, box 26, Washington National Records Center (hereafter WNRC), Eisenhower concluded that the findings of his interim report of August 8th were "verified," reiterating that "with certain exceptions, we did evacuate equipment and personnel from the Russian zone as claimed." (Eisenhower to Truman, 24 Sep 1945, in Chandler and Galambos, eds., *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, 367–368). A 35-page "Report on Evacuations," showing the items in the "Russian Report" alongside a "Summary of U.S. Information" on each item—apparently a copy of Eisenhower's report of September 24th—may be found in the Truman Library, PSF, box 179, folder: Report on Evacuations . . . , albeit without surrounding documentation to indicate what further action might have been taken. See also State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, SWNCC 328/3, Appendix C, RG 165, ABC 387 Germany (18 Dec 43), Sec. 20, NA, for another copy.

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counterintelligence targets for more specialized teams to exploit, and the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS), whose duty it was to select and recommend targets to the T-Forces and arrange for their exploitation once they were secured. To do the latter, CIOS formed or worked together with a variety of special units, which for convenience we can call CIOS teams. In actuality there were, in addition to CIOS teams, BIOS teams (British Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee), TIIC teams (American Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee), Combined Advance Field Teams (CAFT), and numerous unnamed groups that from time to time were attached to, traveled with, and functioned as members of ALSOS teams, Strategic Bombing Survey teams, Technical Oil Mission teams, as well as Air Force, Navy, and Army intelligence units.[4] Eventually, to avoid confusion, competition, and overlapping activities—but only after the war in Europe was over—many of these units and organizations were combined to form the Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT), which remained in existence until 30 June 1947.[5]

To staff the various exploitation units, CIOS drew upon the armed services for engineers, physicists, mathematicians, chemists, and other scientifically and technically trained people who could be transferred to CIOS. In addition, it tapped government agencies and departments, such as the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Foreign Economic Administration and the British Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade, for civilians who could be put on special assignment with CIOS as needed. As the number of targets to be exploited increased and the need for ever more specialists arose, especially after Germany itself came under occupation, CIOS (TIIC in the U.S.) asked universities, private industries, private and public research organizations, and professional, trade, and industrial associations to contribute or recommend people who might serve as CIOS consultants and investigators.[6] Primary qualifications were scientific and technical training and German language competency, although neither appears to have been a must. What emerged was a complex, combined, military-civil organization, staffed by and large by professionals who had, through past experience, study, professional associations, residence, travel, or by other means,

[4] SHAEF, G-2, Intelligence Directive No. 17, 27 Jul 1944, Subj. T-Forces, RG 165, ABC 334.8 CIO Subcmte (30 Jul 44), Sec. 1-A, NA; Report of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS) for 1944, CIC 63/9, 7 Feb 1945, RG 218, JCS. Central Decimal File 1942–45, CCS 319.1 (11-7-44), Sec. 2, box 133, NA; Summary, Final After Action Report, T Force and T Branch, 12th Army Group, 1 Jul 1945, attached to T Branch to G-2 Exec., 6 Jul 1945, RG 332, USFET G-2 Section, Operations Branch, Correspondence, 1945, box 27, WNRC.

[5] SHAEF, GBI/SS322-17, Subj. Establishment of Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT) of G-2, 31 May 1945, RG 331, SHAEF, G-4 file 321(G2), vol. 1, 1945, NA; OMGUS, FIAT, Final Summary Report, Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT), 1 Jul 1947, RG 260, AG Decimal file, 1947, box 120, WNRC.

[6] TIIC, Basic Directive, RG 165, ABC 334.8, CIOS Subcmte, (30 Jul 44), Sec. 1-A, NA; JIC 220/9, 21 Feb 1945, Subj. Interpretation of the Basic Directive of the TIIC, RG 165, ABC 334.8, CIO Subcmte, (30 Jul 44), Sec. 1-B, NA; TIIC, Minutes, 1st Meeting, 15 Nov 1944, RG 151, Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services (hereafter OTS), Reiss Files, box 157, WNRC.

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gained some familiarity with Germany before the war. Some were prewar refugees from Germany.[7]

Initially the CIOS teams had three basic objectives.[8] First, they were to find out what the Germans knew about weapons, radar, synthetic rubber, synthetic fuel, torpedoes, rockets, jet engines, infra red, communications, and such other things as would help the allies in their conduct of the war. Secondly, they were to gather information that could help to shorten the war against Japan after Germany's defeat. What did the Germans know about Japan that might help our war effort? How much and what kind of scientific and technical know-how had the Germans passed on to the Japanese? Finally, the CIOS teams were to locate and detain—even intern—German scientists and technicians to interrogate them for information identified above and to prevent them from slipping away to seek safe haven in another country and continue their wartime research and development programs and projects. Although it has been fashionable to see that latter aspect of the program as an early manifestation of the cold war with the Soviet Union and as a program to deny German scientists to the Russians,[9] it might be noted that early on *Project Safehaven*,[10] as this phase of the program was called, identified Spain, Egypt, Argentina, and other Latin American countries as the most likely havens to which the Germans might try to escape.

In its operations, CIOS used intelligence information gathered in Washington, London, and in the field to draw up lists of targets: black lists for targets of prime military importance and grey lists for those of scientific and industrial interest and possible military value, a distinction that in practice proved difficult to make and which was abandoned in May 1945, when black and grey lists were merged into one target list.[11] Included as targets were such things as industrial

[7] OMGUS, FIAT, Final Summary Report, Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT), 1 Jul 1947, RG 260, AG Decimal File, 1947, box 120, WNRC.

[8] Report of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS) for 1944, CIC 63/9, 7 Feb 1945, RG 218, JCS, Central Decimal File 1942–45, CCS 319.1 (11-7-44), Sec. 2, box 133, NA; Arthur Paul, Office of International Trade Operations, to SecCom, 26 Nov 1945, RG 151, Dept. of Commerce, OTS, file: Meeting . . . , box 79, WNRC.

[9] See Michel Bar-Zohar, *The Hunt for German Scientists*, trans. from the French by Leon Ortzen (London: Arthur Barker, 1967); Franz Kurowski, *Alliierte Jagd auf deutsche Wissenschaftler: Das Unternehmen Paperclip* (Munich: Albert Langen-Georg Müller Verlag, 1982); and Clarence G. Lasby, *Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War* (New York: Atheneum, 1971). In fairness to Lasby, it should be noted that he described the early American search for German scientists and scientific information as a program to end the war against Japan as quickly as possible, rather than as a race and contest with the Russians. The subtitle of the book and the later emphasis on the cold war tend, however, to overshadow his early discussion.

[10] Chief, Policy Staff, to AC/S, G-2, 16 Mar 1945, RG 319, Army Intelligence Decimal File 1941–48, 400.112 Research, 1 Aug 1948, box 991, WNRC.

[11] CIOS, SHAEF (Rear), Grey List Panel Monthly Report No. 1, 25 Jan 1945, RG 218, JCS, Central Decimal File 1942–45, CCS 319.1 (11-7-44), Sec. 2, box 133, NA; US Group, Control Council (hereafter USGpCC), Carrier Sheet, Subj. Grey List Panel of Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, 15 Feb 1945, RG 84, Berlin-Frankfort POLAD files, folder 37 (820.02a—Safehaven-Gen-and CIOS), box 734, WNRC; AmEmbassy, London, from George L. Powell, to SecState, for Crowley & Fleming FEA and Sargeant TIIC, 5 May 1945, RG 151, Dept. of Commerce, OTS, Reiss

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firms, factories, research laboratories and installations, scientific and technical institutes, military installations, universities, and individual scientists and technicians, all of which were to be secured by T-Forces that advanced with—and sometimes got ahead of—combat forces. Once secured and cleared of mines and booby-traps, where necessary, the targets were to be systematically and expertly exploited by appropriate CIOS teams.[12]

T-Forces and CIOS teams were attached to combat units, some of which penetrated into Saxony and Thuringia as the war came to an end in the spring of 1945—into areas that had already been designated by agreement as the future Soviet zone of occupation. The teams were extremely active in these areas in April, May, and June 1945, in part because many of the targets they had expected to exploit in Berlin and other cities had been evacuated there, but also because their original target lists included the synthetic fuel and rubber plants in Merseburg, the Zeiss optical works in Jena, the Schott & Genossen glass works in Jena, the I.G. Farben research laboratories in Wolfen near Bitterfeld, the Junkers aircraft plant in Dessau, the universities of Halle, Leipzig, and Jena, and a host of other places and people.[13] Despite feverish activity, complicated by transportation bottlenecks, lack of communication between units, and the general confusion as Germany collapsed, CIOS teams were far from finished with their investigations and interrogations when it became necessary to withdraw from Saxony and Thuringia because the Russians insisted upon such withdrawal before they would organize the allied control machinery for Germany and permit western allied troops to enter Berlin and occupy the sectors of the city that had been designated by prior agreements as theirs.[14]

The deadline eventually fixed for withdrawal of all allied forces into the agreed zones of occupation was 1 July 1945. As that date drew near, it became clear to CIOS that many targets in Saxony and Thuringia could not be fully exploited beforehand. Futhermore, the Americans and the British had taken key individual

Files, folder: JIOA Early TIIC Papers, box 157, WNRC; JIC to SHAEF, Rear, for US Sec. CIOS, 4 May 1945 and SHAEF, Rear, to War Dept. and SHAEF Main, 11 May 1945, RG 165, ABC 334.8 CIO Subcmte (30 Jul 44), Sec. 1-C, NA.

[12] Summary, Final After Action Report, T Force and T Branch, 12th Army Group, 1 Jul 1945, attached to T Branch to G-2 Exec., 6 Jul 1945, RG 332, USFET, G-2 Section, Operations Branch, Correspondence, 1945, box 27, WNRC.

[13] SHAEF, Main, AC/S, G-2, to "T" Force Sub-Division, Subj. Removal of archives and documents from Berlin, 2 Feb 1945, RG 331, SHAEF, G-2 Div., Intelligence Target Sub-Division, 1944–45, NA; CIOS, G-2 Div., SHAEF (Rear), Subj. Movement of CIOS Investigating Personnel to BERLIN under ECLIPSE Conditions, 24 Feb 1945, RG 165, ABC 334.8 CIOS Subcmte (30 Jul 44), Sec. 1-B, NA; TIIC, Communications Subcommittee, Agenda, 1 Mar 1945, RG 151, Dept. of Commerce, OTS, folder: Com.Subc.Agenda, box 114, WNRC; SHAEF, AC/S, G-2, Main, Subj. Evacuation and Movement of Intelligence Targets from BERLIN, 1 Mar 1945, RG 331, SHAEF, G-2 Div., Intelligence Target Sub-Division, 1944–45, box 144, NA.

[14] U. S. Minutes of Quadripartite Meeting of Allied Commanders in Chief. . . 5 June 1945, Enclosure to JCS Information Memorandum 413, 15 Jun 1945, RG 165, ABC 387 Germany (18 Dec 43), Sec. E-4, NA; SHAEF, from Eisenhower, to War Department, FWD 23723, 6 Jun 1945, RG 319, Army-CAD Messages, CM-INs-1945, box 18, NA; *New York Times*, 7 and 16 June 1945.

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scientists and technicians out of the area to be interrogated systematically in Paris, Luxembourg, Versailles, London, or other places, while their families remained behind in Germany.[15] Others were being held in the Hotel Wittelsbacher Hof in Bad Kissingen or in other interrogation centers while their families were in Dessau, Merseburg, Leipzig, Halle, Jena, and other places. Faced with these circumstances, fearful that Russia's neutrality in the Pacific war might preclude further exploitation of German know-how in the Soviet zone for the war with Japan, and apparently convinced that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, CIOS decided to evacuate the remaining targets as well as the families of those people it already held outside the Soviet zone.[16] In some instances it took targets or portions thereof—as was the case with Zeiss and Schott & Genossen—out of the Soviet zone for further exploitation, interrogation, or perhaps for eventual use in producing goods and services that could be used to shorten the war against Japan.[17]

The evacuations were hurried, badly organized, diverse in detail of execution, and at times chaotic.[18] During the second half of June 1945, officers and men

[15] See for example, Ernst Zindel to AC/S, G-2, Operatons Branch, Technical Intelligence Section, USFET, 23 Dec 1946, copy in Abt. 507, Nr. 3884, Hauptstaatsarchiv, Wiesbaden (hereafter HSA Wiesbaden).

[16] Combined Secretariat, CIOS, London, to "T" Sub-division, SHAEF, Subj. Removal of German Scientists and Engineers from Russian Zone at present occupied by Anglo-American forces to Anglo-American Zone, 15 Jun 1945, Truman Papers, PSF, box 179, folder: Report of Evacuations, Truman Library; U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, AC/S, A-2, to G-2, 12th Army Group, Subj. Movement of German Civilians, 14 Jun 1945, RG 338, USFET, G-2 Section, Operations Branch, Correspondence, 1945, WNRC; J. H. Fisher, USCGR, to Edwin W. Pauley, Subj. Report on Duties and Functions of Intelligence Agencies, 17 Jun 1945, Pauley Reparations Mission, 1945–46, lot M-17, box 26, NA; 12th Army Group to AC/S, G-2, 21st Corps, 20 Jun 1945, RG 332, ETO, USFET, G-2 Section, Misc. Records, 1943–1946, box 22, WNRC; USGpCC, FIAT, to USFET, G-5, Subj. Evacuation of German Scientists from Area now under Russian Occupation, 16 Jul 1945, RG 260, AG Decimal Files, 1945–1949, file AG 231.2 (Scientists), box 4, WNRC; Chandler and Galambos, eds., *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation,* 145, note 4; Lasby, *Project Paperclip,* 43, based on personal information from Major Robert Staver, Army Ordnance.

[17] Morton M. Hunt, "The Nazis Who Live Next Door," *The Nation,* 16 July 1949, 56–58 and 23 July 1949, 82–84; Walther Kiaulehn, *The Odyssey of 41 Glassmakers* (Munich: Graph. Kunstanstalt und Buchdruckerée Karl Thiemig, n.d.), 58 pp.

[18] Unless otherwise noted, the summary that follows is based on personal interviews with evacuees and many sources, of which the following are a sample: Knaut, Laenderrat, Notiz, Betr: Behandlung von Wissenschaftlern, die aus dem von den Russen kontrollierten Deutschland evakuiert wurden, 24 Jan 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 242–244, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (hereafter BA); Profs. Bredereck and Goessler, for Council of Evacuated Scientists, Heidenheim, Memorandum, 12 Apr 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 167–176, BA; 12th Army Group to AC/S, G-2, 21st Corps and to 7th Army, 20 Jun 1945, RG 332, ETO, USFET, G-2 Section, Misc. Records, 1943–1946, box 22, WNRC; Dr. Ludwig Rüger, Prof. fuer Geologie an der Universitaet Jena, Betr: Niederschrift ueber meine Evakuierung aus Jena, 30 Oct 1945, RG 260, 12/201-1, folder 11, WNRC; Michael L. Connors, Col., AGD, Hqs VI Corps, to CG, 12th Armored Div., Subj. Movement of German Scientists, AGO 370, 21 Jun 1945, RG 260, 12/197-2, folder 1, WNRC; Norbert A. Bogdan, Capt., GSC, to Murphy, USGpCC, Political Division, Subj. Brief Report on Visit to Halle, 27 Jun 1945, RG 84, POLAD Papers, Entry 59A543, part 4, folder 46, box 729, WNRC; Hqs 3rd Army to CG 7th Army, Subj. Transfer of Employees of Siemens-Halske Corporation, 16 Aug 1945, RG 338, 7th Army G-2, box 4, WNRC; Paul G. Esche,

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in uniform, working from lists in their possession, appeared in workplaces and homes in Saxony and Thuringia at all hours of the day and night to tell people that they would be moved. Generally they were told orally, but some written orders have survived, such as the one that originated with the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachment in Bitterfeld:

> On orders of Military Government you are to report with your family and baggage—as much as you can carry—tomorrow noon at 1300 hours (Friday, 22 June 1945) at the town square in Bitterfeld.
>
> There is no need to bring winter clothing. Easily carried possessions, such as family documents, jewelry, and the like should be taken along.
>
> You will be transported by motor vehicle to the nearest railway station. From there you will travel on to the West.
>
> Please tell the bearer of this letter how large your family is.[19]

Some were given a few hours, others twelve hours, still others twenty-four hours, to pack and appear at assembly points or to be ready for the trucks that would pick them up. They were asked to come voluntarily, but those who asked what would happen if they refused were told that force would be used or that they would be arrested.[20] Time and circumstances precluded their taking more than the barest essentials: a little clothing, jewelry, bank books, family documents, and other personal valuables—whatever they could put into "two suitcases and a backpack," the phrase that occurs repeatedly in the records and in interviews. They were told they would be cared for at their destination, which some of them apparently were told—and many presumed—would ultimately be the United States. They were promised jobs, housing, good living conditions, laboratory facilities, work contracts, and replacement of furniture, household utensils, and the personal property they had to leave behind.[21] Individuals were told they could take their family members. Family members of those already in custody

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"Der Raub an Materialien und geistigen Werten durch die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht waehrend der Besetzung des Zeiss- und Schott-Werkes in Jena (April bis Juni 1945) und ihre Hilfeleistung bei der Errichtung von Konkurrenzbetrieben in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone," in Leo Stern et al., Hrsg., *Der deutsche Imperialismus und der zweite Weltkrieg, Band 5* (Berlin: 1962), 251–271.

[19] Translated from the original German copy, CIC Bitterfeld to Dr. Schneider, Bitterfeld, Griesheimerstrasse, n. d., in Abt. 507, Nr. 3889, HSA Wiesbaden. Another copy may be found in Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart, EA 1/2, 570.

[20] For examples, see Johannes Dörr, Bericht ueber meine Evakuierung durch die Amerikaner, 30 Sep 1945, copy in Abt. 507, Nr. 3854, HSA Wiesbaden; excerpts from letter attached to Laenderrat, Gen. Sec., to RGCO, Winning, 7 May 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 130–131, BA; Walter Schaefer to Adolf Smekal, 11 Jun 1946, Abt. 507, Nr. 3879, HSA Wiesbaden; but see the letter from Dr. Richard Porter, dated 19 Jan 1962, quoted in Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 46, in which he said, "I can say positively that we used no threats or force of any kind. . . ."

[21] Knaut, Laenderrat, Notz, Betr: Behandlung von Wissenschaftlern, die aus dem von den Russen kontrollierten Deutschland evakuiert wurden, 24 Jan 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 242–244, BA; Profs. Bredereck and Goessler, for Council of Evacuated Scientists, Heidenheim, Memorandum, 12 Apr 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 167–176, BA.

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were "transferred . . . to the American zone by order of Military Government."[22] University professors and institute directors were permitted to take along assistants, secretaries, clerks, and their families. Industrial and research teams were permitted to go as units, "unquestionably because Americans considered reemployment of entire working groups."[23] Those with private transportation were sometimes given bearer passes to travel to the American zone, with orders to wait until "contacted at a later date,"[24] or to report to military government authorities upon arrival at their destination. Some, for example from the Zeiss optical company,[25] the Schott & Genossen glass works,[26] Siemens & Halske, certain Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft institutes, the Solway Werke, the Physikalische-Technische-Reichsanstalt (Bureau of Standards), and other firms were brought out as units with personnel, plans, and equipment sufficient to resume operations in the West.[27]

Contemporary descriptions of the evacuations, of which the following three are not unusual, provide fascinating details of the operation. A former professor of geology at the University of Jena wrote about four months after his evacuation that

> in the afternoon of June 20th, two Americans came to my home. They gave neither their names nor their unit, but one was a captain, the other an "agent," who remarked in passing that he was a law student at New York University. Both spoke German fluently. One had a list against which he checked off names. He told me I was to be evacuated, possibly in a few hours or in a few days. I asked if I was being arrested and he replied that it was not the case ("hiervon keine Rede sei"), but that he was acting under orders of American military officials and that I should obey. He said I would get a 2½-ton truck and could take along what I wanted. Responding to my protest that I would lose my job and my property, one of them said I would be able to work in my speciality in an appropriate research institute under contract with the Americans. I

[22] R. H. Ranger, Lt. Col., Sig. Corps., Communications Subcommittee, FIAT, USFET, to Whom it May Concern, 26 Apr 1946, copy in Abt. 507, Nr. 3850, HSA Wiesbaden; 12th Army Group to AC/S, G-2, 7th Army, 24 Jun 1945, RG 332, ETO, USFET, G-2 Section, Misc. Records, 1943–1946, box 22, WNRC.

[23] Smekal to Regierungsrat Herbert Krause, Eschwege, 20 Jan 1948, Abt. 507, Nr. 3889, HSA Wiesbaden.

[24] Commander W. E. Sweeney, U. S. Navy Technical Mission, to Whom it may Concern, 12 Jun 1945, copies in Abt. 507, Nr. 3856 and 3902, HSA Wiesbaden.

[25] Ernst Rinnert to Smekal, 19 Apr 1948, Abt. 507, Nr. 3874, HSA Wiesbaden; JIOA, War 90828, to CG USFET, 26 Jan 1947, RG 218, JCS Central Decimal File, CCS 471.9, Sec. 9, box 95, NA.

[26] Dr. Erich Schott, Interview, 20 May 1981; Memorandum, Betrifft: Deportation, 6 Nov 1945, (copy from Schott in my possession); Memorandum, Die Niederlage, n.d. (copy from Schott in my possession).

[27] See, for example, "US Army, Marshall Plan Responsible for Rebirth of German Machine Tool Building Firm," *American Machinist* 97 (17 August 1953): 151, for the statement that "Just before the Russian armies overran Leipzig in 1945, American Army trucks carried the top 10 executives of Pittler, German turret lathe producers, to safety in the US Zone, along with truck loads of blueprints and papers." See also, Lt. Col. R. H. Ranger to E. Y. Webb, Chairman, Communications Unit, OTS, 5 Oct 1946, RG 151, Dept. of Commerce, OTS, file: Remington Rand Inc., box 82, WNRC, for a report on the evacuation of 18 AGFA camera-factory engineers and technicians to Munich.

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should bring my scientific materials along, but not bother with furniture, household goods, and replaceable items. When I asked where I was being taken, they said they did not know, but assured me that food and other things would be provided by the Americans. I asked if I could bring other members of my institute and they replied that they did not know, but would find out and inform me later. The captain cautioned me to say nothing about my evacuation to my superiors, to the university, to the police, or to the food-ration office. When they left we began packing.

The next afternoon, June 21st, the "agent" came alone to tell me that things were moving faster than anticipated. The evacuation was scheduled for 8 o'clock the following morning. He said I might bring assistants, but their coming would be voluntary. He also asked about my bank balances, which he said could be transferred.

The truck arrived the following day about noon, rather than at 8 A.M., and I was told by the "agent" that it had to be loaded by 6 P.M. A cloudburst interrupted the loading, and then at about 2 P.M. the "agent" returned to inform me that we would have to leave in an hour, rather than at 6 P.M. We drafted four men in the neighborhood to help with the loading, but still could not meet the new deadline. The "agent" said that what could not be loaded today could be picked up tomorrow. At 3 P.M. my family, my two assistants, and I left Jena. Only when we were underway did I learn that we were going to Heidenheim, where we were interned. None of the promises made to me in Jena have been fulfilled. I lost my position, my income, and about 80 percent of my property. All of my furniture and household utensils and a large portion of my library are gone.[28]

An engineer who had worked for the Junkers aircraft company in Dessau during the war recorded, about three months after the evacuation, that

in mid-June, 1945, an American team, headed by a Mr. Kinneman from Boeing aircraft company, came to Dessau looking for me and other Junkers people. I was not at home at the time, but heard later that they wanted to take us along. So, a few days later I went to the military government office in Halle to make inquiries. I spoke there with a second lieutenant and a CIC agent. They said the American team was interested in my expert knowledge and wanted to know if I would work for them. My immediate family and my close associates could come along. I could take the most important things (documents and equipment) for my work, but there was no need to bring extra clothing and other personal things. They promised attractive working conditions, scientific books, equipment and instruments, a salary commensurate with my qualifications, and replacement of the personal items I would have to leave behind.

I asked for a few days to think it over, but was told by the CIC agent that I would be taken the next day whether I wanted to go or not. They said they would take my mother and one of my assistants and his wife too. They claimed to have our interests in mind and, in fact, sent a car to inform my mother and my assistant in Dessau that they had to come along too.

On June 28th we were picked up by car and taken to a barracks in Halle. The next day we, and about 100 others who had been assembled in the barracks, were taken by truck to a destination which had not been made known to us. In the evening we arrived in

[28] Translated, condensed, and paraphrased from Dr. Ludwig Rüger, Prof. fuer Geologie an der Universitaet Jena, Niederschrift ueber meine Evakuierung aus Jena, 30 Oct 1945, RG 260, 12/201-1, folder 11, WNRC.

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the village of Bad Vilbel, where we were quartered in a school. Our escort officers ordered the mayor of Bad Vilbel to house and feed us for a few days. He had us distributed among neighboring villages and there we have been until today.[29]

Sometime after his evacuation Otto Kloss, a former employee of Siebel-Flugzeugwerke in Halle, jotted down his experiences while they were still fresh in his mind, but left only an incomplete rough draft, which his son discovered among his father's effects after the latter's death.

On June 23, 1945, about 12:45 P.M. a policeman came to my office in Siebel-Flugzeugwerke, Halle, and said I must go to CIC to talk about my evacuation. At CIC headquarters I was told that I would have to leave on the same day. I asked if I was free to choose or whether I was being required to go. They told me that I must join others from industry and the universities who were leaving. I protested the suddenness of it all and asked if I might be informed of what was planned for us. They told me not to worry. I would be a guest of the American government ("Gast der amerikanischen Regierrung"). Evacuation would be to West Germany at first, but I would eventually be employed in a position similar to the one I had in Halle. France, Paris, and the United States were mentioned as possible locations.

I was told I need not take food, as American rations would be provided. Little baggage was needed—only what I could carry—as we would be provided for in that respect also. Balances in my bank accounts and savings passbooks, which I should take along, could be transferred later. Although I tried to get my departure delayed until about 7 o'clock that evening, I was told to be ready by 4:30 P.M., which in fact gave me one and a half hours to pack after I returned home from the CIC headquarters. At 4:30 P.M. an American truck came for me, my wife, my child, and the little baggage we had packed by that time. The truck brought us to the *Waffenmeisterschule* (weapons-training academy), stopping along the way to pick up my chief engineer and his family too. At the academy we found other people who had been brought there from Halle, Dessau, Bernberg, and Bitterfeld. Some of them admitted that they had volunteered; others said they had been required to come, as I had been. No one had written orders. I also learned that we would not leave until the next morning, so I took the opportunity to return home and get more baggage.

At about 11 o'clock on the morning of June 24th we left the academy by truck and were taken to the railway station, where we were loaded—twenty-four people to a freight car—for our trip to the West. The Americans issued bread and canned meat for the trip. We traveled for two days, arriving in Darmstadt on Tuesday, June 26th, where we were required to sleep for a third and fourth night in the freight cars, which were guarded by troops carrying automatic weapons. On Thursday, June 28th, the entire transport of 720 persons was divided into groups which were taken to various villages in the neighborhood of Darmstadt. We—altogether sixty-three Siebel and Junkers aircraft people—were brought to the village of Stockstadt and housed temporarily in the

[29] Translated, condensed, and paraphrased from Dr. Ing. Johannes Dörr, Bericht ueber meine Evakuierung durch die Amerikaner, 30 Sep 1945, copy in Abt. 507, Nr. 3854, HSA Wiesbaden. As a matter of interest, it might be noted that after having been interrogated in England, Dörr eventually went to the French zone and then worked for a time in Paris under contract with the French government. Later he returned to Germany and joined the faculty of the Mathematics Department of the Technical High School in Darmstadt.

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school, one family to a room. From there we were eventually billetted in homes, inns, and other places. My family got quarters in the *Forsthaus*, which is not bad. . . . [30]

How many came will probably never be known precisely. Neither will we know how many were volunteers, how many were actually forced, and how many went along for the ride out of the Soviet zone. Early American reports estimated the number evacuated at about 1,500.[31] The *Zwangsevakuierte Wissenschaftler und Techniker Mitteldeutschlands*, an organization founded in Hessen in the fall of 1945, later prepared a list of 1,294 scientists and technicians entitled to extra rations and other benefits mandated by the Americans and estimated that family members would bring the total to about 4,000.[32] A report prepared two years later said there were 1,800 scientists and technicians and a total of about 5,500, counting families.[33] Estimates made from lists compiled by the evacuated-scientist organizations in Land Hessen and the city and community of Heidenheim, Wuerttemberg/Baden, and from other information gathered in Bavaria and the British zone showed 20 percent of the evacuees to have been academicians (professors, *Dozenten*, assistants, and technicians) from the universities of Halle, Jena, and Leipzig. Forty percent were academically-trained engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel working in private industry (*Akademiker der Industrie*), and the remaining 40 percent were nonacademically-trained engineers, administrative and support personnel, clerks, secretaries, and others who could not be classified.[34]

Regardless of what they had been told or led to believe, most of these people were evacuated, ignored, and abandoned. Any plans that may have existed to exploit them for the war against Japan were aborted after Hiroshima and

[30] Translated, condensed, and paraphrased from Otto Kloss, handwritten report, n.d., in possession of Prof. Dr. Guenther Kloss, University of Manchester, England, who kindly gave me a copy for my files. The report was obviously not finished, but is interesting for its immediacy and realism.

[31] SHAEF Main, GBI/FIAT/319.2, Subj. Bi-Weekly Report Number 1 for FIAT, 4 Jul 1945, RG 260, FIAT 7748th Unit, folder 321.01, box 1, WNRC. The report said 1,000 truck loads of documents were also evacuated.

[32] Evacuated Scientists from Middle Germany in Greater Hesse, Prof. Dr. A. Smekal, to FIAT, Subj. Relief Payments for Evacuated German Scientists, 1 May 1946, RG 260, AGTS, box 17, folder 5 (370.2 Paperclip), WNRC; OMGUS, FIAT, Scientific Branch, Daily Journal, 9 Nov 1946, RG 260, FIAT Records, box 17/9, folder 4, WNRC; Maj. Gen. R. L. Walsh, Director of Intelligence, EUCOM, to CG, OMGUS, Subj. German Evacuees from Central Germany, 8 Oct 1947, RG 260, AGTS, box 5, folder 1, WNRC; OMGUS, Director of Intelligence, to C/S, Subj. Disposition of Scientists Evacuated from Soviet Controlled Germany, 21 Nov 1947, RG 260, AGTS, box 5, folder 1, WRNC; OMGUS to RGCO, Subj. Disposition of Scientists Evacuated from Soviet Controlled Germany, 29 Dec 1947, RG 260, AGTS, box 5, folder 1, WNRC; Col. Robert A. Schow, Deputy Director of Intelligence, EUCOM, to General Walsh, Subj. German Evacuees, 1 Apr 1948, RG 260, AGTS, box 5, folder 1, WNRC.

[33] Smekal, Speaker for Evacuated Scientists from Middle Germany in the American Zone, Memorandum for General Walsh, 6 Jan 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 277–278, BA; Knaut, Laenderrat, Notiz, Betr: Behandlung von Wissenschaftlern, die aus dem von den Russen kontrollierten Deutschland evakuiert wurden, 24 Jan 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 242–244, BA.

[34] Dr. Hubert Altwicker and Prof. Adolf Smekal to OMGUS, Economics Division, Research Control Branch, Attention: Carl H. Nordstrom, 20 Mar 1947, in Abt. 507, Nr. 3889, HSA Wiesbaden.

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Nagasaki. A number of them received mimeographed form-letters, such as the one from the Air Force interrogation team in Bad Kissingen, which said, "In response to the various inquiries received by us, we hereby inform you that there is no possibility at present of using your services. We thank you for your cooperation."[35] A select few were taken to interrogation centers, of which the one bearing the code name DUSTBIN was the most enduring, where they were held—often for weeks, sometimes for months—to make them easily accessible to investigators interested in their special knowledge.[36] The British took some of them to a center near Wimbledon, where they were more readily available to British scientists and technicians for questioning and to British firms and agencies for offers of employment under contract.[37] The Americans took a few to the United States, initially for short-term exploitation under military jurisdiction (*Project Overcast*) and later for long-term employment and eventual citizenship under *Project Paperclip*.[38] How few were involved is suggested in a report of 12 August 1947, which states that of 419 evacuated scientists and technicians living in and around Heidenheim, Wuerttemberg-Baden, fourteen had received contracts from United States forces.[39] Some drifted back to the Soviet zone while others made their way to the French zone and to France, but most of them remained in the towns and villages—Heidenheim, Neider-Roden, Usingen, Weilburg, Bad Vilbel, Eschwege, Biedenkopf, Dillenburg, Rosenthal, Arnsdorf, Ockstadt, and a host of others—where the convoys had dropped them late in June 1945, where they had been billetted in inns, schools, and private homes, and where they were required to report twice weekly to the police and military government so as to restrict their movement and prevent their departure from the American zone.[40]

At one time there was talk about setting them free to go back if they wished.

[35] APWIU, Eric H. Boehm, to Herrn Müller, Alsfeld b. Ziegenhein, 18 Oct 1945, in Abt. 507, Nr. 3888, HSA Wiesbaden.

[36] Special Detention Camp DUSTBIN, attached to CIOS, Information from the CIOS, C.I.C. 61/28, 7 Jul 1945, RG 218, JCS Central Decimal File 1942–45, CCS 319.1 (11-7-44), Sec. 9, box 135, NA; History of the Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT), vol. 1, 30, mss in RG 319, Office of the Chief of Military History, Historical Manuscript File, 8-3.2, AC, V1, C1., NA.

[37] CIOS, Procedure for the Evacuation of Enemy Civilians to the U. K. for CIOS Purposes, CIOS 61, 16 May 1945, RG 218, JCS Central Decimal File 1942–45, CC 319.1 (11-7-44), Sec. 5, box 134, NA; Ernst Baerwind, "Beltane School in Wimbledon/London als Lager fuer deutsche Wissenschaftler und Techniker, August/Oktober 1946," mss in DEGUSSA Firmenarchiv, Baerwind Berichte, Frankfurt a. Main.

[38] Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, passim.; Kurowski, *Alliierte Jagd auf deutsche Wissenschaftler*, passim.

[39] OMG W/B, Director of Intelligence, to ODI, OMGUS, Subj. Food Rationing Policy for Evacuated Scientists, 12 Aug 1947, RG 260, ODI, 27-2/7, box 65, folder 16, WNRC.

[40] For evidence of these restrictions see OMG Det. H-65, Eschwege, form letter, 26 Oct 1945, Abt. 507, Nr. 3860 and OMG Det. H-86, Obertaunus, Subj. Detention of German Personnel, to Herr Wagemann and Dr. Wilhelm Patterson, thru Landrat Usingen, 29 Oct 1945, Abt. 507, Nr. 3872, HSA Wiesbaden; USFET, G-2, Memo for General Smith, Subj. German Scientists Evacuated from Russian Zone, 27 Nov 1945, RG 338, USFET, G-2 Section, Operations Branch, Correspondence, 1945–46, WNRC.

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Military government and army units within whose jurisdiction the evacuees had been restricted asked repeatedly for policy guidance on what to do with their special and restless charges,[41] and the Russians, whose report on the evacuation had been presented to the American delegation at the Potsdam Conference late in July 1945, made further inquiries on 8 September.[42] Based on recommendations of a staff study, which had been inspired by the requests for policy guidance, and in response to the Russian inquiry, General Lucius D. Clay, the American deputy military governor, told his Russian counterpart in the Allied Control Council that the U.S. expected to complete its interrogations by 10 October 1945, and that those people who wished to return to the Soviet zone after that would be permitted to do so.[43] But it never came to that because Washington had other plans.

In July 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had decided to bring about 350 German rocket scientists and engineers, among whom Wernher von Braun is best known, to the United States under *Project Overcast*, a highly secret military program.[44] But as that program got underway in the summer and fall of 1945, hundreds of experts who had served in the CIOS teams in Germany returned to Washington and their places of employment in the United States, many with names of people they thought should be brought here for the benefit of U.S. industry and commerce, some bearing evidence and many expressing fears that the British, the French, or the Russians would get to them first.[45] On 3 October 1945,

[41] P. M. Wilson, Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section, FIAT, to Chiefs, Br. & US I & P Branch, FIAT, Subj. Evacuation of German Scientists from Russian Zone, 11 Aug 1945, RG 260, FIAT Records, box 17/11, folder 1, WNRC; G. W. Staempfli, Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section, FIAT, to Lt. Col. Johnston, I & P Ch., US., 29 Aug 1945, RG 260, FIAT 7748th Unit, box 3, folder 350.09-76, WNRC; USFET, G-2, Operations Branch to AC/S, G-2, 6 Sep 1945, Summary of Days Activities of Operations Branch, RG 332, ETO, USFET, G-2 Section, Operations Branch, Correspondence, 1945, WNRC.

[42] Sokolovsky to Clay, 8 Sep 1945, with attached lists, RG 260, FIAT 7748th Unit, box 1, folder 300.6, WNRC. For references to the Russian report at the Potsdam conference see note 3, above.

[43] USGpCC, Director of Intelligence, to C/S, Subj. Movement of German Scientists and Technologists, 16 Sep 1945 (Staff Study), RG 260, FIAT 7771st Document Center, file: Staff Study FIAT, box 19, WNRC; Clay to Sokolovsky, 28 Sep 1945, RG 260, FIAT 7748th Unit, box 1, folder 300.6, WNRC; Clay to Sokolovsky, 5 Oct 1945, RG 260, AG Decimal File, 1945–46, AG 231.2 Scientists and Technicians, box 41, folder 16, WNRC.

[44] Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 77–79; Clayton Bissell, AC/S, G-2, to CG, Army Service Forces, Subj. Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States, 6 Jul 1945, RG 165, ABC 387 Germany (18 Dec 43), Sec. 10, NA.

[45] JCS to SWNCC, Memorandum, 13 Sep 1945, SM-3346, SWNCC 257, SR microfilm, roll 23, Frame # 1269, NA; A. J. McFarland, Sec., JCS, Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 13 Sep 1945, RG 218, JCS Central Decimal File 1942–45, CCS 471.9, Sec. 4, box 94, NA; John C. Green, Exec. Sec., Publications Board, to SecCom, Henry A. Wallace, 26 Sep 1945, RG 151, Dept. of Commerce, OTS, file: Enemy Scientists, box 85, WNRC; J. D. Hanawalt, Director, Metallurgical Dept., The Dow Chemical Co., to TIIC, Attn: J. K. Tibby, Exec. Sec., TIIC, 22 Sep 1945, RG 40, Dept. of Commerce, OTS, Hilbourne files, folder: Foreign, box 147, WNRC; G. E. Guellich, Buffalo, NY, to TIIC, Subj. Recommendation for evacuation of German plants and personnel, 23 Sep 1945, RG 330, JIOA General Correspondence, file 383.7b Migration of Scientists to Russia, box 4, NA.

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exactly one week before the day on which General Clay had told the Russians he would release the evacuated scientists, the War Department sent two messages affecting that promise. One was a JCS policy directive on scientific and industrial research and teaching which said, among other things, that individual scientists and technicians currently held for investigation should be released "only after" all interested agencies were satisfied that all desired intelligence information had been obtained from them.[46] The second message advised that policy and procedures for exploitation of German scientists for the benefit of American science, industry, and the government were under active consideration by the JCS and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)—the top policy committee for Germany—and asked that the 10 October release date be delayed until 1 November.[47] But the JCS and SWNCC moved much more slowly than anticipated. Influenced by informal reports and observations of CIOS investigators and by a formal request from Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace to import German scientists for the benefit of U.S. science and industry as well as by numerous reports, warnings, and rumors that the British, the French, and the Russians would end up getting the cream of the crop,[48] the JCS and SWNCC deliberated until late February 1946, five months longer than originally anticipated in the message of the previous 3 October.

Late in February 1946, the JCS and SWNCC approved a program, *Project Paperclip*, to bring about 1,000 German and Austrian scientists and technicians to the United States under long-term contracts, to bring their families along, and to sponsor them for immigration visas and eventual citizenship. The two agencies noted that "many government departments and independent agencies urgently desire to exploit these specialists in the United States," and warned that "Great Britian, France, and the USSR will proceed unilaterally" to exploit Germans for civil purposes whether or not the U.S. did so.[49] Under this program,

[46] AGWAR, from JCS, to USFET, for Eisenhower, W-72620, 3 Oct 1945, RG 84, box 74, folder 24 (892a Scientific Institutions), WNRC.

[47] War Department, from JIOA, to CG, USFET, 2 Oct 1945 (dispatched 3 Oct 1945), RG 330, JIOA General Correspondence, box 2, folder: Extra Copies (German Scientists), NA.

[48] For examples see Henry A. Wallace to Harry S. Truman, Memorandum, Subj. Proposed Importation of German Scientists for U. S. Science and Industry Benefit, 4 Dec 1945, Truman Papers, Official File, box 677, folder 192 (1945–1947), Truman Library; Director, JIOA, to William L. Clayton, Subj. Importation of German Scientists for Benefit of U. S. Science and Industry, 30 Nov 1945, RG 59, State Department Decimal File 862.542/11-3045, NA; USFET, G-2, to C/S, USFET, Subj. Evacuation of German Scientists by French, 13 Feb 1946, [describing an incident of 18 Dec 1945], RG 332, ETO, USFET, G-2 Section, Operations Branch, Correspondence, 1945, box 25, WNRC; USPOLAD, Memorandum, Subj. Soviet Recruitment of German Scientists, 15 Jan 1946 [sent to State Department on 23 Jan], RG 84, box 765, folder 23 (892a Scientific Institutions), WNRC; Combined Chiefs of Staff, CCS 870/12, 23 Jan 1946, Subj. The Exploitation of German Scientists and Technicians for Civil Purposes, Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, RG 165, ABC 471.6 (7 Oct 43), Sec. 1-A, box 564, NA.

[49] AGWAR, from JCS, to USFET, W-97733, 19 Feb 1946, RG 260, AGTS, box 4, folder 23, WNRC; SWNCC 257/4, Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States, 26 Feb 1946, Appendix "A", RG 218, JCS Central Decimal File, CCS 471.9, Sec. 4, box 94, NA.

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for which the European Command was asked to nominate candidates, the people evacuated from the Soviet zone were simply part of the larger pool from which the 1,000 scientists and technicians were to be chosen. The JCS *Paperclip* directive of 19 February provided no guidance on the disposition of the evacuated scientists and technicians as a group, and a clarifying, follow-up cable a week later emphasized that the list of candidates should be drawn from all important German scientists and technicians in the U.S. zone, not merely from those evacuated from the Soviet zone.[50] In the end, some of the latter were chosen, but most were not. If the figures for the Heidenheim area are typical, less than four percent ever received contracts from United States forces.

Lacking guidance from Washington, apparently moved by conscience and by concern for their subjects, but clearly faced with possible embarrassment should the story of the evacuated scientists and technicians become widely known, Americans in Germany studied and restudied what they might do. In March and April 1946, the Field Information Agency, Technical sent survey teams into the remote villages and towns of the American zone to distribute two questionnaires among the evacuees, one a denazification questionnaire (*Fragebogen*), the other a mimeographed form asking for information on fields of specialization, publications, research interests, patents held, knowledge of foreign languages, family size, and whether the respondent would be willing to work in the United States or for the United States in the American zone of Germany.[51] This survey was used to collect names of scientists and technicians that Washington had asked the European Command to recommend for possible inclusion in *Project Paperclip*, but its original purpose was to gather information to be used for more adequate exploitation of these people, either by direct employment by FIAT or in an institute under FIAT control. A year later, the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) studied the situation and found that the evacuees were being held in the American zone under orders from Washington to do so "by any means short of internment," that the intelligence services had in fact promised them "preferential treatment with regards to employment, housing, etc. . . . with only occasional references to OMGUS," and that disagreement existed as to whether these people should continue to be treated as a special group entitled to extra rations and other benefits, which local military government units had provided ad hoc in the beginning and which the War Department had authorized officially on 7 December 1945.[52] Finally, on 5 November 1947, OMGUS held a

[50] JCS to Joseph McNarney, CG, USFET, WAR 98408, 25 Feb 1946, RG 218, JCS Central Decimal File, CCS 471.9, Sec 4, box 94, NA.

[51] Joseph S. Piram, Planning Office, FIAT, to Chief, Operations Branch, FIAT, 29 Mar 1946, Subj. Exploitation of German Scientific and Technical Personnel, RG 260, FIAT 7771st Doc. Center, box 11, file: Atomic Bomb, WNRC; OMGUS, FIAT, H. J. Hawkinson, JIOA Liaison Officer, to Col. E. W. Gruhn, Director, JIOA, 8 Apr 1946, RG 260, FIAT 7771st Doc. Center, box 11, file: Atomic Bomb, WNRC; Fragebogen, FIAT, copy in Abt. 507, NR. 3902-3903, HSA Wiesbaden.

[52] OMGUS, ODI, to Col. Rodes, Subj. Synopsis of Control of German Scientists and Technicians, 26 May 1947, RG 260, AGTS, box 55, folder 2, WNRC; War Department to CG, USFET, No. 87317, 7 Dec 1945, RG 165, ABC 471.6 (7 Oct 43), Sec. 1-A, box 564, NA.

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conference of interested agencies in Berlin (Intelligence, Claims, Research Control, Education and Religious Affairs) for a full discussion of the evacuees' condition and future status, the "possible violation by the U.S. of laws of war or Rules of Land Warfare," various legal questions arising out of the evacuation, and the claims, averaging 73,000 *Reichsmarks* (RM), that some 250 of the evacuees had filed against the United States.[53] That conference became the starting point for a staff study, which concluded that either OMGUS or the German Council of Minister Presidents of the American Zone (*Laenderrat*) should integrate the evacuees into the German economy and thus bring about a permanent solution to the problem. The staff study identified a series of possible actions, such as finding them gainful employment and securing for them residence permits, and concluded that these things would be most appropriately done by the *Laenderrat*.[54] Turning the problem over to the Germans became the policy, even though further internal American discussions and apparent disagreements caused the OMGUS Director of Intelligence, Major General R. L. Walsh, to initiate a program to resettle the evacuated scientists and technicians into Third World countries—a program that Germans, who had by this time become disgusted and cynical, referred to as General Walsh's *Urwald-Programm*, and of which the State Department did not approve. Having pressured Latin American nations after the war to deport Germans and generally reduce German influences in their countries, the State Department did not want those same nations to be approached now with lists of German scientists and technicians whom they might encourage to immigrate. The most the State Department would do was accept from the Army a list of names of screened people "for use solely as [a] reference in handling specific requests [from] third countries."[55]

Early in January 1948, following the recommendation of the staff study, OMGUS made the *Laenderrat* responsible for the future welfare of the scientists and technicians and gave notice that the special rations that the experts and their families had been receiving would be terminated on 1 March 1948.[56] The *Laenderrat* and the *Laender* (state) governments eventually helped to integrate them into the West German economy and society. They helped them to find employment commensurate with their abilities and to secure housing and residence permits (*Zuzugsgenehmigungen*) in the communities in which they were em-

[53] J. B. Rintels, Legal Advice Branch, OMGUS, Note for File, 6 Nov 1947, RG 260, AG Decimal File, 1947, folder: AG 150 Claims, July thru Dec., box 211, WNRC.

[54] OMGUS, Director of Intelligence, to C/S, Subj. Disposition of Scientists Evacuated from Soviet Controlled Germany, 21 Nov 1947, RG 260, AGTS, box 5, folder 1, NA.

[55] War Dept. to CINCEUR, W 91739, 6 Dec 1947, referred to in SecState to USPOLAD, A44, 19 Jan 1948, Army-CAD Messages, CM-IN's-1948, RG 319, box 21, NA; CINCEUR, Clay, to Dept. of Army, for JIOA, CC-2705, 27 Dec 1947, RG 260, AGTS, box 5, folder 1, WNRC; OMGUS to RGCO, Subj. Disposition of Scientists evacuated from Soviet Controlled Germany, 29 Dec 1947, RG 260, AGTS, box 5, folder 1, WNRC; Col. Robert A. Schow, Dep. Dir. of Intelligence, EUCOM, to General Walsh, Subj. German Evacuees, 1 Apr 1948, RG 260, AGTS, box 5, folder 1, WNRC.

[56] RGCO, Charles D. Winning to Erich Rossmann, Sec. Gen. Laenderrat, 6 Jan 1948, Subj. Disposition of Scientists Evacuated from Soviet Controlled Germany, Z1/1024, Nr. 254, BA.

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ployed.[57] Those who had not already received refugee status were provided with refugee identification papers (*Fluechtlingsaussweise*),[58] which made them eligible to receive certain benefits and loans, including those provided later under the equalization of burdens law (*Lastenausgleichgesetz*) of 1952. Those who had reached retirement age, or who were otherwise unable to work, received pensions and other compensations.

Soon after turning responsibility over to the Germans, the Americans unexpectedly agreed to process and pay the claims that the chairman of the *Evakuierte Wissenschaftler und Techniker Mitteldeutschlands* had filed late in 1945 on behalf of the group, and which he had continued to press the U.S. Army in Europe to recognize.[59] OMGUS set aside 100 million of the excess *Reichsmarks* it expected to have after the currency reform went into effect and eventually paid out to claimants 69.5 million RM in May and June 1948, just prior to the currency reform. A few additional claims were paid in *Deutschmarks* (DM) after the currency reform, some of them filed late because the people were working in France and the United States.[60]

Although each of those involved in the evacuation and its aftermath has his own story to tell and undoubtedly has an assessment of its impact, three general observations are perhaps appropriate. First, the intelligence services immediately responsible for the evacuated scientists often acted without coordinating what they were doing with general U.S. military government policies and without informing the military government functionaries who were responsible for implementing those policies. They (G-2 USFET) insisted that "all references to evacuation from the Russian Zone . . . be classified 'Top Secret'."[61] A study con-

[57] Smekal to Preller, Laenderrat, 21 Apr 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 153 BA; Interne Laenderratssitzung, 2.3.1948, Z1/19, Nr. 123-124, BA; Smekal to Generalsekretaeriat, Laenderrat, Betr: Aus Mitteldeutschland evakuierte deutsche Wissenschaftler, 10 Mar 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 219, BA; RGCO to Prof. Dr. Ludwig Preller, Laenderrat, Betr: Evakuierte Wissenschaftler, 22 Apr 1948, Z1/1024, Nr. 151 (Nr. 163 in English), BA; Generalsekretaeriat, Laenderrat d. amerik. Besatzungsgebiets, to Arbeitsministerien der US Zone, 12 Jul 1948, Betr: Aus Mitteldeutschland evakuierte Wissenschaftler und Spezialisten, Z1/1024, Nr. 63-64, BA.

[58] Generalsekretaeriat, Laenderrat (Middlemann) to Fluechtlingsadministrations in Muenchen, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, 25 Mar 1948, Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart, EA 1/2, 570.

[59] RGCO, Charles D. Winning, Director, to Erich Rossmann, Gen. Sekr. des Laenderrats, 24 May 1948, Betr: Behandlung von Wissenschaftlern, die aus dem von den Russen kontrollierten Deutschland evakuiert wurden, Z1/1024, Nr. 122 (Nr. 181 in English), BA; EUCOM, Intelligence Division, Robert A. Schow, Dep. Dir., to General Walsh, Subj. Evacuee Questionnaire, 12 May 1948, RG 84, box 812, folder 892a Scientists, WNRC; Award of Board of Officers, 12 May 1948, copy of form from Dr. Werner Zwiesler and Erika (Hellwig) Zwiesler, Heidenheim, in my possession.

[60] Kenneth C. Royall, SecArmy, to SecState, 10 June 1948, RG 59, State Department Decimal File 740.00119, EW/6-1048, NA; N. Hemmendinger to Mr. Secretary [of State], Subj. Compensation to German Scientists Evacuated from the Soviet Zone, 22 July 1948, RG 59, State Department Decimal File 740.00119 EW/6-1048, NA; G. C. Marshall, SecState, to SecArmy Kenneth C. Royall, 27 Jul 1948, RG 59, State Department Decimal File 740.00119 EW/6-1048, NA; Dept. of Army to CINCEUR, W-90008, 29 Sep 1948, RG 260, AGTS, box 4, folder 150 Claims, WNRC.

[61] OMGUS, FIAT, H. J. Hawkinson, JIOA Liaison Officer, to Col. E. W. Gruhn, Director, JIOA, 8 Apr 1946, RG 260, FIAT Records, box 17/11, folder 1, WNRC.

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ducted by the Office of the Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, in May 1947, noted that the evacuated scientists had been given "preferential treatment . . . with only occasional reference to . . . Military Government."[62] On at least one occasion when a military government official tried to intervene, he was dressed down and told that the instructions regarding rations were issued "at the direction of the War Department . . . that this was a top secret order . . . which must be obeyed . . . [and that he must prevent] the question of rations for these evacuated German scientists" from being raised by any Germans.[63] Given this condition, it is perhaps not surprising that Ambassador Robert Murphy, the U.S. political adviser in Berlin, "doubted" what the Russian deputy military governor told him—truthfully—late in 1946, and that so little is known to this day about the evacuation, its conduct, and its aftermath.

Second, the evacuated specialists, some of Germany's more productive minds, were simply kept on ice for about three years, because of where they were, the restrictions placed upon them, and their inability to relocate and receive residence permits elsewhere. As a consequence, they made little or no contribution to education recovery or the resumption of research in the immediate postwar period, despite the fact that allied education and university-control officials worked hard to reopen institutions of higher education and despite the fact that research control officers—in addition to their negative, control functions—claimed to be interested in encouraging and sponsoring resumption of research that was permitted under the level-of-industry plans. Neither did these scientists and technicians contribute to make Germany economically self-sufficient, a goal that Americans pursued with increasing vigor as the occupation progressed, especially after the formation of the Bi-zone with the British late in 1946.[64]

Finally, the evacuated scientists, technicians, and their families suffered undue economic, moral, and psychological deprivation, because of the circumstances of their rapid and chaotic evacuation, because they were dumped upon and restricted to villages and towns far removed from the universities, research centers, and industrial regions where they might have found employment, and because the Americans treated them as little more than pawns in the early postwar years. Having originally evacuated them in a military operation for their scientific and technical know-how, the Americans generally lost interest in them when the war with Japan ended. Before they could be released to return to their homes, however, intelligence authorities in Washington and Germany froze them in place, first while policy was developed in Washington and then as potential candidates for *Project Paperclip*. The latter was a program with a twofold purpose: to insure

[62] OMGUS, ODI, to Col. Rodes, Subj. Synopsis of Control of German Scientists and Technicians, 26 May 1947, RG 260, AGTS, box 55, folder 2, WNRC.

[63] RGCO, Pollock, to Maj. Gen. C. L. Adcock, Asst. Dep. MG, 1 Jun 1946, RG 260, AGTS, box 4, folder 23, WNRC; Adcock to Col. Whipple, handwritten note, 7 Jun 1946, ibid.; C. L. Adcock to RGCO, Pollock, 13 Jun 1946, ibid.

[64] For details see John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), passim.

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exploitation in the United States of those individuals whom American military, industrial, and scientific experts would identify for their know-how, and to deny these and other German scientists and technicians to the Soviet Union and other nations. Not until 1948 were the Americans ready to release the people in whom they were no longer interested. In releasing them, the Americans settled their claims in surplus and soon-to-be-devalued *Reichsmarks* and turned responsibility for their future welfare over to German authorities.[65]*

[65] The Americans did authorize extra rations and other benefits for the specialists and their families, but at no cost to the U.S. The directive from Washington, AGWAR to USFET, W-87317, 7 Dec 1945, RG 260, AGTS, box 17, folder 5 (370.2 Paperclip), NA, said: " . . . authority is granted to provide food in quantities larger than that allotted German Nationals, adequate winter clothing and adequate fuel supplies providing cost is borne by these persons." In actuality, German local and state governments carried much of the financial burden.

* This article is based on research for a larger study on science, technology, and reparations in postwar Germany, currently supported by a generous grant from the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk and the Lehrstuhl fuer Wirtschaftsgeschichte of Duesseldorf University, and previously supported or assisted by grants from the Fulbright Commission of Germany, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Humboldt State University Foundation.

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Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists

ROBERT J. McMAHON

Within the past decade, revisionism about Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency has become a veritable cottage industry. A torrent of books and articles has already appeared—with many more undoubtedly on the way—that have forced a major reassessment of the Eisenhower presidency, and especially of its foreign policy. According to the new literature, the former image of the popular general as an amiable but bumbling leader who presided over the "great postponement" of critical national and international issues during the 1950s can no longer be sustained by the evidence. On the contrary, writes one historian, he was "intelligent, decisive, and perceptive, a strong leader who guided his administration with a deft hand and a president who led his nation peacefully through eight tortuous years of Cold War."[1] In the words of another scholar:

[1] Mary S. McAuliffe, "Commentary: Eisenhower, the President," *Journal of American History* 68 (December 1981): 625. Numerous reviews of this literature have already appeared. See, for example, Barton J. Bernstein, "Foreign Policy in the Eisenhower Administration," *Foreign Service Journal* 50 (May 1973): 17–20, 29–30, 38; Vincent P. DeSantis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," *Review of Politics* 38 (April 1976): 190–207; Gary W. Reichard, "Eisenhower as President: The Changing View," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 77 (Summer 1978): 265–281; Donald R. McCoy, "Trends in Viewing Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower," *Midwest Quarterly* 20 (Winter 1979): 117–136; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Ike Age Revisited," *Reviews in American History* 11 (March 1983): 1–11.

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"He now appears to be a more astute and more sophisticated politician, a stronger and more concerned chief executive, a more successful president both in domestic and foreign affairs, a more prescient and imaginative leader and a more energetic, perceptive, and compassionate person."[2] Certainly the new scholarship on Eisenhower is not uncritical, nor is it unanimous in its judgments on the various facets of the administration's record. Nonetheless, there does appear to be a consensus developing on the part of the majority of the new Eisenhower scholars that, at least within the realm of foreign affairs, Eisenhower must rank as one of the most skilled and probably the most successful of all the postwar presidents.

Fueled by a combination of new sources and fresh prespectives, revisionist accounts of the Eisenhower presidency have challenged earlier studies on two broad grounds: first, the Eisenhower revisionists have portrayed the general, in the words of one scholar, as a "skilled tactician and a master of his administration";[3] and, second, they have argued that his foreign policy was astute, restrained, and largely successful. The two contentions, of course, deal with separate issues and are often advanced by scholars with different sets of interests.

Given the weight of evidence presented by the Eisenhower revisionists, the first contention now appears virtually unassailable. Robert Ferrell's wry remark in his introduction to the *Eisenhower Diaries* that "the general-president knew what he was doing" aptly captures the new consensus.[4] As Richard H. Immerman has persuasively argued, contrary to the conventional wisdom Eisenhower exercised strong executive control in foreign affairs, often reining in his bombastic secretary of state.[5] Even Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., hardly a sympathetic observer,

[2] DeSantis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," 206–207. For the purposes of this article, the following general works are considered part of the new "Eisenhower revisionism": Herbert Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Peter Lyon, *Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952–1961* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975); Gary W. Reichard, *The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-Third Congress* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975); Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977); Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979); George H. Quester, "Was Eisenhower a Genius?" *International Security* 4 (Fall 1979): 159–179; Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979–80): 577–597; William Bragg Ewald, Jr., *Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days, 1951–1960* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981); Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Ike Age," *New Republic*, 9 May 1981, 26–34; Stephen E. Ambrose with Richard H. Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (New York: Doubleday, 1981); Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: Norton, 1981); Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Robert Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth," *American Historical Review* 87 (February 1982): 87–122; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, II, *The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).

[3] Bernstein, "Foreign Policy in the Eisenhower Administration," 30.

[4] Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries*, xi–xii.

[5] Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology* 1 (Autumn 1979): 21–38.

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concedes that "the Eisenhower papers . . . unquestionably alter the old picture. . . . Eisenhower showed much more energy, interest, self-confidence, purpose, cunning, and command than many of us supposed in the 1950s."[6]

These new revelations about Eisenhower's leadership capabilities and uses of presidential power have added an important dimension to our understanding of the man and his presidency. Despite the intrinsic value of such work, however, it has serious limitations for the student of American foreign relations. For those interested in examining the goals and results of American diplomacy during the 1950s, the preoccupation with the decision-making process appears at best peripheral. This debate focuses on the means of presidential leadership, not the ends. As Fred I. Greenstein concedes in his acclaimed book, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, his interest is exclusively in Ike's style of leadership—which he admires—and not with the President's aims and accomplishments.[7]

The second contention, involving longer-term perspectives and more intricate standards of evaluation, has inevitably sparked more controversy. Do Eisenhower's accomplishments in foreign affairs place him in the first rank among the postwar presidents? Despite inevitable differences on particulars, the revisionists are virtually unanimous in applauding Ike's consistent exercise of mature judgment, prudence, and restraint and in celebrating his signal accomplishment of maintaining peace during an unusually perilous period in international relations.

Robert Divine has ably summarized the revisionist perspective in his recent book, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*. "The essence of Eisenhower's strength," Divine writes, "and the basis for any claim to presidential greatness, lies in his admirable self-restraint. . . . Nearly all of Eisenhower's foreign policy achievements were negative in nature. He ended the Korean War, he refused to intervene militarily in Indochina, he refrained from involving the United States in the Suez crisis, he avoided war with China over Quemoy and Matsu, he resisted the temptation to force a showdown over Berlin, he stopped exploding nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. . . . His moderation and prudence served as an enduring model of presidential restraint—one that his successors ignored to their eventual regret. Tested by a world as dangerous as any that an American leader has ever faced, Eisenhower used his sound judgment and instinctive common sense to guide the nation safely through the first decade of the thermonuclear age."[8]

Despite the general consensus among Eisenhower revisionists on the success of his diplomacy, these scholars have been curiously ambivalent on one major topic: the efficacy of Eisenhower's approach to the emerging nations of the Third World. As Robert Divine's examples—Korea, Indochina, Suez, the Taiwan Straits—would suggest, the wisdom of the President's policies toward the Third World constitutes an important element in the favorable assessment of at least

[6] Schlesinger, "The Ike Age Revisited," 6.

[7] Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*. On the effectiveness of Eisenhower's leadership style, see also Anna Kasten Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Fall 1983): 307–326.

[8] Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, 154–155.

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some historians. To the litany of achievements cited by Divine, moreover, other scholars have added the limited but effective use of force to help overthrow unfriendly governments in Iran and Guatemala and to help prop up a friendly one in Lebanon. Other Eisenhower scholars, however, including Peter Lyon, Charles C. Alexander, and Stephen E. Ambrose, have criticized the President's handling of certain Third World problems. They have nonetheless concluded their evaluations by praising the President's overall diplomatic legacy. Thus Lyon, whose critique of the administration's record in the Third World is both sustained and sharp, closes his largely sympathetic "portrait of the hero" with the observation that Eisenhower must be praised for the pacific nature of his two terms in office.[9]

This seeming contradiction is actually quite easily explained. Regardless of whether they see success, failure, or a mixed record in the Third World, the Eisenhower revisionists do not consider that aspect of Ike's diplomacy crucial to their overall evaluation. It is such issues as maintaining the peace, managing relations with the Soviet Union, gaining control over the nuclear arms race, and understanding the limits of American power that these scholars typically emphasize when calculating the balance sheet on the Eisenhower years. Given that perspective, Third World issues fade in importance; only the President's refusal to commit American troops to any open-ended Third World conflict appears critical to the new consensus on Eisenhower.

That perspective, however, is certainly open to question. Undoubtedly the concerns mentioned above were critical ones during the Eisenhower years. With the ever-present threat of nuclear confrontation—a threat compounded by the advent of the H-Bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles—U.S.-Soviet relations certainly had to top Ike's diplomatic agenda. Still, the single most dynamic new element in international affairs during the 1950s was the emergence of a vigorous, broad-based, and assertive nationalism throughout the developing world.[10] Those nationalist stirrings, moreover, constituted not only a major challenge to the world order that Eisenhower and his advisers sought to preserve, but promised as well to exacerbate tensions between Washington and Moscow as the two superpowers competed for the loyalty and resources of the newly emerging areas. The nature of the administration's response to Third World nationalism, in its varying manifestations, must therefore rank as a fundamental

[9] Lyon, *Eisenhower*, especially 906–909. For similar conclusions, see Alexander, *Holding the Line*; Ambrose, *Ike's Spies*. In *Eisenhower*, II, *The President*, the most thorough and balanced of the revisionist accounts, Ambrose calls Eisenhower's response to the Third World one of his principal failures, although his overall assessment of Ike's foreign policy is quite favorable. (See especially 621–622.)

[10] The following works offer a broader global perspective on this process: Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964), chap. 6; Rudolph von Albertini, *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919–1960* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971); L. S. Stavrianos, *Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age* (New York: Morrow, 1982).

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consideration in any overall assessment of Eisenhower's diplomatic record. This article will argue that the failure of the Eisenhower revisionists to appreciate the centrality of Third World nationalism has led them to present a distorted and oversimplified view of American foreign relations during a critical eight-year period.

The publication in recent years of a series of detailed studies on U.S. relations with different parts of the developing world, either focusing specifically on the Eisenhower years or spanning a broader time frame, has considerably enhanced our understanding of this important subject. Considered as a whole, this work offers an assessment of Eisenhower's foreign policy sharply at odds with that drawn by the revisionists. Indeed, a brief review of some of the more important recent work on U.S. relations with Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa reveals that Eisenhower scholarship actually is moving in two very different directions. Instead of applauding restraint, the authors of these studies often criticize intervention; instead of seeing a prudent administration aware of the limitations of American power, they often see an administration self-consciously expanding American involvement in all corners of the globe and trying to manage the internal affairs of other nations to an unprecedented degree.

Although recent literature on U.S.–Third World relations during the Eisenhower years varies considerably in scope, quality, depth of research, and interpretive thrust, it does suggest the plausibility of an alternative interpretation of Eisenhower's foreign policy. That view might be summarized as follows. The Eisenhower administration grievously misunderstood and underestimated the most significant historical development of the mid-twentieth century—the force of Third World nationalism. This failure of perception, furthermore, constituted a major setback for American diplomacy. The Eisenhower administration insisted on viewing the Third World through the invariably distorting lens of a Cold War geopolitical strategy that saw the Kremlin as the principal instigator of global unrest. As a result, it often wound up simplifying complicated local and regional developments, confusing nationalism with communism, aligning the United States with inherently unstable and unrepresentative regimes, and wedding American interests to the status quo in areas undergoing fundamental social, political, and economic upheaval. Rather than promoting long-term stability in the Third World, the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration contributed to its instability, thus undermining a basic American policy goal. In this critical area, then, the Eisenhower record appears one of persistent failure. The new Eisenhower revisionism, which largely overlooks, downplays, or misinterprets this record, may consequently be a castle built upon sand.

Asia

Eisenhower's response to Asian developments well illustrates this larger theme. Nearly all of the new revisionist writers applaud the President's decisions to extricate the United States from the Korean quagmire and to avoid the considerable

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pressures for American intervention at Dienbienphu in Indochina.[11] In addition, most of these scholars similarly praise Ike's astute avoidance of conflict with China over the Quemoy and Matsu imbroglio. The President, Herbert Parmet contends, was "cautious and fully cognizant of the hazards involved in military commitment, held the controls during the Indochinese crisis of 1954 and, together with John Foster Dulles, maneuvered with care and skillfully avoided enticements to involvement during two crises over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu."[12]

The revisionist reasoning in this regard is as logical as it is compelling: the former general, who well understood the limits of military force, carefully steered the nation clear of open-ended military commitments, a policy of restraint that stands in sharp relief when compared to that pursued by both his predecessor and successors in the Oval Office. At least in the case of Indochina, this judgment appears sound. John Prados's *"The Sky Would Fall,"* a book based on newly-declassified records, concludes that the pressures for intervention were even stronger than previously suspected. Accordingly, Ike's firm stand against U.S. military involvement in the face of strong contrary advice from many of his leading military and civilian advisers appears both bold and farsighted. Despite the considerable evidence that Prados amasses to demonstrate how close the United States did come to intervention, the salient fact remains that the President ultimately exercised sound judgment.[13] In a new study of "the day we didn't go to war," George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman conclude that "there seems little reason to quarrel with the view that the administration acted wisely in staying out of war in 1954."[14]

The Korean case is somewhat more problematic. Our understanding of how the President negotiated an end to that conflict has until very recently been hindered by the unavailability of essential documentary sources. Critics of his policy, however, suggest that he may have relied far too heavily on the threat of nuclear weapons to break the negotiating logjam, thus initiating a "brinksmanship" policy that gravely endangered world peace.[15]

[11] See, for example, Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 573–574; Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, 153–155; Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, II, *The President*, 106–107, 173–185.

[12] Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 574.

[13] John Prados, *"The Sky Would Fall": Operation Vulture, The U.S. Bombing Mission, Indochina, 1954* (New York: Doubleday, 1983).

[14] George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: 'The Day We Didn't Go to War' Revisited," *Journal of American History* 71 (September 1984): 363.

[15] Edward Friedman, "Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War," *Modern China* 1 (1975): 75–91; Barton J. Bernstein, "New Light on the Korean War," *International History Review* 3 (April 1981): 256–277. The recent publication of *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1952–1954, *Korea*, vol. XV (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984) should shed considerable light on this subject. Two recent studies, based largely on that volume, suggest that Ike's reliance on atomic threats as a means for ending the war has been exaggerated. At the same time, they both conclude that the President's Korean policy was a good deal less masterful than many Eisenhower revisionists have suggested. Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: The Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (New York: Knopf, 1986); Edward C. Keefer, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," *Diplomatic History* 10 (forthcoming, Summer 1986).

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Scholars have advanced similar arguments with regard to the Taiwan Straits crises of 1955 and 1958. Divine approves of the President's brinksmanship in those twin showdowns with China, arguing that "the beauty of Eisenhower's policy is that to this day no one can be sure whether or not . . . he would have used nuclear weapons."[16] That brandishing nuclear weapons could be a thing of beauty under any circumstances is a value judgment that some historians have been unwilling to make.[17] Lyon faults the President for placing the United States in "an untenable position" during the 1958 crisis, "which, by maladroit diplomacy, was transformed into an intolerable dilemma, one that could apparently be resolved only by nuclear catastrophe or Chinese restraint."[18] Likewise, John Gaddis's brief account of these episodes in his suggestive book, *Strategies of Containment*, also raises serious doubts about the efficacy of Ike's brinksmanship. "Far from validating the adminstration's strategy," he writes, "these incidents—particularly the one of 1958—in fact thoroughly discredited it in the eyes of the American public and allies overseas by revealing how little it would take to push the administration into a war with China involving the probable use of nuclear weapons." Decrying the riskiness of brinksmanship in the Taiwan Straits and elsewhere, Gaddis argues that "in retrospect the most startling deficiency of the administration's strategy was its bland self-confidence that it could use nuclear weapons without setting off an all-out nuclear war."[19]

The real problem with the interpretation of the President's Asian policy advanced by the Eisenhower revisionists is not just that their assessments of his remarkable restraint in the incidents noted above are open to question. Rather, it is that they build a case based on a narrow, highly selective, and episodic approach that largely ignores the crucial question of nationalism. How well did the President accommodate American foreign policy to the transforming dynamic of Asian nationalism? Given the framework sketched above, that question should be critical to any rigorous analysis of Eisenhower's diplomatic record in Asia. Yet it is missing from most of the revisionist accounts. Most importantly, posing that question necessitates a very different evaluation of the administration's policy toward Asia since, according to much of the recent literature, its response to Asian nationalism was often inadequate and at times even disastrous.

Indochina is a case in point. While the revisionists routinely cite Ike's nonintervention at Dienbienphu to bolster their overall interpretative thrust, they

[16] Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, 66. A recent essay by Leonard H. D. Gordon offers a more sophisticated defense of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. "Committed to the nonuse of force," he writes, "Eisenhower deftly handled Chiang and the Nationalist government by combining a defensive strategy of military deterrence with political adroitness in his exertion of influence for restraint. Creating that balance was a highly successful achievement of the Eisenhower administration." Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to the Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait," *Journal of American History* 72 (December 1985): 637–660. The quote is from 660.

[17] Schlesinger, "The Ike Age Revisited," 9.

[18] Lyon, *Eisenhower*, 831.

[19] John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 170, 173.

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rarely evaluate the more general issue of American policy toward Indochina during the post-Geneva period. Those revisionists who do discuss this aspect of the administration's record invariably temper their judgments. Lyon, for example, praises the President for his staunch refusal to aid the French in 1954, but adds that "the decisions to make massive commitments of military and financial aid to the puppet government in Saigon were Eisenhower's, as were the decisions to authorize hostile acts, 'dirty tricks,' acts of war against the Viet Minh undertaken by Americans under the direction of Americans."[20] George C. Herring's important study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, *America's Longest War*, renders a harsh verdict on Eisenhower's Vietnam policy. "Certain that the fall of Vietnam to Communism would lead to the loss of all of Southeast Asia," he writes, "the Eisenhower administration after Geneva firmly committed itself to creating in the southern part of the country a nation that would stand as a bulwark against Communist expansion and serve as a proving ground for democracy in Asia." But this experiment in nation building, Herring argues, was a "high-risk gamble" that by the close of Eisenhower's second term was on the verge of collapse. Despite massive military and economic assistance—aid that by 1961 had catapulted South Vietnam to fifth place among recipients of U.S. support worldwide—the Americans never succeeded in laying the foundation for a genuinely independent nation; on the contrary, the American financial stake tended to foster dependence. As renewed guerrilla warfare erupted in the south in 1957, the inefficacy of the U.S. effort became painfully apparent. Only "the quirks of the electoral calendar," Herring contends, "spared Eisenhower from the ultimate failure of his policies in Vietnam."[21]

The administration's record in Laos, conveniently ignored by most of the Eisenhower revisionists, constituted another effort at nation building whose outcome was less than a triumph for U.S. policy objectives. Charles Stevenson, whose book *The End of Nowhere* remains the most detailed and informed account of American relations with that struggling young country, offers a scathing indictment of the Eisenhower policy. He charges that the administration was animated exclusively by that nation's supposed significance to the Free World in its struggle against international communism. But by reducing complex Lao developments to broad Cold War categories, the United States almost completely misread and distorted the internal dynamics of Lao society. Stevenson

[20] Lyon, *Eisenhower*, 908.

[21] George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (New York: Wiley, 1979), 43–72. The quotations are from 43–44 and 72. In an essay on the Dienbienphu crisis, Herring and Immerman argue that after the Geneva Conference the Eisenhower administration "made political commitments to South Vietnam fraught with fateful long-range consequences. . . . The decision not to intervene militarily [in 1954] may loom as less important than the political commitments made after the fall of Dienbienphu." Herring and Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu," 363. The most complete study to date of U.S. policy toward Vietnam during this period also judges the Eisenhower policy as a failure. Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941–1960* (New York: Free Press, 1985; originally published in 1983 by the Center for Military History).

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demonstrates the futility of the U.S. effort to create an anticommunist bastion in Laos by pumping enormous sums of money into the Lao army. As Ike's second term came to a close, the deepening U.S. involvement in Laos had elevated a limited, local struggle against a communist-led guerrilla movement to global significance. Yet, as in Vietnam, U.S. objectives were further from realization than ever before.[22]

U.S.–Indonesian relations, another subject largely ignored by the Eisenhower revisionists, provide even more dramatic evidence of the administration's failure to understand the depth and appeal of Asian nationalism. Specialists in this area have argued that the Eisenhower administration's virtual obsession with the prospects for a communist takeover of Southeast Asia's largest and most important nation blinded it to the complex internal developments that were shaking Indonesian society to its very core. The result was a policy that proved almost entirely counterproductive in terms of long-range U.S. objectives in that country. By providing clandestine support to Indonesian dissidents, whose long-simmering regional rebellion erupted into full-scale civil war in 1958, Eisenhower apparently hoped that he could help topple President Sukarno's left-leaning regime and replace it with a more pliant, moderate, and pro-American government. But the administration's bold gamble backfired when Sukarno quickly suppressed the rebels; not only did the United States support the losing side, but its covert support for that side was embarrassingly exposed when Sukarno's troops shot down a CIA pilot flying bomber missions for the rebels. The heavy-handed U.S. intervention wound up strengthening Sukarno's hand while simultaneously offending nationalists of nearly all political hues with what was universally denounced as imperialist intervention.[23] As a former Indonesian Foreign Minister later recalled, "the general opinion in Indonesia was unanimous that the CIA had a hand in the rebellion" and this suspicion "was to linger on for a long time and was the main cause of further deterioration in Indonesia–U.S. relations. . . ."[24]

In comparison to the continuing crises in Indochina and Indonesia, U.S.–Philippine relations during the Eisenhower years appear remarkably placid. Indeed, as a recent study by Stephen Shalom makes clear, by the mid-1950s U.S. policy makers looked upon the Philippines as a real American success story: the Huk rebellion had been suppressed; economic collapse had been averted; a staunch U.S. ally, Ramon Magsaysay—with timely help from the

[22] Charles A. Stevenson, *The End of Nowhere: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), especially chaps. 2–4. See also two earlier studies which advance a similar interpretation: Jonathan Mirsky and Stephen E. Stonefield, "The United States in Laos, 1945–1962," in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations* (New York: Random House, 1969), 254–323; Len E. Ackland, "No Place for Neutralism: The Eisenhower Administration and Laos," in Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., *Laos: War and Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 139–154.

[23] Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), 322–325.

[24] Quoted in ibid., 323–324.

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CIA—had been installed in the presidency; U.S. economic and strategic interests had been secured; and nationalist sentiment appeared largely neutralized. Beneath this surface tranquility, however, lay festering problems, and Shalom shows how pent-up Filipino frustrations with their nation's neocolonial status—symbolized by the mammoth U.S. military bases and the unequal trade relationship between the two nations—led to an explosion of nationalist sentiment in the mid-1950s. As a result, the negotiations over a revised military bases agreement became harshly acrimonious and were broken off in 1956 as the United States could not satisfy Filipino demands for even limited sovereignty. It was U.S. recalcitrance in the face of enhanced Filipino nationalism, Shalom argues, that led both to the collapse of the talks and to a searching reexamination by Manila of its relationship with Washington. The significance of the Philippine case is that it demonstrates how, even in the most moderate, American-oriented Asian nation, nationalism posed a formidable threat to American objectives; the American response to that nationalist challenge proved at best halting and inadequate.[25]

Another important topic rarely examined by the Eisenhower revisionists, U.S. policy toward South Asia, can best be understood as part of this general pattern. Recent work in this area by scholars such as Selig S. Harrison, M. S. Venkataramani, and Stanley Wolpert has suggested that the Eisenhower administration proved incapable of appreciating the deeply-felt neutralist stance of the region's most important power, India. Instead of cultivating India's friendship as the key to regional stability, the Eisenhower administration made a major strategic blunder by aligning itself with Pakistan, first through a military assistance agreement in 1954, and subsequently through Pakistani membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact. This decision, based on a global geopolitical approach that viewed Pakistan as a valuable strategic asset and thus an important anchor in America's worldwide containment network, proved counterproductive, however; it helped foster an arms race between India and Pakistan, rendered an amicable resolution of the tangled Kashmir dispute increasingly unlikely, alienated Afghanistan, and opened the door for greater Russian involvement in both India and Afghanistan. In short, the Eisenhower administration's decision to provide Pakistan with arms and to align it with the West increased regional instability and, as Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru charged at the time, brought the Cold War to South Asia.[26]

[25] Stephen R. Shalom, *The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1981), especially 92–103.

[26] Selig S. Harrison, *The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1978), 260–270; M. S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947–1958* (New Delhi: Radiant, 1982); Stanley Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Superpowers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), chap. 9. Two unpublished studies offer similar judgments: Sultana Afroz, "U.S.–Pakistan Relations, 1947–1960" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Kansas, 1985); Robert J. McMahon, "The Eisenhower Administration and the Containment of South Asia," unpublished paper delivered before the Organization of American Historians, April 1986. For a less critical interpretation, see James H.

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The Middle East

Turning to another important region of the developing world, it can be argued with equal force that the major stumbling block to the accomplishment of American objectives in the Middle East during the Eisenhower years was, as in Asia, the rising tide of indigenous nationalism. Here too the President's record provides little comfort for the revisionists. Judging from recent scholarly accounts, Ike's policy toward the region was characterized by missed opportunities, strategic miscalculations, and counterproductive actions. It foundered, in short, on the rock of Arab nationalism. "The Eisenhower Administration," asserts Robert W. Stookey in his book *America and the Arab States*, "never arrived at a clear distinction between communism and revolutionary Arab nationalism." He contends that the administration's inability to come to terms with this nationalism quickly erased the momentarily favorable impression created by its opposition to the Suez invasion of 1956. By foolishly intervening in a series of domestic Arab crises in the post-Suez period, the United States wound up "reinforcing its own neocolonialist image and facilitating the infiltration of Soviet influence."[27] Similarly, in her study of U.S.-Egyptian relations Gail E. Meyer states that the administration "usually failed to make any practical distinction between communists and Arab nationalists." The Eisenhower policy was counterproductive, she argues, since "American support for unpopular regimes that tried to repress [nationalists] drove the wedge between the United States and these same nationalists ever deeper and actually forced the nationalists to turn to the Soviet Union for help." Consequently, "American policy unified and strengthened Arab nationalist resistance while ignoring its tremendous popular appeal."[28]

The revisionists, of course, use a different standard of evaluation. Wedded to the thesis that the President well understood the uses as well as the limits of military power, they typically cite Ike's restraint during the Suez crisis and his limited but effective use of force during the Lebanon operation of 1958 to illustrate the point. "When the Suez war of 1956 threatened either American intervention or estrangement from the Western allies," writes Herbert Parmet, "Eisenhower avoided either hazard. When he sent the Marines into Lebanon, he did so after choosing a time, place, and display of power that minimized the risks and ensured success."[29] "Nothing exemplifies better than the Lebanon intervention," adds William Bragg Ewald, "the American people's reasons for wanting Eisenhower as Commander in Chief." Ike's guiding principle, he notes approvingly, was that when resorting to force one does so overwhelmingly, thus ensuring

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Hitchman, "Parry and Thrust: Eisenhower, the Soviet Union and India, 1953–61," *World Review* 24 (April 1985): 11–24.

[27] Robert W. Stookey, *America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter* (New York: Wiley, 1975), 148.

[28] Gail E. Meyer, *Egypt and the United States: The Formative Years* (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 19, 194.

[29] Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 574.

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success.[30] Although the revisionists are divided on the appropriateness of covert operations, many also add the Iranian coup of 1953 to the list of Ike's Middle East triumphs; not only was CIA intervention in Iran successful, in their view, but it well served American interests in that strategic country and was accomplished at a remarkably minimal cost.[31]

The foregoing interpretation of Eisenhower's Middle East policy, while compelling, is also open to serious question, since it largely ignores the crucial nationalist equation. Barry Rubin's study of American-Iranian relations suggests some of the complexities involved in any effort to evaluate the coup of 1953. Although the operation was without doubt a success in the short run, he points out that "in the long run the CIA's support for the shah's return would breed Iranian anti-Americanism and play a central role in shaping the attitudes of the post-shah regime." The myth propagated by Eisenhower and Director of the CIA Allen Dulles, moreover, that Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh's government had been a communist-dominated regime, in Rubin's view, "encouraged a tragic confusion between militant nationalism and Marxism-Leninism that plagued United States policy elsewhere in the Third World."[32] Divine as well, despite his general approval of Eisenhower's Middle East policy, questions the efficacy of the Iranian operation, concluding that "in this case, a short-term triumph led to a long-term defeat for the United States."[33]

A broad evaluation of the Suez invasion also casts some doubt on the validity of the revisionist framework. Donald Neff, who bases his recent book *Warriors at Suez* on much newly declassified material, partially supports the revisionists case by concluding that Ike's "firm insistence that the rule of law be obeyed was one of the high points of his presidency." He quickly adds, however, that in the aftermath of the invasion the administration squandered a unique opportunity to improve relations with Egypt and other emerging nations. The problem, Neff suggests, was that Eisenhower and his advisers had a deep aversion to Gamal Abdel Nasser and the radical Arab nationalism that he represented. "Such blind prejudice," Neff asserts, "allowed a unique opportunity to slip by."[34] Steven L. Spiegel adds in his new study, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*: while on one level Eisenhower's Suez policy was a success, he failed to understand the two underlying causes of the crisis, Arab nationalism and Israeli isolation. Instead of trying to come to grips with the true sources of regional instability—Arab-Israeli tensions and intra-Arab rivalries—the administration concentrated on a phony

[30] Ewald, *Eisenhower the President*, 242.

[31] See, for example, Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938–1980* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1980), 214.

[32] Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 87–88.

[33] Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, 78–79.

[34] Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East* (New York: Linden Press, 1981), 441–442.

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communist menace "and any instability in the area was perceived as originating behind the Kremlin walls."[35]

Gail E. Meyer, who analyzes the Eisenhower administration's Middle East policy through the lens of Egyptian-American relations, offers a similar perspective. She argues that a chronic American "aversion to Arab nationalism" proved to be an implacable impediment to the establishment of a constructive relationship with Nasser's Egypt, the key to the region. By sponsoring a Baghdad Pact grouping that encouraged Iraq's ambitions for Middle Eastern leadership, the United States undercut Egypt and exacerbated regional tensions. With Iraq challenging Egypt's cherished role as leader of the Arab world and the Eisenhower administration unwilling to meet its demands for arms, Egypt believed it had no choice but to embrace neutralism and to move in an increasingly anti-western direction. Meyer insists that the Suez crisis must be placed within the context of American opposition to Nasser's ambitions, its support for Egypt's rivals, especially Iraq, its refusal to sell arms to Cairo, and, most important, its humiliating withdrawal of the promised Aswan Dam financing in the wake of Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Like Neff, she suggests that the United States managed to preserve a modicum of prestige and influence by its Suez policy, but she also sees this as a transitory phenomenon since Washington remained unwilling to reappraise its attitude toward Egypt and Arab nationalism. The Syrian and Jordanian crises of 1957 demonstrated the bankruptcy of Eisenhower's Middle East policy. By refusing to come to terms with Arab nationalism and treating local and regional problems within a global anticommunist framework the United States ironically fostered the regional instability that its policy was presumably designed to quell.[36]

It is equally hazardous to view the 1958 Lebanon invasion as an unambiguous triumph for U.S. interests in the Middle East. Divine praises the landing of American troops, which he says "was designed to impress Arab leaders with American strength and determination." Eisenhower, he observes, had "a clear sense of the strategic value of Persian Gulf oil and acted boldly to protect that vital national interest." But even Divine concedes that the danger of communist subversion in Lebanon, which served as a pretext for the invasion, was in fact nonexistent. "Arab nationalism," he says, "not Soviet communism, was the source of danger to American hopes for a stable Middle East."[37] His own evidence suggests the plausibility of an alternative evaluation: that by viewing local developments within a global perspective Eisenhower wound up responding with an excessive and wholly inappropriate use of force that in the long run harmed America's position in the region. Lyon emphasizes that the intervention alien-

[35] Steven L. Speigel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 85–86.

[36] Meyer, *Egypt and the United States*, especially 143–146, 185, 192–194. See also Barry Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950–1957," *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Spring 1982): 73–90.

[37] Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, 101–104.

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ated rather than impressed the Arab states, and only managed to stoke the flames of radical Arab nationalism. He speculates that the real reason for the invasion was the misplaced hope that Lebanon could serve as a base of operations against the new revolutionary regime in Iraq.[38]

Viewing Eisenhower's Middle East policy from a broad perspective, Robert W. Stookey offers the following assessment of the President's record: "Lacking a sufficient appreciation of the difference (in fact, the incompatibility) of communism with Arab nationalism and neutralism, the United States was led into unilateral actions that, far from shielding the Near East from the cold war, actually tended to draw it into the confrontation and lent substance to communist assertions, eagerly adopted by Arab nationalists, that the United States had become the leader of a Western imperialism opposed to Arab freedom and progress."[39]

Steven L. Spiegel's evaluation is equally scathing. "In evaluating the record, policies, and decision-making style of the administration," he writes, "the contrast is dramatic between its high hopes and great attention and limited results. For every Middle East policy problem, the policy had failed by the time Eisenhower left office. . . . By attempting to maneuver between the conflicting interests of Egypt, Israel, Britain, and France, the administration has alienated all of them."[40]

Latin America

As in other regions, so too in Latin America an explosive nationalism posed the principal challenge to American interests during the Eisenhower years. Recent literature on inter-American relations during this period, much of which draws heavily on documentation from the Eisenhower Library, suggests that the administration adapted poorly to the problems—and opportunities—presented by this renewed nationalism. Only the threat of communist penetration could arouse high-level interest in Latin American issues during Ike's presidency; otherwise, the administration pursued a policy of benign neglect, calculating that in comparison to more pressing international hot spots Latin America could safely be placed on the proverbial back burner. The result of this policy, according to most recent accounts, was nothing short of disastrous. Throughout the 1950s inter-American relations steadily deteriorated, a fact dramatically illustrated by the angry mobs that greeted Vice President Richard Nixon in Venezuela and elsewhere during his goodwill tour in 1958, the establishment of a revolutionary regime in Cuba in 1959, and Eisenhower's belated efforts to repair relations within the hemisphere during the waning months of his presidency. In his new study of U.S. relations with Central America, *Inevitable Revolutions*, Walter LaFeber states flatly that the Eisenhower administration simply could not

[38] Lyon, *Eisenhower*, 822–826.
[39] Stookey, *America and the Arab States*, 157.
[40] Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 91–92.

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"come to terms with history."[41] Even the episode that some Eisenhower revisionists point to as a successful and limited defense of American interests—the CIA-led overthrow of the leftist Jacobo Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954—has been severely criticized in recent works.

The studies of Blanche Weisen Cook, Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, and Richard Immerman offer the fullest account yet of the Guatemalan coup, an operation still shrouded in secrecy.[42] They agree that the intervention in Guatemala was not only unjustified by nearly any standard, but set a dangerous precedent for the expanded use of covert operations as an instrument of American policy. Cook insists that the Guatemalan model has been used time and again, with only minor modifications.[43] There are important differences in emphasis in these works. In *Bitter Fruit*, Schlesinger and Kinzer argue that the American intervention was motivated by concern with the confiscation of the properties of the powerful United Fruit Company. In *The CIA in Guatemala*, Immerman takes a broader and more convincing view, suggesting that an all-embracing Cold War ethos led the United States to fear radical social experimentation in Guatemala and equate it, despite the lack of hard evidence, with communism. They do agree wholeheartedly, however, on the baleful impact of the operation. Of course, it was a resounding short-term success; Arbenz was ousted and replaced by a leader beholden to the United States. In the long-run, though, Immerman and Schlesinger and Kinzer see the intervention as detrimental not only to the evolution of democratic institutions in Guatemala, but also to the achievement of long-term U.S. interests in the country and in the region. Arbenz sought to end centuries of social and economic injustice, Immerman asserts, but "the CIA's 1954 coup made moderation impossible." He sees the guerrilla struggle currently raging in Guatemala as "the final irony—and legacy" of the Eisenhower administration's intervention in that tragic land.[44] Schlesinger and Kinzer are equally biting in their indictment of the CIA's meddling in Guatemala. "Over the longer term," they contend, "the coup gravely damaged American interests in Latin America. The gusto with which the United States had ended the Guatemalan revolution embittered many Latins, and strengthened deep-seated anti-Americanism throughout the continent." Partly as a result of the coup, they conclude, "movements toward peaceful reform in the region were set back, dictators were strengthened and encouraged, and activists of today look to guerrilla warfare rather than elections as the only way to produce change."[45]

[41] Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: Norton, 1983), 143.

[42] Blanche Wiesen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower* (New York: Doubleday, 1981); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1982); Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

[43] Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, vi.

[44] Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala*, 200–201. See also Richard H. Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979–80): 575–599.

[45] Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 229, 254.

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U.S. insensitivity toward the rising tide of Latin American nationalism took a less dramatic form in Brazil, but the results were just as detrimental to the accomplishment of long-term American objectives in the hemisphere. In his essay, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945–1960," Stanley E. Hilton contends that the Eisenhower administration's neglect of the region's largest and most important nation brought about an eclipse in the special relationship between the two countries that had long served U.S. and Brazilian interests. As a result, by the late-1950s the Brazilian leadership began to replace dependence on and cooperation with the United States with a more independent policy, one that would eventually lead Brazil to proclaim solidarity with the neutralist nations of the Third World and to seek common cause with fellow Latin states. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations "bear responsibility for that shift," according to Hilton. By foolishly ignoring its leaders' incessant pleas for the maintenance of a privileged relationship, he writes, "Washington alienated Brazil, formerly an eager ally in hemisphere matters. It also contributed powerfully to the long-range decline of American influence in the region by propelling Brazil along the path of solidarity with its historical antagonists, the Spanish Americans."[46]

Stephen G. Rabe's important new book on U.S.–Venezuelan relations presents another chronicle of insensitivity and missed opportunities during the Eisenhower era. "Perhaps what distinguished its policies from the previous administration," Rabe notes, "was the Eisenhower administration's unabashed embrace of military dictatorships and its failure to criticize, however mutely, the rampant political and civil repression in Latin America." This failure was particularly evident in Venezuela, where the U.S. heaped medals and accolades on the brutal dictator, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, for his staunch anticommunism and his favorable treatment of U.S. oil companies. When Pérez Jiménez was toppled in January 1958, the unqualified support for a leader who had managed to alienate nearly all segments of Venezuelan society produced a vicious backlash against the United States. The angry mob that nearly killed Nixon in Caracas in May 1958, "shocked the United States," Rabe writes; "relations with the model Latin American country were in a shambles." In the aftermath of the assault on the Vice President, the Eisenhower administration scrambled to repair relations with some limited success. Support for the liberal democrat Romulo Betancourt certainly represented a welcome reversal of previous policy. Nonetheless, Rabe contends that the Eisenhower administration's failure to adapt to the stirrings of economic nationalism in Venezuela laid the seeds of future problems. The Eisenhower administration continually blocked any Venezuelan efforts to gain more control over their only important resource: oil. And when the President announced price cuts and import quotas on Venezuelan petroleum in 1959, Venezuelan leaders responded by founding the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

[46] Stanley E. Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War: End of the Special Relationship," *Journal of American History* 68 (December 1981): 599–624. The quotation is from 624.

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Countries (OPEC), a cartel that would raise fundamental problems for the United States in succeeding years.[47]

Without doubt, Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba presented the most serious immediate threat to the accomplishment of the administration's objectives in the region. It is the verdict of much recent scholarship on Cuban-American relations that the Eisenhower administration's response to that challenge was rash, poorly planned, and ultimately counterproductive. As former Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal recalled in a 1972 memoir: "The Russian presence in Cuba is largely the consequence of the American reaction to Castro's provocations. . . . Russia came to Castro's rescue only after the United States had taken steps designed to overthrow him."[48] Richard E. Welch's *Response to Revolution*, the most recent and balanced account of these events, concludes that "the Cuban policy of the Eisenhower years can only be judged a failure. Its legacy was one of defeat and animosity."[49] Eisenhower, moreover, must be charged with the primary responsibility for the Bay of Pigs fiasco. "It was Eisenhower," writes Peter Lyon, "who had ordered that the attack be prepared, just as the operation was carried out under the purview of officials . . . who were completing what they had begun at Eisenhower's instigation."[50] Peter Wyden, whose *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* is the fullest account to date of that failed operation, offers a savage indictment of an ill-conceived and poorly-planned "wild gamble" that he calls "Eisenhower's baby."[51] Even Cole Blasier, who accepts the still hotly-debated theory that Eisenhower was correct in believing that Castro, from the very inception of his rule, sought to radicalize Cuban society and establish close relations with the Soviet Union, insists that the President's decisions "to arm a conterrevolutionary force and cut the sugar quota were counterproductive. . . . U.S. policies seem to have removed whatever slight chances may have existed for Castro's demise and facilitated his alignment with the USSR."[52]

Africa

For the Eisenhower revisionists—indeed, for nearly all specialists in postwar American diplomacy—Africa remains virtually uncharted territory. This neglect of Africa is, of course, understandable since most scholars agree that it posed

[47] Stephen G. Rabe, *The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919–1976* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 126–138, 158–164. The quotations are from 126 and 135. For another critique by Rabe of the administration's Latin American policy, see his article, "Eisenhower and Latin America: Arms and Dictators," *Peace and Change* 11 (Spring 1985): 49–61.

[48] Philip W. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 191–192.

[49] Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959–1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 61.

[50] Lyon, *Eisenhower*, 908.

[51] Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 318.

[52] Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), 228.

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relatively few problems for the United States during Eisenhower's two terms. Yet, at the same time, the emergence of vigorous nationalist movements in Africa and the creation of numerous new states out of former colonial areas—eighteen in 1960 alone—parallels developments elsewhere in the Third World. Ike's response to the shifting currents of African nationalism, moreover, well conforms to the pattern sketched above of an administration largely insensitive to this new force and prone to view radical nationalism through the distorting prism of U.S.-Soviet relations. As Thomas J. Noer notes in his impressively researched account of the U.S. response to white minority regimes: "By continuing a 'Europe first' approach at the expense of alienating the newly independent countries, Eisenhower may have insured immediate support for America's Cold War efforts, but he identified Washington with the dwindling pockets of white rule."[53] Cold War blinders joined with deference to the former European colonial powers, writes Richard D. Mahoney in a provocative new study, to frustrate the development of constructive relations between Washington and the new African states.[54]

The Congo crisis provides a case in point. When an independent government emerged out of the former Belgian Congo in 1960, under the leadership of the charismatic if erratic and left-leaning Patrice Lumumba, the United States quickly interpreted developments there as a new Cold War battleground. In her recent study of that crisis, Madeleine G. Kalb states that the Eisenhower administration saw Lumumba as "a Castro or worse" and determined that he must be eliminated lest his calls for Soviet intervention upset U.S interests in Africa. She offers a chilling account of various U.S. assassination plots, prominently featuring a CIA agent known only as "Joe from Paris," whose assignment was to provide lethal injections for the would-be assassins.[55] But was Lumumba a protocommunist and a direct threat to U.S. interests? The Eisenhower administration, argues Stephen R. Weissman, simply failed to understand the political force of nationalism represented by Lumumba and instead mistakenly based its policy on international communist conspiracies that were completely illusory. Nationalism was the issue in the Congo, not communism. Lumumba's policies "were rationally related to the militant nationalism which was his basic formula," writes Weissman. "But the Eisenhower Administration regarded Lumumba's acceptance of Soviet military aid as a last of a series of actions tending to prove 'Communist influence.'"[56]

[53] Thomas J. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 60.

[54] Richard D. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). See also Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, chap. 14; Henry F. Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960* (New York: Morrow, 1982).

[55] Madeleine G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa—from Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982). The quotation is from 128–129.

[56] Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), especially 257–268.

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Conclusion

The foregoing review raises some troubling questions about the new Eisenhower revisionism. Certainly the revisionists are to be congratulated for combining new evidence with fresh perspectives to give us a challenging reinterpretation of the Eisenhower presidency. Many of their findings, moreover, appear basically sound; that the general was a strong leader who often exercised prudence and restraint in the conduct of international relations seems veritably unassailable now. In their zeal to revise, however, some revisionists have badly overstated their case. This paper has tried to demonstrate that they often ignore, downplay, or misinterpret major elements of the President's policies toward the Third World, and thus seriously distort the Eisenhower record. It is particularly revealing that the revisionists offer judgments about American diplomacy that are widely at variance from those drawn by scholars who have focused more narrowly on U.S. relations with particular developing nations or regions. If one accepts the premise that Eisenhower's response to the Third World, and especially its nationalist stirrings, must be at least one critical ingredient in any overall evaluation of his foreign policy, then the revisionist case for Ike appears far weaker than many recent accounts would have us believe.

There are several possible explanations for the contrasting perspectives offered in the two sets of literature. Since the nature and availability of documentary evidence inevitably shapes the judgments rendered by scholars, it is tempting to see interpretive differences as a function of the reliance on different sources. Such an explanation, however, would risk gross oversimplification. To be sure, many of the studies of U.S.-Third World relations discussed above are painstakingly researched, while some of the revisionist works—Robert Divine's, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* is a prime example—are general accounts based solely on secondary literature. Yet other revisionist works certainly do mine important primary sources. Herbert Parmet, Peter Lyon, Fred I. Greenstein, and Stephen E. Ambrose all rely heavily on newly released documentation from the Eisenhower Library. Ambrose's magisterial biography, *Eisenhower, The President*, reflects its author's exceptional grasp of the available primary sources.

Depth and breadth of research alone simply cannot explain such sharp differences in interpretation. All studies of the Eisenhower presidency to date, after all, despite the boasts of some specialists, are based on a woefully incomplete documentary record. Many of the most important sources on the Eisenhower years—including most of the critically significant minutes of the National Security Council's weekly meetings—remain classified. Not even the most diligent researcher can compensate for the tightening web of governmental security regulations. The Department of State, moreover, has yet to publish more than a handful of volumes in its indispensable documentary series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*. In comparison, studies of the Truman presidency have been based on a far broader empirical base; scholarly reconstructions of Truman's foreign policy have consequently been more numerous, more comprehensive, and more sophisticated.

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Varying perspectives and conflicting methods of evaluation more accurately explain these contradictory trends in Eisenhower scholarship. What criteria does one use to evaluate the relative success or failure of any administration in international affairs? On this crucial question the revisionists and their critics differ profoundly. As noted above, the revisionists emphasize several key considerations in analyzing Eisenhower's foreign policy: maintaining the peace, managing relations with the Soviet Union, and understanding the limits of American power. On every point they award Ike high marks, contrasting his accomplishments, either implicitly or explicitly, with those of other postwar occupants of the White House.

Rather than reject these sweeping claims directly, many specialists in the field of U.S. relations with the developing nations simply investigate areas and topics outside the standard purview of the revisionists. Thus many of the nations discussed above—Laos, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, Brazil, Venezuela—are virtually ignored in revisionist accounts of Eisenhower's presidency. Yet the issues raised by these case studies speak directly to the conclusions reached by revisionist scholars. Using different standards of measurement—such as the *impact* of American actions on developing nations and the gap between goals and results—they reach strikingly different conclusions. If these authors are correct about the meager results of American initiatives, the detrimental long-term effects of many U.S. actions, and the chasm between expectations and accomplishments in so many parts of the world, then it becomes nearly impossible to view Ike's foreign policy in such a favorable light. Nor do the occasionally rash and often counterproductive actions detailed in these studies bolster the image of Ike's admininstration as consistently wise, prudent, and restrained.

Most important, this work on U.S.–Third World relations provides the basis for a fuller and more sophisticated understanding of Eisenhower's foreign policy. It promises to move the traditionalist/revisionist debate to a new plane. If any one theme emerges clearly from the recent literature on postwar American diplomacy it is the global nature of American interests. To understand a global foreign policy requires a systematic examination of *all* the areas of the world in which the United States tried to exert influence or affect developments. The studies discussed above certainly move us closer to that ultimate goal.

As the authors of those studies typically emphasize the continuity in American policy toward the developing nations, another question must be addressed: Is it fair to single out the Eisenhower administration for criticism in this area? Or, to rephrase the question: Is the Eisenhower administration any more to blame for American policy failures in the Third World than those of Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, or other recent presidents? Although that question cannot be answered with precision until far more detailed work on U.S.–Third World relations during those administrations has been published, it is certainly germane to this discussion. If Eisenhower's policies toward the Third World are in fact just part of a continuum in postwar American foreign relations, as some of the studies discussed above suggest, then this article's

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emphasis on the failures of one particular administration may be misplaced. At the same time, the revisionists' emphasis on discontinuity—the heart of their argument for Ike's diplomatic success—might be equally misplaced.

Many additional questions remain unanswered. The most basic of these is *why* did the Eisenhower administration fail to develop constructive relations with the emerging nations of the Third World? Were there truly prospects for an accommodation with Third World nationalism that were missed, as some authors assert? Or was militant nationalism itself, whether influenced by the Kremlin or not, simply perceived as a significant threat to American interests that demanded a vigorous response? If so, how then did Eisenhower administration officials define those interests? Were they primarily economic in nature, or strategic and political? Can the administration fairly be accused of a failure of vision in its approach to the developing nations? Or is it more properly a failure of strategy? Is it the administration's preoccupation with the Soviet Union that best explains its failures in the Third World? Or is Eisenhower's relative neglect of Third-World nationalism simply characteristic of the Europe-first orientation of a whole generation of American leaders? Did indifference or aversion to Third-World issues by key congressional leaders or by the American public as a whole set limits on the Eisenhower administration's freedom of action? And what of the President's personal views toward the newly emerging areas?[57] Did he truly appreciate the dynamism of Third-World nationalism, as some of his defenders insist? If so, then why was he so unsuccessful in translating those insights into workable policies? These questions should rank high on the future research agenda of Eisenhower scholars.*

[57] On this question, see Burton I. Kaufman, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, II, *The President*, especially 10, 333, 539, 587.

* An earlier version of this article was delivered before the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, December 1983. I am indebted to the following for their valuable comments and suggestions: James S. Amelang, Barton J. Bernstein, Kermit L. Hall, Richard H. Immerman, Aaron David Miller, James E. Miller, David Painter, Thomas G. Paterson, David S. Patterson, Gary W. Reichard, and Thomas Zoumaras.

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Book Reviews

The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende *by Nathaniel Davis. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1985. 480 pp. $24.95.*

The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy *by Michael Fleet. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1985. 274 pp. Cloth $35.00; paper $14.50.*

Scholarship about Chile retains a high quality, notwithstanding the bitter polemics around the overthrow of Chile's President Salvador Allende in 1973 and the subsequent military government. These books join an impressive, growing literature that describes and explains the collapse of Chilean democracy in the 1970s.

Nathaniel Davis, a career foreign service officer, was U.S. ambassador to Chile during Allende's last two years. His book is part apologetic memoir, part diplomatic history, and part a study of Allende's overthrow. Davis's role in Chile has been controversial; I find his account of his role credible and, thus, his behavior honorable under difficult circumstances. I focus, however, on the book's other aspects.

Although Davis provides little new evidence, his meticulous citation of other sources (including many at odds with U.S. policy) enables a scholar to confirm much still-disputed evidence. Moreover, his account of U.S. policy unravels its complexity. At one end, under "Track II" the U.S. government promoted a coup in Chile even behind the previous ambassador's (Edward M. Korry) back. At the other end, the U.S. embassy, under both Korry and Davis, sought to contain other U.S. government policies, to negotiate many issues in dispute, and to maintain as much bilateral cooperation as possible. The result was a bizarre policy mix. Davis also makes a good case that the diplomatic management of the copper firms' expropriation issue succeeded because of "what did not happen. The issue never really came to a head." The copper dispute did not become "the ultimate determinant in Chilean politics or the U.S.–Chilean relationship" (p. 107). One reason is that Davis worked at his job: "I tried to solve problems and reduce differences, not create them" (p. 401). He respected many key Chilean officials and Presi-

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dent Allende, who, Davis writes, "will find his rightful place in Chilean history, honored for his spirit, his vision, and his aspiration" (p. 407).

A reader will have to work harder, however, to understand the essence of U.S. policy that Davis describes but de-emphasizes. U.S. policy, for the most part Track I, was hostile to the Allende government, although it was skillful in hiding it. Although Allende might have fallen even if the United States had taken no actions against his government, the U.S. government did act. The Nixon administration opposed socialism's rise to power through elections in Chile and did its utmost to undermine it by fair and by foul means, unilaterally and multilaterally. That the U.S. government was not directly involved in the 1973 coup does not belie its extensive efforts to undermine the Allende government. That the latter was guilty of many mistakes does not explain why the U.S. government acted against it even before that government could commit them. The power of ideology in the White House and of the President's at times unrestrained capacity to act in foreign affairs, emerges in Davis' book, to his personal regret but to his professional credit.

Michael Fleet's book is a scholarly account of Chile's Christian Democracy. A novel empirical contribution is his secondary analysis of Eduardo Hamuy's public opinion polling in Chile between 1958 and 1973. Fleet's portrait of the Chilean electorate is clear. Theoretically, Fleet emphasizes his "modified class analysis of Chilean Christian Democracy" (p. 6). In fact, the book shows that the impact of social class on Chilean politics was complex and at best indirect. Religion, the choice before the electorate, and ideological and institutional factors are better explanations than social class for the course of Chilean politics. Although it is not clear whether Fleet shares this judgment, his able presentation permits reaching these conclusions at some odds with the original approach. Especially interesting is his explanation that the Christian Democrats expanded their support from blue collar workers in the early 1970s, and that these became more anti-Allende, not less. In general, religious, political, and ideological factors were the main explanation of Christian Democratic opposition to Allende. Consistent with Davis's book's de-emphasis of the U.S. impact on Chile's internal dynamics, the U.S. government and the CIA do not appear in Fleet's index.

There are two disappointments in Fleet's book. He tells us much about Christian Democracy but never discusses the party as an institution. And, despite religiosity's importance, there is little discussion of Roman Catholic ideas and institutions. There are also two problems. Fleet does not give a convincing justification for the second part of his title. He discounts Chilean Christian Democracy's revival in the early 1980s because of new serious structural problems. But he forgets the party's new opportunities: its main party rivals for electoral support to its right and in the center have been weakened or fragmented. Secondly, his standard for judging the Eduardo Frei Montalva presidency so critically is not clear. At times he suggests that Frei's supporters had wanted more reform (pp. 3, 80), even though elsewhere he shows most of those supporters were not so reformist (p. 118). Fleet makes clear that Frei's promotion of economic growth was ultimately disappointing—but was it more so than under Allende or under Augusto Pinochet Ugarte? A comparative and historical standard would have been useful.

Davis and Fleet illuminate the roles of Chile's main international partner, the United States, and of its main political party, Christian Democracy. Theirs is a story of tragedy

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for Chile, but they illustrate, too, the growing effectiveness of the passion of scholars for dispassionate analysis.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
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NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa *by Christopher Coker. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985. 302 pp. $32.50.*

Christopher Coker offers a succinct and serviceable summation of the linkages constructed with Africa since 1960 by the western and eastern politico-military blocs, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact. Using the two rival military alliances as the focal point for inquiry proves a useful device, permitting a coherent synthesis of the action and objectives of the most important extra-African actors participating in African crises: France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and East Germany, in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union. The extant literature concerning African international relations tends to an exclusive preoccupation with the two heavyweights, the United States and the Soviet Union, or to a monographic concentration upon a single power: France and Africa, East Germany and Africa. *NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa* thus finds a distinctive niche and makes a valuable contribution.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact are in the first instance military pacts, with a corollary function of political coordination. Accordingly, the book focuses primarily on these dimensions of Africa-bloc alliance relationships. The most original passages deal with the policy motivations of the secondary actors—France, Britain, and East Germany. The striking contrast between British and French post-colonial African policies—relative withdrawal versus often high-profile involvement, even interventionism—receives timely illumination. At the 1960 baseline of African independence, few would have anticipated such an outcome; British decolonization strategies seemed designed with subtlety and skill, while the French retreat was propelled by the calamitous Algerian war and punctuated by the collapse of the Fourth Republic. But today the Commonwealth is a shadow of its former self, while Franco-African summits regularly draw more African heads of state than Organization of African Unity (OAU) meetings.

To this reader, the most novel and striking contribution by Coker is his stress upon the economic dimension to East European African strategies. By the end of the 1960s the Soviets were quietly warning their Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) junior partners that their long-term raw materials needs in a number of key commodities could not be met by Soviet supplies. This made alternative supplies in Africa of such critical commodities as oil, coal, chrome, bauxite, and phosphates appear much more attractive and triggered much more active East European interest in African resource development.

One may query, however, whether this valuable insight does not overstate its real impact. To date, the East European resource development schemes have been modest in scale and have enjoyed indifferent success in Africa. The stress on resource access leads to un-

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derplaying, in the East German case, of the crucial security apparatus tutelary role played the Erich Honecker regime in consolidating the power structure of would-be Leninist regimes. To highlight autonomous elements in East German African policy is useful, but one cannot overlook the fact of the utter subordination of this most vulnerable satellite to overall Soviet policy objectives, and its compelling need to demonstrate its value to the Soviet Union in the international division of socialist labor.

Coker undertook this study on a NATO fellowship; he is primarily a specialist in international politics and western alliance affairs. It is not surprising that the study is more sure-footed in unravelling external factors than in relating these to African events. His sources are not always clear; his acknowledgements refer to substantial help from the NATO Information Office and to the extensive travel his fellowship permitted. However, neither footnotes nor bibliography make any reference to interview sources, which must have been important. More serious, the sources identified concerning the crises examined omit crucial works: Bereket Selassie and David and Marina Ottaway on the Horn; Madeleine Kalb and the Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politique (CRISP) and the Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation Africaines (CEDAF), Brussels, on Zaire, for example. There are accordingly a number of inaccuracies concerning the Angolan, Zairian, and Horn crises that more careful coverage of readily-available secondary sources would have averted. These peccadilloes do not detract from the overall contribution of the book in its principal focus upon NATO and Warsaw Pact behavior in Africa.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin–Madison

The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization, 1940–1980 *by Alan Ware. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 275 pp. $29.95.*

Alan Ware, who teaches at the University of Warwick in Britain, has written a book on American politics that is intellectually stimulating and exceptionally well-informed. It is not another study of electoral or governmental party decline at the national level. Although the findings have national implications, Ware's scholarly contribution is based on field research that he conducted among local party organizations. He presents careful case studies of Democratic party organizations in Denver, California's East Bay area, and New York City. For Ware, it is important that all three organizations are in large northern conurbations and that they experienced a major insurgence by liberal activists in the 1950s, but that they differ sharply from each other in the degree and nature of their strength at the beginning of the forty-year period with which the study is concerned. Hence, Ware has reason to believe that similar findings from the three cases provide the basis for cautious generalizing about the breakdown of Democratic organizations in a major portion of the United States. Yet he is familiar with the political diversity that produced exceptions to almost any generalization about American state and local politics.

The book is arranged to emphasize certain common developments. Instead of discrete chapters for each case study, Ware takes up all three Democratic organizations under topical headings, including the missing party work force, the decline of party structures, the rise of the new notability (candidates), and the impact of the new campaign technology.

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Altogether, the evidence leads him to conclude that what happened to Democratic parties between the early 1960s and the late 1970s was "truly extraordinary" (p. 241). The individual candidate for public office became dominant as the party organization lost control of nominations and as it ceased to be the main actor in general election campaigns. Ware understands that many factors contributed to the change, and that some are long-run causes and that others more specifically relate to the 1960s.

Although Ware emphasizes party organizational decline in the 1960s and 1970s, after what might have been an Indian summer for parties between 1940 and 1960, his thesis may not be meant as a challenge to the perception of a long-term twentieth-century decline of local party organizations. As in at least one of Ware's cases, the change in other places might often have been only sharper and more complete in the last few decades. At an earlier date, many American party organizations were believed to be significantly limited, especially in their capacity to control nominations. Indeed, that belief was authoritatively expressed about state party organizations at least as far back as the mid-1950s when V. O. Key (in *American State Politics*) analyzed the atrophy of organizational roles in legislative nominations. One might, therefore, question Ware's statement that "the ineffectiveness of the parties was not apparent to observers in the early 1960s . . ." (p. 10). But since Ware's citations indicate familiarity with Key's work, it is fair to assume that he has in mind a particular though important kind of party organization—namely, the metropolitan phenomenon with which he deals so persuasively in his three case studies.

A more substantive question about Ware's thesis could come from political scientists who now argue that party organizations, state and local as well as national, have developed new and more consequential roles since the early 1960s. Often, however, the newly-strengthened organizations are Republican, and their fund-raising and bureaucratic professionalism are more evident than participatory roles in determining nominations. Thus, the development of such organizations is not incompatible with the decline of organizations with which Ware is concerned. He recognizes the import of the new development and takes into account the possibility that Democratic party organizations may revive in response to Republican success.

This excellent empirical work is connected to a brief but challenging criticism of the fairly conventional "trinity" model (p. 7) of American parties—electoral, organizational, and governmental. The separation of these three elements, Ware argues, leads to efforts to analyze different kinds of party activities without satisfactorily relating them to each other or to a general conception of party. Such relationships are at the heart of Ware's own study.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
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Religion in American Public Life *by A. James Reichley. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1985. 402 pp. Cloth, $31.95; paper, $11.95.*

It would be virtually impossible to find a better summary of the history, law, and current controversy about religion in American public life than Reichley's Brookings Institution monograph. The author's treatment of this intricate, complex, and sensitive subject is so

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even handed, balanced, and accurate that this reviewer found himself searching for mistakes in nuance and tone with which he could find minor fault. The search was unsuccessful.

Reichley's conclusions about the proper role of the churches in public life—for which one must wait 350 pages—are sane and reasonable; and after his careful preparation they seem almost unarguable. In effect he calls for a religious version of judicial restraint, a position that one might label (through Reichley does not use the term) "ecclesiastical restraint."

Two paragraphs from the concluding chapter summarize the author's position and display his fair and balanced judgment and style: "By very reason of their broad and varied memberships and the moral standing they should naturally possess, the churches are well suited to act as mediators or fact-finders on many issues over which technical experts disagree. But to perform such roles, the churches would have to cultivate reputations for objectivity and openmindedness as to means. These qualities are hardly compatible with the positions that some churches have recently been taking as partisan combatants or propagandists for the political left or right" (p. 355). You cannot mediate in other words if you are arguing for the Moral Majority or indulging in a "preferential option for the poor."

"From the standpoint of the public good, the most important service churches offer to secular life in a free society is to nurture moral values that help humanize capitalism and give direction to democracy. Up to a point, participation by the churches in the formation of public policy, particularly on issues with clear moral content, probably strengthens their ability to perform this nurturing function. If the churches were to remain silent on issues like civil rights or nuclear war or abortion, they would soon lose moral credibility. But if the churches become too involved in the hurly-burly of routine politics, they will eventually appear to their members and to the general public as special pleaders for ideological causes or even as appendages to transitory political factions. Each church must decide for itself where this point of political and moral peril comes. But it is in all our best interests that the churches not be frivolous in testing the limits of public tolerance" (p. 359).

One might add that it is in the interest of all of us that political factions be consistent in their own stand on these matters. If you scream that "separation of Church and state" is being violated (and you won't if you've read Reichley's monograph) when a New England bishop condemns a pro-abortion candidate, you are in no position to applaud when a California bishop denounces a racist candidate. If you cheer loudly when the Catholic hierarchy condemns abortion legislation, you are in no position to sulk when it also condemns the nuclear arms race.

Those who are expert in the field will find *Religion in American Public Life* a useful summary and handbook. Those who wish to learn more about the field will find it a superb introduction. Those who are contemplating a course on the subject will have to search a long time to find a comparable textbook. Reichley is to be applauded and congratulated.

ANDREW GREELEY
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National Opinion Research Center

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Images of Voting/Visions of Democracy *by Peter B. Natchez. New York, Basic Books, 1985. 287 pp. $21.95.*

Those of us who remember the very considerable intelligence, vitality, and charm of Peter B. Natchez will welcome this book. We will also greatly regret that his death in August 1981 at 40 years of age has robbed us of a colleague whose further contributions to the ongoing progress of our discipline would have been good to have. Not many political scientists are capable, as Natchez was, of reading work as technical and as diversely ramified as the literature of voting behavior and rendering a sustained and nuanced appreciation and critique of it in the light of philosophical considerations.

This, in a nutshell, is the project of the present, posthumously published, book: to examine the contribution of the voting behavior literature to democratic theory and vice versa. It is unusual to see this literature treated as a piece of intellectual history and given what might almost be regarded as a literary criticism, in which the reader is invited to consider the conceptual foundations of the works in question, and not merely to reread their tables. Major landmarks in voting behavior—work issuing from Columbia and from Michigan, from the students of *The Authoritarian Personality*, from Almond and Verba, from Herbert McClosky, and from V. O. Key are given close attention and set into the context of the political science of the time in which they were published.

Thus, the bulk of this book consists of a descriptive commentary about classics of the voting behavior literature. Members of the generation of social scientists who saw these studies emerge and discussed them thoroughly at the time might be inclined to dismiss Natchez's work as nothing more than Monday morning quarterbacking. This would be a great mistake; understanding the intellectual foundations of an enterprise—understanding, for example, how Paul Lazarsfeld's interest in voting and campaigns arose out of his work on consumer choice and advertising—helps enormously in understanding the strategic choices that are made in the course of designing research. These choices, in turn, shape and constrain what any given piece of research, or research tradition, contributes to knowledge. It is a great merit of this book that Natchez retrieves a considerable amount of folklore about the strategic choices and the intellectual foundations of the study of voting behavior.

Because so much of this information is folklore, I assume more work will have to be done to verify that everything reported in this book is factually accurate. Is it, for example, literally the case that the Columbia Bureau of Applied Social Research voting studies provided evidence making "untenable" "the central premise of group theory" (p. 99) and therefore the Bureau was starved of funds for surveys after 1948 owing to the displeasure of influential group theorists who sat on the Social Science Research Council Committee on Political Behavior? Natchez went through the papers of V. O. Key, who was a leading member of the committee, and so his view if not a casual one, but a doubt remains in my mind.

The major argument of the book claims that a systematic attention to democratic theory would have provided a firmer intellectual foundation than the emergent study of voting behavior actually had. Partial exemptions from the overall tone of disappointment are granted Paul Lazarsfeld, owing to the singular imaginativeness of his work, which established in his community surveys so much of what we now think we know on the basis

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of better evidence; V. O. Key who, though allergic to systematic theorizing, provided a running critique of the voting studies as they emerged, always advocating greater attention to the problem of political relevance; and Herbert McClosky, who at several critical junctures designed and executed sophisticated studies grounded in politics and in psychological and political theory to a degree unmatched by any of his predecessors or contemporaries.

I imagine that some of the judgments in this book will not stand the test of time as we come to know more about the intellectual history of the study of voting behavior. Nevertheless, Peter Natchez has given us a stimulating and provocative reading of the literature in this lively branch of social science, and opened up a style of work which deserves emulation.

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

Party Identification, Political Behavior, and the American Electorate *by Sheldon Kamieniecki. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1985. 228 pp. $35.00.*

This study contributes to the ongoing research aimed at reassessing the traditional seven-point party identification scale—strong Democrat, weak Democrat, independent leaning Democrat, independent, independent leaning Republican, weak Republican, and strong Republican. This reassessment began with the discovery that the traditional scale did not behave like a simple ordinal variable. The problem with the scale (in which weak identifiers are supposedly more partisan than independents who lean toward a party) is that independent leaners often act as if they are more partisan than weak identifiers.

Kamieniecki seeks to build on this research by examining the social backgrounds, attitudes, and behavior of partisans and independents and by discovering whether strength of partisanship and independence are on one dimension or two. He begins by reviewing the many studies of party identification, and chooses to follow up on Herbert Weisberg's multidimensional model, which states that party identification consists of four components: partisan direction, strength of partisanship, independence, and party system support.

The author then uses 1980 National Election Service (NES) data to replicate Weisberg's factor analysis of a set of measures representing the four hypothetical components of party identification. Since the party system support factor fails to appear, the author rejects it and continues with the remaining three. In the rest of the book, the author presents and discusses the set of correlations between the eleven items that measure the three components of party identification and a variety of other variables that measure social background, attitudes, and political behavior. In short, what we have here is an 11 by 96 correlation matrix explained at book length. From these correlations we learn what sorts of people are more likely to be Democrats, Republicans, independents, and strong identifiers. Each set of correlations is preceded by a short discussion of the variable's theoretical background. All of this is useful stuff to be sure, but most readers will already know most

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of these facts. After all, those interested enough to read the book will already have a solid background in political behavior.

A similar problem arises with the author's use of statistics. The authors says, "This book was written with the idea that most students of politics do not have a strong background in statistics and methodology" (p. 30). That may well be, but few who care about multidimensional models of party identification will be unable to go beyond simple correlations.

Kamieniecki's principal finding is that strength of partisanship and independence are separate dimensions. The evidence is based on the author's argument that if strength of identification and independence were opposites, we would find the correlations between the scales measuring these two characteristics and the criterion variables to have opposite signs and roughly equal magnitudes. There are indeed a few variables with which both strength of partisanship and independence are positively correlated (for example, interest in politics), and there are several that have opposite signs, but for which the correlations are not of the same magnitude. The problem with this is that the author exaggerates the findings. For instance, upon discovering that ideological self-identification is negatively correlated with independence (−.10 and −.12) and positively correlated with strength of partisanship but at an insignificant level (+.03 and +.05), the author concludes, "These findings seriously challenge the long-held belief that strength of identification and independence are unidimensional" (p. 141). Leaving aside the fact that comparing correlations is a tricky business, differences in magnitude of .05 to .09 hardly seem like a serious challenge to anything.

On the whole, this is a disappointing book. Those who are interested in the subject will want to read it, but it has limited appeal for others, since it fails to tell us very much that is new.

ERIC R. A. N. SMITH
Columbia University

Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook *by Wolf Blitzer. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 259 pp. $15.95.*

The U.S.–Israeli relationship has come a long way since 1947 when much of the American administration, especially in the State Department, opposed President Harry S. Truman's position favoring support for an independent Jewish state. Today the two countries are staunch allies despite occasional policy differences.

Blitzer attempts to fill a lacuna in the literature on the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel. Most books, he notes, have been written on specialized aspects of the U.S.–Israel relationship, while few focused on the entire picture. In a concise introduction the author offers insight into the interaction between the two countries: "Both countries have come to recognize that they must keep those differences within limits, because . . . strong, close ties serve the national interests of both countries" (p. 4).

As the author realizes, the relationship, which is rooted in "longstanding moral factors"

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(p. 6), evolved into mutual strategic interests. The U.S. and Israel have further developed a network of exchange and cooperation. Such is the case with their collaboration in the development of new weapon systems and their extensive informal exchange in the areas of intelligence and military doctrine.

The author examines various groups that seek to shape American policy toward Israel: the bureaucracy, lobbying groups, the media, labor unions, blacks, Christians, and of course the politicians. The lesson that emerges is that lobbying groups, such as the American Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC), and Israeli diplomats have been able to exploit the decentralized U.S. foreign policy apparatus to their advantage.

The books major strength is also its main weakness. The author's concentration on the American side of the relationship leads him to neglect the Israeli side. A good example is the treatment of the events of September 1970. Israel's involvement to insure the survival of the Jordanian monarchy is treated largely as an Israeli service to America's request and interest. The author ignores the fact that Israeli self-interest was served by maintaining King Hussein in power.

Although the author does state that "Washington and Jerusalem are natural allies with many synonymous international interests" (p. 8), he does not stress the critical point that the U.S. and Israel will collaborate and cooperate only and as long as *both* countries' interests are served. This is the reason why the American administration won congressional support to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia over the opposition of pro-Israel groups. U.S. national interest encompasses more than its special relationship with Israel. When U.S. national interest does not coincide with Israeli interests, the United States will go its own way.

Among the most enticing aspects of the book is the collection of ancedotes gathered by the author throughout his career as a journalist. Although they provide an interesting revelation about the role played by individuals in bilateral interactions, too often the author jumps from one ancedote to another at the expense of analysis. *Between Washington and Jerusalem* does, however, provide an in-depth and interesting analysis of the U.S.–Israel relationship, accompanied by the experiences and insights of an excellent journalist.

YAGIL WEINBERG
University of Maryland

The MX Decision: A New Direction in U.S. Weapons Procurement Policy? *by Lauren H. Holland and Robert A. Hoover. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1985. 289 pp. Paper, $22.50.*

The subject is timely, the research is good, but unfortunately the resulting book is not one that is recommended for a general audience. The authors hoped to use a case study of the missile experimental (MX) to show that the prevailing bureaucratic model of decision making may not be adequate for understanding and explaining certain types of weapons-acquisition decisions. Even though the authors may have accomplished their task, they have produced a book which, because of it organization and execution, makes rather difficult reading for the concerned citizen.

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The book is organized into three sections of uneven length that are concerned with an examination and critique of the bureaucratic model (45 pages), a discussion of the issues and actors (78 pages), and finally, "MX decision making" (134 pages). The examination of the prevailing model results in fourteen propositions, which the authors believe are characteristic of that approach but which are not well documented and are referred to later by the authors as a "straw man" (p. 245). Their critique results in seven more propositions, some of which read like a typical doctoral dissertation in political science: "Environmental considerations will be significant factors in procurement decisions in cases where the weapon system will be environmentally costly" (p. 38).

The distinction between part two and three is difficult to understand and results in much duplication. For instance chapters two and three are devoted to an examination of the strategic, foreign, and domestic policy issues from the late 1960s to 1983 and reveal which of the actors took which position on those issues. However chapters six and seven then look at the same period from the point of view of MX decision making and in the process cover much of the same ground discussed in chapters two and three. The book would have been much easier to follow if a chronological scheme had been used throughout so that the reader did not have to try to remember what was said earlier in one context to understand what was said later on.

The principal problem with the execution is the authors' constant and often tedious habit of suggesting that a particular finding does or does not support a particular proposition. No one is going to remember the twenty-one propositions given in the first part, and it is annoying for the reader to constantly refer to those hypotheses while reading the book. For instance on pages 148 and 149 the reader is informed that a particular finding does not support proposition 6 of the inner layer of propositions and is then told that another finding also does not support that proposition, while a few sentences later the reader learns that some findings support propositions 15, 16, 19, and 20. This process continues annoyingly when on page 151 we learn that propositions 4, 5, and 9 are in trouble, while on page 153 we discover that propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 are only partially correct. This kind of self-conscious reference to propositions of the inner and outer layer would tax the patience of even the most dedicated Thomistic scholar and could have been avoided by a simple summary after the story had been told. In fact the authors offer such a summary in table 10.1 (pp. 246–250) which is helpful but too late, since the reader has already been irritated by all the references throughout the text. It would have been far more interesting for the general reader if the authors simply told the story and then summarized methodological findings in a concluding chapter.

In addition, the book could have used a more thorough proofreading that would have eliminated some obvious mistakes that are disconcerting. For instance, a Democratic Senator from Nebraska, J. J. Exon, comes out looking very much like an oil company descendant (Exxon, p. 234), and the governor of Nebraska is misidentified as Bob Kerney (p. 257). For the reasons noted this book would not be interesting to the general reader and of only limited usefulness to the professional political scientist.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska–Lincoln

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The Vietnam War: A Study in the Making of American Policy *by Michael P. Sullivan. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1985. 198 pp. $20.00.*

The major goal of this book is to illustrate the relevance of theories of international relations to the analysis of a specific case and in that way "demonstrate that the study of American foreign policy need not be limited to the traditional diplomatic historian's analysis that makes up the vast majority of the field" (p. 7). The need for greater theoretical rigor in the study of American foreign policy cannot be disputed, but this book makes little progress toward that goal. The limited number of sources cited and the errors of fact and interpretation that crop up throughout the book suggest that Sullivan has not done the research necessary to write clearly and perceptively about the American role in the Vietnam War. This is certainly ironic, because most of the book's errors could easily have been avoided, if only Sullivan had made greater use of the traditional techniques of the diplomatic historian—the very methods he seeks to supplant—such as immersing himself in the abundant primary source materials on the war that have recently become available.

A case in point is Sullivan's effort to determine the extent to which Vietnam was considered vital by American officials, in order to learn more about the process by which the United States became involved in the war. Sullivan attempts to determine the importance attached to Vietnam by American officials by counting, for each year from 1946 to 1968, the number of pages of official documents reprinted in the *New York Times* and Senator Mike Gravel editions of the *Pentagon Papers.* Since both of these editions contain relatively few pages of documents for the years 1946–1962, Sullivan concludes that Vietnam "did not become of great interest to decision makers until certain fateful decisions were made to become further involved" (p. 24). This conclusion is repeatedly referred to in subsequent chapters as one of the major findings of the book.

Reasonable people can disagree over whether page counts of this kind are a valid indicator of anything, but it cannot be doubted that Sullivan's findings have been tainted by inadequate research. Nowhere in this book is there any indication that there was a third edition of the *Pentagon Papers*, published by the Government Printing Office, which contains hundreds of pages of documents from the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations that did not appear in either the *New York Times* or Senator Gravel editions. Sullivan's results would have been very different if this material had been included in his data, necessitating in turn a drastic revision of his conclusions.

Sullivan's casual approach to the secondary literature on the Vietnam War is readily apparent in his review of the debate over the "quagmire model," first proposed by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and later sharply criticized by Daniel Ellsberg and by Leslie Gelb of the *New York Times.* Sullivan's bibliography suggests that he deemed it unimportant to actually read Schlesinger's writings on this subject, relying instead on brief excerpts cited in a paper by Ellsberg. His discussion of the writings of Gelb and Ellsberg is essentially a caricature that hardly does justice to the subtlety of their analyses. Important pieces in the debate over the quagmire model, such as Schlesinger's rebuttal to Ellsberg and Gelb's rejoinder to Schlesinger, are not even cited. In a later chapter, Sullivan's lack of familiarity with the available literature leads him to re-invent the wheel, in the form of his attempt to use Frank Klingberg's notion of alternating moods in American foreign policy to understand the timing of the American disengagement from Vietnam. This is

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an exercise that was first undertaken more than fifteen years ago by Samuel Huntington who, incidentally, receives no credit for blazing the trail that Sullivan later followed.

WALLACE J. THIES
Catholic University of America

Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe *by Gregory F. Treverton. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1985. 211 pp. $24.95.*

The NATO edifice has always looked unstable. Its twin arches straddle the Atlantic, while builders struggle against the elements to add the fabric of a mid-Atlantic defense culture. Winds of political change are constantly destroying parts of the building, but the architects are quick to patch the cracks and slap on a new coat of paint. Few analysts have tried to explain this complex construction project in book-length form, and even fewer have managed to keep their proper balance in doing so. Gregory Treverton has spent enough time studying strategy on both sides of the Atlantic and has a sophisticated enough sense of balance to produce the most sensible look about the state of NATO for at least a decade.

Treverton's thesis is simple: NATO has carried out its basic tasks for thirty-five years and "even if it is managed with only modest adroitness, it should last thirty more in its present form" (p. 192). According to Treverton, the alliance never had a "golden age" of tranquility and, therefore, no "enduring balance" is likely in the future. But neither has the alliance been in "enduring crisis," even though commentators have often warned of its imminent collapse. Thus the need for balanced judgment results from the basic unnatural qualities of NATO. It is an alliance of proud sovereign states, divided by history and many interests, but united by ideology, some economics, and above all a fear of a mutual enemy.

Although Treverton's thesis is simple, he is also in command of the complex dilemmas of NATO. For example, on the one hand if the United States is protected from the worst of nuclear war, either by the absence of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as in the 1950s, or by a strategic defense initiative (SDI), then the Europeans are concerned that Washington will try to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe. On the other hand, with the coming of strategic parity and a vulnerable United States, Europeans questioned whether Washington would come to its aid, and so more American theatre-range nuclear weapons had to be deployed in western Europe. The alliance cannot win either way, but Treverton is persuasive in arguing that the essential "common good" of the alliance—robust deterrence—remains present.

NATO's more serious problems have come in the political realm. For example, if the United States takes a strong lead, the Europeans howl that they are being ignored. When the United States sits back, Europeans mutter about indecision and drift. But as Treverton makes plain, the real problem is the instabilities in United States policy and the weakness of European unity. For example, in a short period Washington wanders from the rhetoric of détente to the megaphone diplomacy of "evil empires" and star wars. As

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a result, NATO bickers over human rights, economic relations with eastern Europe, and "out of area" military operations.

Treverton is at his best in arguing that common sense and complacency need not be dirty words for NATO. But he falters (or betrays his American base?) when it comes time for suggestions for reform. The obvious option, and one that is gaining increasing support in western Europe, is the creation of a stronger European pillar. As Helmut Schmidt has recently argued, NATO needs to reintegrate France into the military structure in order to make it possible to reduce the United States influence. Then Americans can take part in Europe as a genuine partner. Of course the price might be greater west-west rivalry and an encouragement of the United State's once traditional isolationism. But as Treverton so clearly reminds us, NATO can remain strong while suffering change and instability.

GERALD SEGAL
University of Bristol

Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf *by Thomas L. McNaugher. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1985. 266 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $9.95.*

Thomas McNaugher's basic thesis can be briefly stated. He argues that Persian Gulf oil remains of strategic importance to the West; that a Soviet move in the direction of the Persian Gulf is more likely to take the form of an occupation of northern Iran than a frontal attack on the oil fields themselves; and that the most effective U.S. response to such a move is conventional deterrence rather than nuclear escalation.

To mount such a defense—to stop the Russians with ground troops and air support in northern Iran and to occupy the oil fields in the south—the United States would need to strengthen existing military capacity; but this could be done with modest investment in arms, personnel, and lift capacity. The U.S., however, would still need staging posts in Turkey and the interior Gulf; and bases in the interior Gulf are unlikely to be available given the sensitivity of local rulers to domestic and Arab opinion. This latter consideration leads McNaugher to proposals for protecting the oil fields by enhancing the defensive capacity of the Gulf states themselves.

Since military cooperation with Iran or Iraq is not now feasible, McNaugher focuses on the six Arab oil states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Military planning here is not easy. Local forces are weak. Weapons absorption and manpower training are slow. Rulers avoid too close an identification with the United States. Fearful of their own troops, they avoid centralization of military command. Weapons are purchased, seemingly haphazardly, from half a dozen western states. Military personnel (in less queasy times they would have been described as mercenaries) from Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan buttress local forces. The members of the GCC cannot even integrate aircraft purchases.

McNaugher's sensible advice is that the U.S. should build on the seeming disarray rather than reach for levels of organization, integration, and cooperation with

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Washington, which cannot be achieved. The local states, he notes, have so far been able to deal effectively with internal security and low-level regional threats through a combination of traditional diplomacy, family and political intrigue, material inducements, and minimum force.

They have dealth with more serious regional threats—Ali Muhammad Nasser in Yemen, the Iraqi threat the Kuwait, rebels in Oman, religious zealots in Saudi Arabia—by seeking help variously from other Arab states, the Shah of Iran, England, and France, with ad hoc U.S. support. Such strategies can work in the future as well. The diversity of weapons supply is useful precisely because it allows the Saudis and others to call on support from powers other than the U.S. The involvement of Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan in local defense should be encouraged for the same reasons.

McNaugher thus argues that despite the muddle, the local approach to defense "evinces a wisdom all its own" (p. 158). Local military forces "are disorganized for a purpose" (p. 158). The U.S. should encourage the existing diversity of outside involvement, reinforce local capacity where it can, leave the task to others where possible, and be prepared, if absolutely necessary, to interdict a major regional attack, for example, by Iran or Iraq. The U.S. approach to local security issues should thus be "selective, low-key and somewhat detached" (p. 161).

For dealing with the small Arab states of the Gulf, this is eminently sound advice. It presumes, however, that somewhere down the road, restraint, patience, and slow encouragement of local defense capacity will yield the staging posts in the interior Gulf that will be needed for the defense of Iran, "the critical buffer" between the Soviet Union and the Gulf. But it does not guarantee the availability of these bases. The defense of Iran thus remains problematical. The great strength of McNaugher's highly readable book, nevertheless, is that he states his assumptions, argument, and conclusions with clarity and concision. The reader may agree and disagree; he can hardly accuse the author of fudging difficult issues or seeking refuge in obfuscation.

SHAUL BAKHASH
George Mason University

A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence *by Walter Laqueur. New York, Basic Books, 1985. 404 pp. $21.95*

In recent years intelligence has become a subject that has received not only increased journalistic attention but also increased academic attention. It is now the subject of numerous courses throughout the academic community. Such attention is clearly justified by the role intelligence plays in the formulation of foreign and defense policy as well as the approximately $20 billion a year that the intelligence community consumes of the national budget.

In his study for the Twentieth Century Fund, Walter Laqueur tackles the uses and limits of intelligence. His main focus is not on covert action operations (which are dealt with very briefly) nor collection but on the end product—the analyses produced and their use

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by decision makers. In some cases he examines specific cases, while in other cases he synthesizes his readings into an analysis of particular problem areas such as the relationship between intelligence and its consumers and intelligence failure.

In his early chapters Laqueur examines the various types of intelligence collection, the production of economic and scientific intelligence, and the conflicts that arise between those who analyze information and those who must act (or not) on the estimates produced. These chapters are representative of much of the rest of the book. Laqueur makes several points that if not original are worth repeating—for example, that U.S intelligence "has been too crisis-oriented and too little directed toward studying situations in depth and identifying trends that could eventually lead to serious problems . . ." (p. 98). At the same time many of his pronouncements are made without any presentation of evidence to support his point of view.

Additionally, there is a lack of depth in many discussions—in part necessitated by the number of topics he is trying to deal with. Thus, his discussion of the role of national technical means (reconnaissance satellites and aircraft, ground stations, and signal intelligence (SIGINT) ships) does not do justice to the importance these systems play in intelligence collection. Without surveying the different systems and their targets, judgments as to their inadequacy are not justified. While Laqueur may be correct that the capabilities of these systems have been oversold in the past, he may be involved in underselling their capabilities and value.

Laqueur's case studies concern the missile gap, the Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, and the estimation of Soviet missile strength from 1962 to 1969. His discussion of collection efforts during the missile crisis is particularly interesting. His approach provides a good idea of what the specific targets of various collection systems were and thus gives the reader a good feel for how the collection process would work during such a crisis. One wishes he had dealt with all the intelligence aspects of the crisis in more detail. Indeed all the case studies are relatively short. Further, given the excellent full-length works already written about estimating Soviet military strength, one wishes Laqueur would have focused more on his announced concern for political intelligence. U.S. intelligence performance concerning the situation in Iran in the late 1970s would have been a good subject to tackle in depth.

Two chapters seem particularly out of place—those on the Soviet and western intelligence services of Israel, Britain, and Germany. Given the minute attention Laqueur gives to U.S. organizations, his devoting two chapters to other nations' intelligence organizations seems peculiar. Whatever lessons could be drawn from their intelligence performance could be incorporated into other chapters.

Laqueur's book can, despite its flaws, be quite useful as an introduction to various aspects of the intelligence process. It addresses important subjects, even if somewhat superficially, and can start a newcomer thinking about issues that matter in the field.

JEFFREY T. RICHELSON
American University

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The West Bank: Line of Defense *by Aryeh Shalev. New York, Praeger, 1985. 209 pp. $35.95.*

From the Israelis' point of view the world is a grim place. They can only afford to lose but one war. Despite enormous success in the past, their military superiority seems to be eroding, as witness the bloody fighting of 1973 and 1982 (on the ground, at least). This is one prism which refracts Israeli concerns over the West Bank; politico-ideological concerns are the other. What security risks Israel might face in conceding the West Bank form the subject of Aryeh Shalev's new book.

Brigadier General (Reserves) Shalev brings impressive credentials to the task, having been head of the Israeli delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commissions, head of the Production and Estimate Department of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and from 1974 to 1976 military governor of the West Bank. He is currently a member of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

Shalev analyzes the security implications of an Israeli withdrawal in terms of two characteristics of the military threat: the geostrategic element and the correlation of forces. The West Bank, with its rugged highland flanked by sloping plains, is well suited both for defense and launching attacks. It dominates the central plain of Israel, the fertile middle of the state stretching only fourteen to thirty miles in width, on which is found two-thirds of Israel's population and four-fifths of its industry.

Joined to the geostrategic problem is the correlation of Arab forces. Shalev measures that threat not so much in intentions as in military capabilities. He notes that Jordan, though a reluctant foe at best, has greatly increased its military capabilities since its disastrous 1967 loss. Syria has pursued a course aimed at military parity with Israel. Iraq is acquiring an armed force of impressive scope (forty divisions, some 3,000 tanks, over 500 combat aircraft), as well as a group of battle-hardened soldiers. It is Shalev's concern that combinations of these foes in various ways that the past gives precedents for, combined with an Israeli absence from the West Bank, could lead to that final disaster that so preoccupies Israelis.

Shalev's proposed solution makes two demands. First, Israel must maintain early warning stations on the high ridges that run like a spine through the center of the West Bank; second, Israel must preserve a fairly substantial military presence in that mostly unpopulated region, enough to slow down an attacking force until the full IDF can be mobilized. But having set the precedent of total withdrawal in the Sinai settlement, Israel has decreased the probability that any other Arab state could settle for less than Egypt's Anwar Sadat. Shalev's proposals based on military necessity must be balanced against those of political possibility. In fact, his book serves as a primer for demonstrating the tradeoffs between what the military man needs and what the diplomat may be able to accomplish. By so doing Shalev illustrates the dilemma of the statesman: what margin of safety am I willing to give up in order to secure an agreement?

The book is effectively designed and presented and well worth reading for those concerned about feasible solutions for the West Bank problem. It is rather expensive for its

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length and is somewhat marred at the end by the addition of an historical supplement by Mordechai Gichon, which is superfluous at best and contradictory of Shalev at worst.

MARC ROBBINS
The Rand Corporation

Economic Statecraft *by David A. Baldwin. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1985. 409 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $12.50.*

Baldwin's book is a rebuttal to the naysayers who debunk the efficacy of economic sanctions in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Rather he argues that the use of both carrots and sticks—which combined form the arsenal of economic statecraft—provides useful indicators of capability, intent, and commitment to a foreign policy objective. In essence, *Economic Statecraft* is a study of "means." Baldwin sets out an analytical framework "to reassess the utility of economic techniques of statecraft" (p. 4), concentrating on the myriad of contingencies that a policy maker faces in a foreign policy crisis and the multiple targets and objectives of such adventures.

To Baldwin, economic statecraft is a communications medium, sending signals and portraying images of favor or displeasure—to friend and foe alike. He finds that economic assistance and denial serve a useful purpose as a conduit of policy whether or not the measures themselves have much economic impact on the target country. Indeed, he regards imposing costs for noncompliance as a measure of success of a sanctions episode. It is a rare case, indeed, that does not meet his low threshold of success. Baldwin spends a great deal of time reassessing selective, "major" sanctions episodes based on his policy-contingency model. He examines publicly declared as well as implicit and second-best goals and how those goals change over time. He faults—with undue arrogance—past scholarship for its imprecise and incomplete description of policy goals. While his analysis is not always rigorous (indeed historians may blanch at some of the unsupported assertions), the exercise confirms Baldwin's main point that economic statecraft operates on multiple levels and often is an effective means of achieving foreign policy goals.

Interestingly, one case Baldwin did not discuss is South Africa. Using Baldwin's methodology, sanctions have been working in South Africa since 1962. The apartheid regime has borne costs of noncompliance with UN resolutions, but it remains a staunch ally against communist intrusion in southern Africa, and modest internal reforms have been undertaken. But has western influence been instrumental in these developments or have the conflicting goals (moral vs. strategic) of the West cancelled each other out and yielded little influence on South African policy? Most would side against Baldwin in denigrating the effect of economic measures in this instance.

This example illustrates how Baldwin's model overstates the coercive value of sanctions that impose costs for noncompliance. Baldwin argues that sanctions costly to the sender convey seriousness of purpose. Such sanctions demonstrate resolve and threaten escalation of the conflict—or, in other words, deter—without resort to more bellicose actions. But are such actions coercive and are they sustainable? Symbolic acts may have an immediate impact on public opinion, but the effect soon fades away—and along with it

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domestic political support for the policy—in the absence of tangible results from the sanctions. If a policy is not sustainable, how seriously will it be taken by the rival power? Whether economic measures impose *sufficient* costs of noncompliance to influence the behavior of foreign countries depends on the perception by those countries of what the sender country will do in the future.

Another flaw in Baldwin's model is that he understates the vulnerability of allies and close trading partners to economic coercion. Because of the symmetry of interests between target and sender countries, he regards economic coercion as less useful in such cases. One can document case after case, however, where small powers have submitted to economic coercion *on specific issues* (nuclear reprocessing; human rights) in deference to the overall relationship.

In sum, Baldwin's study is an overreaction to the foibles of conventional wisdom. It is a scholarly effort that challenges academic and practitioner alike to undertake a more rigorous analysis of the efficacy of economic statecraft in the implementation of foreign policy. It provides a useful, if flawed, analytical framework for that task.

JEFFREY J. SCHOTT
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Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States *by Kenneth T. Jackson. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 396 pp. $21.95.*

This is a marvelous baseline document, absolutely required reading for every student of American society in general—and those interested in the processes of urbanization most specifically. The study of modular currents of life style has been largely abandoned by the sociologists in favor of aberrants, and it is a rare historian who has both the courage and the competence to attempt narrative history in a 150-year sweep that incorporates a theory of dynamics rather than a glossary of names and dates. The work won the Bancroft prize—and is fully worthy of it. Superbly written, the notes and the bibliography are easily worth twice the price of admission.

Jackson, professor of history at Columbia, provides more in sorrow than in wrath a magnificent historical sweep of anecdote, data, and well-footnoted literature, which concludes with the declining potency of the central city and the hegemony of suburbia. It effectively closes out the era whose hallowed reference point, now more than two generations old, was Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.'s *Rise of the City.* Yet, I left it with an uneasy feeling. The author's preoccupation with the issue of whether a better world, one with more equity, with a greater role for the central city being not only desirable but feasible seems to have colored his perspective. The author's moral judgment in terms of the decline of the central city, the problems of those left over within it, tends to pervade the book. While there is always a deference to the notion that "Americans have long preferred a detached dwelling to a row house, rural life to city life, owning to renting" (p. 11), Jackson's predilection for a different destination struggles mightily with his honesty and vigor as an historian.

The model that he uses is essentially technology driven, but technology within the ma-

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trix of a unique society, of government, of affluence, and perhaps a unique-to-America set of priorities. Yet Jackson cannot really decide whether the suburban pattern of the United States is the result of deterministic processes or rather a series of corruptions which kept us from evolving into a better life. Perhaps a more insightful approach would have been generated by looking to the most probable levels of tomorrow and using those as the baseline for retrospective analysis.

Jackson basically waffles on the future. On the one hand, he suggests that energy costs and a decreasing potency of race as a centrifugal force will yield a slowing—and potentially a stabilization—of the suburbanization pressure. But then he hedges his bets by again referring to the cultural preference for privacy, for the detached home and plot.

The focus on energy constraints has implicit within it my major cavil with what is otherwise a superb collection—that is, the failure to understand that Levittown's suburbs and their predecessors (which are detailed clearly and simply) are very different from the new ring cities that are evolving. The latter, based on the circumferential highways, are creating a new pattern of development/workplace/liveplace. The difference is not merely incremental but rather suggests whole new folkways and settlement patterns that fit uneasily within the classic framework of suburbanization. Fortunately, the author projects a return to the central city as evolving circa 2025—a long enough grace period for any review. In the meantime, read the book!

GEORGE STERNLIEB
Rutgers University

Chicago Divided: The Making of a Black Mayor *by Paul Kleppner. DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1985. 313 pp. Paper, $9.50.*

Kleppner has written an important and provocative book that chronicles the history of black empowerment in the city of Chicago and the simultaneous defeat of the last great urban political machine. That the machine's demise came with the election of Chicago's first black mayor is no accident, according to Kleppner. He argues that there has been an historical pattern of racial hostility in Chicago that dates back to the race riots of 1919. Moreover, the racial segregation that has come to characterize Chicago's neighborhoods was reflected in the political agenda of the machine. Blacks may have been part of the machine's electoral coalition through 1967, but according to Kleppner the cost was acceptance of white cultural dominance.

The issue that most divided the city of Chicago was racial integration. For black politicians, like the infamous Bill Dawson, the tradeoff for being part of the machine's patronage network was keeping questions of racial fairness off the political agenda. Kleppner convincingly demonstrates that blacks were always unequal partners in the machine's governing coalition. In the struggle for school integration and scattered-site low-income housing the machine always sided with the white ethnic community's desire to keep neighborhoods and schools segregated, in effect institutionalizing racism. Chicago, however, is also a city of competing ethnic groups, so it is difficult to maintain

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that race was the city's only political conflict of significance. Kleppner notes this point, but only to argue that as blacks became an increasingly larger percentage of the city's voting-age population the machine's strategy shifted to consolidating ethnic interests and demobilizing the black population.

Not surprisingly, black political discontent did not fully emerge until the machine began to unravel when its mayor of twenty years, Richard Daley, died in 1976. In the struggle for leadership in the machine a new generation of white ethnics made it clear that they had no intention of sharing power with black Chicago. We know what has happened in the years that followed. The machine underestimated the political strength of the city's blacks and Harold Washington became Chicago's first black mayor.

The dramatic nature of the events that culminated in Washington's victory are carefully unfolded by Kleppner so that this political history reads like an exciting novel. Leaders of the Democratic machine abandoned Washington after he defeated two white candidates in the 1983 primary, and Chicago's white ethnic population voted overwhelmingly for the Republican candidate. Washington's extremely narrow victory came from unanimous support in the black community and a smattering of votes from Chicago's white liberals. One of the most disturbing facts revealed by Kleppner is the level of racism that surfaced during the general election. Kleppner clearly documents how lifelong white Democrats abandoned their party for the sole purpose of voting against a black mayoral candidate. It is at this point where Kleppner's analysis is least compelling. Kleppner seems content to attribute Chicago's racist politics to the machine, yet he is willing to acknowledge that even in Philadelphia, black mayoral candidate Wilson Goode received no greater share of the white vote than Harold Washington received in Chicago. I am not convinced that the machine is really the villain of this history, nor am I convinced that blacks were wrong to support the machine during the years it provided them with tangible benefits. By focusing on elections Kleppner has only told part of the story of black empowerment in Chicago. This fascinating book makes me very anxious for a sequel.

ESTER FUCHS
Barnard College, Columbia University

Politics, Democracy, and the Supreme Court: Essays on the Frontier of Constitutional Theory *by Arthur S. Miller. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1985. 368 pp. $35.00.*

"Thinking like lawyers is, I suggest, a form of brain damage" (p. 203). This is one of the many heterodox opinions voiced by Arthur S. Miller, professor emeritus of law at George Washington University, in this collection of ten of his recent law review articles. In view of this opinion, it is not surprising to find that Miller cites political scientists rather more often and more favorably than his legal colleagues. The pages are dotted with such names as Theodore Lowi, James Q. Wilson, Arthur Bentley, Thomas Cronin, Robert Dahl, Samuel Huntington, Grant McConnell, Robert McCloskey, Martin Shapiro, Herbert A. Simon, and Walter F. Murphy. This collection of essays "on the frontier of constitutional

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theory" deals with such problems as "The Constitutional Challenge of Nuclear Weapons," "Toward Recognition of a Constitutional Right to a Job," and "Taming the Corporate Beast."

The book offers a wide range of analysis and advice on various issues, with the intention "more to stimulate debate than to answer all of the questions" (p. 156). The approach throughout is free-wheeling and wide-ranging. For example, the chapter on "Interstate Equal Protection," which begins with the assertion that in recent equal protection decisions the Supreme Court has been "playing a zero-sum economics game while using lawyers' language" (p. 159), then turns out rather surprisingly to be mostly an argument for enfranchising independent voters by abolishing closed primaries.

Throughout, the emphasis is that of the introductory chapter, written for this volume, which opposes "constitutional realities" to "constitutional myths." Miller does not enter the debate between "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism," because he believes that nebulous constitutional language has always required the latter. "The Constitution was in effect, although not expressly stated and not widely recognized even today, a delegation of power to later generations of Americans to write their own fundamental laws" (p. 273).

What Miller does attempt is a reexamination of the fundamental nature of American constitutionalism, positing a Political Constitution and an Economic Constitution. In the former, Supreme Court justices act as governmental officers with the mission of protecting the existing political order against undue change. Court opinions are "Political documents written by a group of political Justices" (p. 40). Judicial independence from the governing coalition (page Robert Dahl) is "a part of the myth system, but not part of the operational code of the United States" (p. 40). As for the Economic Constitution, it has always supported "socialism for the affluent" and a "class society" (p. 71). The dominant class rules by identifying itself with the people through "the myths and legends of democracy and popular sovereignty" (p. 71).

Miller perhaps comes closest to writing a traditional law review article in the chapter on "The Iranian Hostages Case." But again, his theme is that the Court's support of executive action was a political decision by a political court, and that necessity is the mother of constitutional law. "[W]hen matters of important State policy are concerned the Supreme Court acts as an arm of the State" (p. 275).

This is a lively, opinionated book, which may seem dangerously heretical in some quarters. But political scientists will hardly be scandalized by Miller's advice that "those who think about American constitutionalism should begin with Machiavelli" (p. 151).

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
University of California, Santa Barbara

Conservatives in Court *by Lee Epstein. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1985. 204 pp. $17.95.*

Research into interest-group activities in the judicial arena has continued to shatter what is left of the once-entrenched and pervasive myth that courts are apolitical arbiters of legal disputes. Most of this research has centered on litigation sponsored, cosponsored,

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or directly undertaken by liberal interest groups pursuing, for example, racial equality, religious freedom, and fairness in the administration of criminal justice. Researchers demonstrated that some groups relatively powerless in the political process were successful in inducing courts to safeguard their interests by judicial decree. From this emerged the widespread assumption that interest groups resort to the courts primarily because they are politically disadvantaged in the executive and legislative channels of power.

In this brief but comprehensive book, Lee Epstein examines the assumptions drawn from the numerous studies or accounts of liberal interest-group litigation by testing them against empirical research into the use of the judiciary by conservative interest groups, a field of inquiry, she says, "largely overlooked" by scholars (p. xi). "Given the minimal scholarly attention that conservative groups have received, an examination of their activities is critical to a full understanding of the use of the courts by *all* interest groups" (p. 15).

In a highly systematic presentation, Epstein traces the manner in which conservative economic, social, and public-interest groups, some of which are very powerful economically and politically, have nonetheless utilized the judiciary to further their political values; and she carefully assesses the success of their efforts. One assumption derived from prior research is immediately rejected: that recourse to the courts is primarily a tool of the politically powerless. The book is arranged in six chapters. The first discusses interest-group litigation in general and the alleged oversight of social scientists to analyze organized conservative pressure in court. It is difficult to comprehend the oversight in view of the author's citation to scores of secondary materials to reinforce her claims about conservative litigation.

The next three chapters present some interesting facts about the mobilization of conservative forces, as early as the turn of the twentieth century, to seek favorable judicial rulings. Epstein analyzes the strategies and successes of conservative efforts to halt the growth of social and economic progressivism (understood at the time in some quarters as Bolshevism) such as federal legislation to eliminate the exploitation of child labor or to reduce the rate of infant mortality. Much of the success of conservative litigation, of course, Epstein rightly attributes to the conservative, and occasionally reactionary, disposition of the judiciary on such matters. She also carefully describes the very activist conservative movement, since the 1960s, in organizing to promote, *via* courts as well as legislatures, the rights to life, work, decency, and law enforcement (values comprehended in other quarters as anti-abortion, anti-union, and anti-freedom in general). The power of such a movement, especially as a force in court, has grown tremendously; the author graphically displays, as an exmaple, the exponential growth in membership in the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, from 10,000 in 1969, to almost 300,000 in 1981 (p. 57).

As Epstein stresses, conservative interest groups are not novelties, nor have they only recently learned from their liberal counterparts the utility of litigation. The amount and frequency of conservative litigation has greatly increased, however, as contemporary conservatives have intelligently observed, in the aftermath of liberals' successful exploitations of the Warren Court, the fluidity of judicial choice and the power of judge-made law. "Courtrooms, in fact, may no longer be much different from legislative corridors, which often serve as arenas for competing group interests" (p. 148). Judges may soon "more than ever before [be] put . . . in the position of having to mediate between competing group

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interests" (p. 156). The strategies, resources, and successes of conservative (as well as liberal) litigants inevitably vary and depend on a multitude of different and complex factors (including, of course, the prejudices of judges), all of which are examined meticulously in Lee Epstein's scholarly book.

JAMES MAGEE
University of Delaware

Judges and the Cities: Interpreting Local Autonomy *by Gordon L. Clark. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985. 247 pp. $25.00*

This book is not about cities and not about judges. It is a philosophical and jurisprudential argument on what the author terms the determinacy of social explanations and legal interpretations. Local autonomy is the vehicle for this exploration, but it is not systematically examined.

The author begins by tilting at windmills when he argues that he will argue against "the well-known logical positivist mode of social inquiry, which supposes that an objective and unique truth can be established," which he contrasts to "the less familiar notion of moral pluralism" (p. 1). Many practicing political scientists will be surprised by the vehemence of his argument, because they already accept the relativistic position that analysts cannot be insulated from the norms they profess and that research findings are bound to the contexts in which they are set. In this sense, the post-behavioral movement in political science has already won the battle and most of the arguments that Clark marshals will attract little interest.

Clark conducts a dialogue with the most significant philosophers and scholars of jurisprudence of our day including Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Richard A. Posner, and Ronald Dworkin. He has many observations about the degree to which they sometimes overlap and disagree with one another. Those who approach this book with that objective will find it of considerable interest.

On the other hand, political scientists interested in urban politics will look principally at his four case studies of the interaction of law and urban conflicts. They deal with Boston's successful attempt to impose residential and minority hiring quotas on municipal construction projects; land use disputes in Ontario, Canada; a dispute between a Chicago suburb and the Metropolitan Sanitary District over the construction of a sewage disposal facility; and Denver's occasional difficulties with Colorado courts. These cases are described very skimpily. The Boston case, however, is a textbook example of the transformation of a political conflict into a legal dispute. Clark's reliance on the briefs filed in that case provides insights that are ordinarily lost when only court opinions are examined.

The book is unhappily marred by the lack of definitions of central terms and by unforgivable jargon. For instance, I could find no definition of "determinacy," the central concept of the book. The jargon includes such words as "relevation" (p. 25), "imperation" (p. 66), "contrectation" (p. 68), and "structuration" (p. 196).

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The book reflects wide ranging scholarship. It defies disciplinary classification. It is not clear to me that the reader is adequately compensated for the effort it requires.

HERBERT JACOB
Northwestern University

Without Precedent: The Life and Career of Eleanor Roosevelt *edited by Joan Hoff-Wilson and Marjorie Lightman. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984. 266 pp. $17.50.*

Whether interested in women's political participation or not, political scientists can agree that Eleanor Roosevelt had a considerable impact on twentieth-century American public life. But how should we understand that impact? Assembled to celebrate the centenary of "ER's" birth, this intriguing collection of twelve essays by historians offers a wealth of information on Eleanor Roosevelt's personal and public life, and suggests some ways—beyond the purely biographical—to comprehend her distinctive political significance. This book also hints at the broader advantages students of U.S. politics might gain from familiarizing themselves with the new women's history that is currently expanding our understanding of gender relations in the American past and present.

From the New Deal through the aftermath of World War II, Eleanor Roosevelt was a constant hub of political activity, much of which is described in parts two and three of *Without Precedent.* Acting ostensibly, or actually, as a stand-in for Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eleanor travelled all over the country on fact-finding tours to see first-hand the sufferings of the Depression and war. She received and answered many thousands of letters from ordinary citizens and often intervened as a self-appointed ombudsperson to see that New Deal leaders and the federal bureaucracy dealt humanely with problems. In the course of all this, ER also pursued what the editors of this volume call "a politics of conscience." As Joanna and Robert Zangrando show in their piece on "ER and Black Civil Rights, this meant challenging racial segregation and supporting antilynching bills in the face of her husband's reluctance to alienate the white South. And as Winifred Wandersee shows, it meant supporting participation by organized youth groups, even when elements in them took pro-Communist stands that ER abhorred. Ultimately a politics of conscience also led Eleanor Roosevelt to champion Henry Wallace over Harry Truman and to pursue an internationalist program for world peace, matters covered by Richard Kirkendall and Blanche Wiesen Cook.

Although not a feminist in today's sense, Eleanor Roosevelt was an indefatigable patron of women in New Deal politics, helping Molly Dewson to organize women's divisions in the Democratic party, lobbying to secure professional women positions in the federal administration, and giving them access to FDR to advocate social reforms. Especially revealing on this score is Martha Swain's discussion of the "Partnership for Women's Work Relief and Security," between ER and Mississippian Ellen Woodward, who served in relief agencies and the Social Security Board. Along with Susan Ware's book *Beyond Suffrage: Women in the New Deal*, Swain documents ER's centrality to a women's network that helped to fashion several parts of America's fledgling national welfare state in the 1930s.

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Indeed, not only was ER central to this women's network, she must be understood as part of a remarkable generational group of female social reformers whose experiences and outlooks bridged from Victorian "separate spheres" for women and men into the post-1920s era of formally equal participation in U.S. politics for women citizens. Essays by William Chafe, Susan Ware, Elisabeth Israels Perry, Tamara Hareven, and Lois Scharf in parts one and four of this volume are especially useful for situating ER's career in this broader historical perspective. Even though she did not go to college and was married and the mother of six children, Eleanor Roosevelt had a great deal in common with other women, many of them higher-educated and never married, who were active in social-reform politics in the Progressive Era and the 1920s. These women maintained emotionally intensive female friendships and believed that women, precisely because they were different from men, could bring a special humanizing outlook to politics once the vote was won.

As *Without Precedent* reveals, Eleanor Roosevelt spent happy teenage years in a girls' boarding school with a reform-minded headmistress, and then after some painful years as a domestically confined wife and mother, found both friendship and public challenge in World War I service and in political activities undertaken on behalf of her crippled husband during the 1920s. Moreover, Chafe and others offer fascinating speculations on the ways in which Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, emotionally estranged in their private life, worked out a delicate balance of activities in their publically visible marriage, allowing her to serve as both loyal helpmate and independent political agitator for reformist causes.

Along with other women whom she helped into places of influence in the New deal, therefore, Eleanor Roosevelt was able to act on a national stage the ideal role of the Progressive woman reformer, a politically active "mother" to the nation, at once compassionate and morally conscientious. In the process, she also created for the first time the modern definition of the role of the First Lady. For, as Abigail McCarthy's essay shows, first ladies prior to Roosevelt were simply social hostesses, while since her time the normative expectation has been that the wife of the president will lead a partially independent public life, pursuing worthy projects that symbolize national moral concerns.

THEDA SKOCPOL
Harvard University

From Working Girl to Working Mother: The Female Labor Force in the United States, 1820–1980 *by Lynn Y. Weiner. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1985. 187 pp. $17.95.*

This valuable book integrates a wide gamut of research on the female work force by labor economists, demographers, political scientists, historians, and social workers within a framework that gives the female work force a coherent identity. It traces the changing public definition of the "social problems" related to working women over time. The values, culture, ideology, nature of work, and the female "propensity to work," which un-

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derlay these definitions, are made to fit seamlessly together with no attempt to assign undue emphasis to any one of them.

In the nineteenth century it was the young unmarried woman, the "working girl," who needed moral protection; by the end of the second decade of the twentieth century public concern with her had subsided. No longer controversial, she was now taken for granted. She had been assimilated. She had "disappeared" (p. 78).

Now the social problem was the working wife. Until the 1940s she was "anathema," "beyond the pale of middle-class respectability" (p. 85). Especially if she did not *have* to work. Not until the 1940s did the scene change. By then married women had become a major source of needed new workers. Demographic changes and changes in the nature of work and in the roles of women accounted for much of this increase—as did the growing "propensity" among women to work and, especially, the need for workers in the war effort. Despite official manpower policy, which at first had opposed the employment of married women, these needs limited its success so that in time married women workers were no longer being defined as a social problem. They were even being urged to work.

Not, however, mothers. In the 1960s they became the social problem or, rather, the care of their children did. There was a long history of dealing with problems of child care in the nineteenth century, but it referred primarily to poor, black, or immigrant or other non-white middle-class women. The white middle-class working mother was different. "Increasing numbers of people saw day care not as a charity or as a welfare function, but as a community service for normal families, similar to public education or public transportation" (p. 137). Not, in brief, as a social but as a policy problem.

In a 1970 White House Conference on Children, day care was judged to be the most serious problem of the day, and massive federal funds were asked for to deal with it. In 1971 the Comprehensive Child Development Act recommended government provision of day care for all children. Nixon vetoed it. Tax legislation in the 1970s allowed credit for the expense of child-care services. In addition, a host of other non-governmental ideas were also proposed. In 1980 the bottom line was still that "despite their rapidly growing numbers and despite more than a half century of public discussion [and attempts to forge legislative solutions] working mothers remain[ed] defined as a social problem" (p. 140). Nor was the solution yet in sight. As long as our society could not "reconcile women's work patterns with the ideology of domesticity" working mothers would remain "as an unresolved issue on the national agenda" (p. 140).

JESSIE BERNARD
Washington, D.C.

Women as Candidates in American Politics *by Susan J. Carroll. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985. 236 pp. $25.00*

Carroll has written an intriguing book. It is based on mail questionnaires sent to 1,936 female candidates in 1956. An unusually high response rate of 63 percent suggests that women were more interested in this kind of research than are men.

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The book, despite some flaws, is generally persuasive. The flaws concern a determination to show that women are victims. The book asserts that "governing institutions often have not acted in response to women's interest on women's issues" (p. 16). True, but almost every group extant makes that appeal. As an example, Carroll cites the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Majorities of the questionnaire sample have always supported it, yet the amendment failed because "predominantly male governing bodies have failed to act in response to women's interests on policy issues dealing with women" (p. 16). There are numerous examples of disparity between public opinion and public policy: majorities favor gun control yet we do not have it; majorities oppose affirmative action, yet we have it. Janet Boles's work makes it clear that there was more at work in the defeat of ERA, such as Phyllis Schlafly.

When the author pokes at her data, the analysis rarely is off the mark. Majorities were encouraged by party leaders to run, frequently as "sacrificial lambs." The definition of sacrificial lambs may be inaccurate. One component is challenging an incumbent. But it is not uncommon for rising stars to be thrust into such roles to establish name familiarity and run a good, if unsuccessful, race.

The attitudes of the candidates is a fascinating topic, well handled by Carroll. They are feminist in ideology and "androgynous" (p. 100) in their sex-role identities. Yet they did not strongly emphasize women's issues in their campaigns. Therefore, winning or losing had little to do with gender and a lot to do with opportunity. Women frequently run against incumbents, and few women are incumbents. Surely the opportunity structure will improve. In 1984, there was the usual increase in the number of women in state legislatures. But Carroll found that many of the candidates for statewide office had no ambition. Again, the opportunity structure looms large. Having children inhibits women, not men.

But, assuming that the increased candidacies of women does ultimately result in an increase in female legislators, will it make any difference to women? Carroll believes that the "closet feminists" (those candidates who eschewed feminism for fear of being labeled "one issue candidates"), must assert their interest in matters of unusual interest to women while they simultaneously serve the interests of their constituencies on other issues—a tough job. My work on the voting behavior of female members of Congress suggests, however, that it is far from impossible.

Quibbles aside, this is a very good piece of research. It is generally balanced, especially when the author works through the data in a careful manner and avoids unsupported generalizations which she usually does. We learn things that we did not know before. We are forced to reflect on the consequences of well-intentioned reforms (such as spending limits and the trend toward single-member districts in state legislatures) that operate to the disadvantage of others. Written before the election of 1984, the book asserts that women candidates are perceived as likely to pull extra votes, an illusion. But 1984 should lead to more women candidacies. Perhaps the author's optimistic conclusion that the increase in women candidates may lead to a closer look at the opportunity structure is justified.

HARMON ZEIGLER
University of Puget Sound

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Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics *by Emmanuel Sivan. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985. 218 pp. $18.50.*

This is a first-rate study. A short book (190 pages of text), it might seem at first sight to be more nearly a discursive essay on this elusive subject. Such is not the case. This is a painstakingly researched and tightly-reasoned study. The book is readable but demands—and deserves—careful reading. It should receive the attention not only of specialists in modern Arab and Islamic societies but of all interested in the complex mix of religion and politics. Another strength of Sivan's is his ability to situate his presentation within a comparative framework, drawing on earlier Islamic and western experience.

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, there has been no lack of scholarly writings on Islam and politics. Much of this literature shows telltale signs of overly-hasty reaction to headlines. Even the best scholarly work tends to emphasize Islamic fundamentalism as symptomatic of perceived failures in modern Arab society and politics. This, of course, is an important part of the explanation. Radical movements, perhaps especially intense religio-political movements, thrive in societal soil of a generalized malaise, of a sharp disjuncture between expectations and reality. Even so, all radical movements have their own historically-conditioned individuality. To concentrate on the socio-political context is to set the stage. It does not suffice to introduce the actors.

Herein lies the major contributions of *Radical Islam.* Sivan has studied the writings of Sunni Muslim fundamentalists. He seeks to understand what they are saying on their own terms. What emerges from his study is a much more intellecturally coherent ideology than many who have concentrated their attention on radical-Islam-as-symptom might have suspected. He also shows how Ayatollah Khomeini's radicalism, as a Shi'i movement, can have only a limited impact on the way Sunni radicals present their case.

Sivan sets out fully what has often been only hinted in earlier scholarly writing—the intellectural debt to Ibn Taimiyya (1268–1328), the great influence on Sunni Arabs in this century of the Indo-Pakistani theologian Abu-l-A'la Maudoodi, and the central ideological role of Egypt's Sayyid Qutb. He shows that Islamic fundamentalism is not simply reactionary in the literal sense or nostalgically longing for a presumed "paradise lost." Instead, he reworks Islamic ideas into a revolutionary frame. The result is a justification of revolution against nominally Muslim governments, a total rejection of the venerable Muslim tradition of political quietism, and an acceptance of modern technology but adamant rejection of all other aspects of alien, western culture. Radical Islam also turns its back on Arab nationalism and heaps scorn on earlier Muslim efforts to reconcile Islam with western modernity (the apologetics theme). Sivan's careful interpretation makes it easier to understand how and why Sunni Muslim radicals have largely set the terms of the ideological debate raging in the Sunni Arab world.

L. Carl Brown
Princeton University

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Protest in Democratic India: Authority's Response to Challenge *by Leslie J. Calman. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1985. 258 pp. Paper, $19.50.*

One of the striking features of India's democratic polity is a very high incidence of extra-constitutional protest. Calman's book consists of two case studies of localized protest movements: the radical Naxalite movement in the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh and the movements led by two organizations committed to nonviolent change in the Thane district of Maharashtra.

Both the cases involve the political mobilization of poor "tribals": marginalized indigenous peoples—called Girijans in Srikakulum and Adivasis in Thane—faced with extreme economic deprivation. Ideologically, the Indian state adopts a paternalistic stance towards these marginal peoples. There are laws in the books meant to protect them and to improve their living conditions. These legislations, however, are poorly implemented. Calman's study is theoretically informed by the literature on revolutions, especially questions of state legitimacy raised by Chalmers Johnson and Theda Skocpol. Calman locates the protest movements in contexts of "structural disequilibrium" that arise because of a discrepancy between societal values embodied in the law and the deteriorating conditions of the marginal peoples (pp. 5, 133).

In Srikakulam the Girijans were mobilized by activists under the influence of the radical Naxalite movement—a Marxist-Leninist movement inspired by a voluntaristic interpretation of the Chinese revolution. While it initially involved the seizure of land and its redistribution among Girijans, it later took the form of terrorist attacks against individual landowners. The state responded to the Srikakulum movement by using coercion and violence. However, it also "recognized" the legitimacy crisis (p. 99) and introduced welfare measures to improve the condition of the Girijans. But these ameliorative measures did not "dramatically change" their conditions (p. 125).

Unlike the Naxalites of Srikakulum, the Shramik Sanghatana and the Bhoomi Sena in Thane sought to "raise consciousness" within the framework of existing laws. Two sets of economic issues of Adivasis were taken up: loss of land to nontribals and low wages for agricultural workers. The results of the Thane movements were mixed. The laws regarding the return of land to tribals were so difficult to implement that the movement itself modified that demand (p. 186). On the issue for implementation of statutory minimum wages, the state "straddles the fence" between the laborers and the landowners; it does not implement the law on its own, but allows "those who are sufficiently organised to implement it themselves" (p. 225).

The official violence in Srikakulum was possible because despite the localized legitimacy crisis, the state had not lost legitimacy in the country as a whole (pp. 95, 236). The Thane movements, because of their rejection of violence and reliance on values embodied in Indian law had a "legitimacy that the Naxalites lacked" (p. 237). Calman is hopeful that these movements will generate "imitative movements" elsewhere (p. 239). Two interesting questions that arise are: What are the possibilities of such localized legitimacy crises and movements turning into a nationwide crisis and challenge to the Indian state? In such circumstances, would the state still be able to reestablish "equilibrium" using traditional means?

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Calman's frequent use of long indented extracts impedes the flow of the narrative. Perhaps not enough effort went into turning her doctoral dissertation into a book. Her reliance on unnamed "observers" and on journalistic accounts is at places somewhat uncritical. Her work would have benefited from the anthropological and historical literature on the encapsulation of marginal societies by dominant societies. She sometimes too readily assumes a scholarly consensus on controversial questions: for instance the "reliance of Indian state and central governments on dominant landholding elites," is not "well-known" (p. 239). Despite a few shortcomings, this is a useful book: Calman's theoretically-informed case studies throw light on an aspect of Indian political life that is becoming more and more salient.

SANJIB BARUAH
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The Politics of Deregulation *by Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1985. 265 pp. Cloth, $28.95; paper, $10.95.*

A little more than ten years ago George Stigler elaborated the so-called economic theory of regulation. To political scientists, Stigler's theory looked like a familiar tale of interest groups and iron triangles dressed up in the rhetoric of partial equilibrium analysis. To economists, however, Stigler's rhetoric made all the difference. From his basic model all sorts of interesting, falsifiable hypotheses could be derived. Not the least of these was that deregulation of the transportation industry was simply not possible. But Americans are an obstreperous lot. Whenever anybody lays down a rule of law, their first inclination is to test it. No sooner had Stigler formulated his theory than others set out to falsify it.

Clearly, Stigler was wrong. Total or substantial deregulation has occurred in many areas. The question is why. Students of public choice accept Stigler's approach and take issue with the content of his model. In contrast, Derthick and Quirk argue that "it is the implausible pretention of the economic theory of politics to extreme simplicity and yet general application that is its fundamental error" (p. 27). Instead of deductive reasoning and formal hypothesis testing, Derthick and Quirk claim that the best way to explain political outcomes is by a traditional hermeneutic. They try to demonstrate the validity of this claim by example and in large part succeed. Their basic objective is to explain three policy outcomes: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications deregulation. Given their aim, their method is appropriate and their execution superb—their interpretation of each of these cases is balanced, plausible, and ultimately persuasive. Anyone who really wants to understand why these industries were deregulated should read this book.

Social scientists tend to follow wherever the latest fashion takes them. It is therefore somewhat refreshing to come across authors who have consciously chosen not to do so. Nevertheless, Derthick and Quirk's methodological argument makes me uneasy, not only because interpretation is an art and very few of the rest of us are artists, but also because it's hard to tell good interpretations from bad ones. To do so one must know a great deal about the subject. In this instance I believe I know enough to say that this is a very good

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interpretation indeed. But in most cases the reader must simply trust that the authors know enough to distinguish the important from the unimportant. For example, Derthick and Quirk never mention the "uniform antitrust standard" established in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. Under this standard, a regulatory agency must find that action is necessary to accomplish an overriding statutory purpose of the agency, that the benefit to the public clearly outweighs any anticompetitive effects of the action, and that there are no alternative, less anticompetitive means to achieve the same end, before it can take regulatory action that would substantially lessen competition or impose a significant burden upon competition. Is this omission important? Does this act help explain the outbreak of deregulation after 1976? Derthick and Quirk evidently think not. The reader must accept this answer on faith. Finally, Derthick and Quirk are not content to explain outcomes. On the basis of three cases they attempt to generalize about the policy process. Insofar as their conclusions are negative, generalization is not inconsistent with their method. Unfortunately, they do not stop there and I, for one, see no necessary reason to prefer loose and fuzzy generalizations to hard and testable ones.

FRED THOMPSON
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Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece *by Constantine P. Danopoulos. Chapel Hill, N.C., Documentary Publications, 1984. 225 pp. Cloth $34.95; paper, $19.95.*

In recent years and particularly since the rise and fall of the Greek junta (1967–1974), the role of the military in Greek politics has received a great deal of attention from scholars both in Greece and abroad. Efforts have also been made to draw from the Greek experience implications for general theoretical concerns raised by military intervention and military rule. Much of this important work is listed in Danopoulos's excellent nineteen-page bibliography. However, the author's contribution to this growing body of literature is minimal.

The focus of this study is the use of the concept of military professionalism as a basis for analyzing the role of the military in contemporary Greece. Specifically, the author examines Greek military professionalism as it affected or was affected by pre-1967 civil-military relations; the 1967 military intervention; the praetorian regime's legitimation efforts; the junta and the Cyprus crisis of 1974; the transition from military to civilian rule; and post-1974 civil-military relations. Danopoulos contends that professionalism has been a major factor in the Greek military's intervention, regime legitimation efforts, attitude formation concerning its relationship with the state, withdrawal from governing, and post-disengagement behavior. He concludes that a new military coup can be avoided only if the politicians attempt to balance public interest with military preparedness and only if the political leadership will exercise courage and sensitivity when working with today's more professional Greek military corps.

The basic flaw of the book is its overemphasis on the concept of military profession-

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alism, while downplaying or neglecting altogether other significant and often decisive factors in explaining the behavior of the Greek military since 1967. Other flaws are the use or abuse of the terms "military professionalism," "a fully professionalized military," and "professional behavior," which appear through out the book. Professionalism is never clearly and objectively defined. Instead, it is defined and redefined to fit the author's explanation of civil-military events in Greece. Thus, we are told that Greece did not have a fully professional armed force until after World War II and that its intervention in politics in April 1967 was different from the many previous military interventions prior to World War II because of its professionalism, meaning in this case institutional independence, self-confidence, and doctrinal orientation. Danopoulos is good on description but short on explanation. Thus, the best chapter of the book is the one dealing with the junta and the struggle for Cyprus.

The author takes the meaning out of "professionalism" because everything the military does or fails to do is attributed to it. In the end his "professionalism" is nothing more than behavior to enhance the perceived interests of members of the armed forces. Thus, according to Danopoulos, this concern of the military with its "professional" attributes and goals can prompt it to intervene and seize power just as it can prompt it to relinquish its governmental authority. In the Cyprus chapter, the concern for professionalism leads to a misplaced emphasis concerning the motives of the Greek military to overthrow Archbishop Makarios and bring about double *enosis* or the partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. We are told that the Greek military acted to support NATO/U.S. interests in Cyprus and that it did so because it was highly dependent for its professional needs on the U.S. and the NATO alliance. Thus "it often compromised its national aspirations regarding the Greek state for those of the defense alliance" (p. 118). While there may be an element of truth to this argument, of far greater importance was the desire of the colonels to shore up their tottering regime and to bring the free Greek world in Cyprus under Greek military rule.

A serious omission by the author is his failure to analyze the role or lack of role of the senior Greek military staff in the 1967 coup and its aftermath. If, as the author contends, the Greek military was fully professionalized by 1967, why did the senior professionals allow the colonels to usurp their prerogatives in the command structure and to become the spokesmen for the *corporate interests* of the armed forces?

HARRY J. PSOMIADES
Queens College, City University of New York

Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905–1980 *by Peri E. Arnold. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1986. 374 pp. $37.50.*

The Constitution affords meager guidance on the nature of the executive branch, on who should give it form, and on who should direct it. The constitutional powers of Congress suffice to permit its dominance, should it choose to exert it. Centrifugal forces in the

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American polity work against integration of the executive branch. In this century, though, the president has increasingly asserted his responsibility and, largely by congressional acquiescence, succeeded in developing what Peri Arnold terms "the managerial presidency."

Central to this development have been the many efforts to achieve comprehensive reorganization of the executive branch, and this, Arnold says, for two reasons. By letting the president or presidentially-dominated commissions set the reorganization agenda, Congress conceded presidential administrative leadership. And the reorganization groups articulated doctrines and advocated institutional means that strengthened the president's claim to management of the executive branch. Congress's enactment or non-veto of reorganization proposals were requisite, but the initiative had passed to the president or to presidentially-minded commissions. Arnold unveils a mystery in finding that presidents invested precious political capital in initiating reorganization proposals because they perceived benefits for themselves, not just for their successors.

This book is the definitive analytical history of comprehensive reorganization planning of the national executive branch. It draws on original materials in presidential libraries, on interviews, and on a wide range of literature. Arnold is particularly effective in establishing the persistence of organization doctrines first formulated in the Progressives' municipal and state reforms and embraced thenceforth both by public-administration scholars and by business executives involved in executive reorganization efforts. These doctrines, more anatomical than physiological, and emphasizing a neutral, apolitical approach to administration, tended to bypass both policy and political considerations. The chief executive of any American government, it was held, should be at the apex of a hierarchy of bureaus and departments and empowered to direct their activities. Otherwise, coherence, coordination, and the public interest itself would be lost amidst an environment filled with bureaucratic entrepreneurs, legislators, and legislative committees allied with or bedeviling administrative units, and special interests seeking to dominate such units. Efficiency, broadly conceived, was the objective, though ill-founded claims of economy marked the rhetoric addressed to congressional and popular audiences. However flawed the doctrines (and there are dissenters), no alternative model of executive-branch organization has emerged.

The author focuses on the major contours of proposed reorganizations (including strengthening of presidential staff support) and, with particular insight and fascinatingly new information, on the internal life and presidential relations of the commissions and task forces serving from William Howard Taft to Jimmy Carter. This makes for a more lively work than one detailing recommended shifts of bureaus. An unemphasized finding is the recurrence of proposals for substantially the same new or greatly expanded departments. Surprisingly, not Franklin Roosevelt's Brownlow Committee but Dwight Eisenhower's rather unfruitful Advisory Committee on Government Organization is credited with starting a new era (apparently because it operated confidentially and in close relation to the President).

Arnold concludes that "the managerial conception of the presidency is untenable. It places impossible obligations on presidents" (p. 362). He properly puts the president's political and policy concerns first, and expects the president to engage only episodically in administrative matters as a tactic serving his policy objectives within a regime of dispersed

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authority. Ironically, he "will find within the armory of tools created for the [unachievable] managerial presidency the necessary instruments of presidential leadership within a bureaucratized state—reorganization planning among them" (p. 364).

JAMES W. FESLER
Yale University

Who Paid the Taxes, 1966–85? *by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1985. 84 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95.*

This study basically updates the classic 1974 study by Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner, *Who Bears the Tax Burden?*, which developed estimates of tax burdens by income class for 1966 under eight alternative sets of assumptions regarding how the economic system responds to different taxes. In the present study, Pechman continues to use the same methodology, applying it to more recent data to generate estimates of tax burdens by income class for 1970, 1975, 1980, and a projection for 1985. Much of the discussion of data issues and tax incidence theory is taken verbatim from the earlier work; the major new feature is the estimates provided for more recent years.

The new results are quite interesting. To put them in perspective, let me note that the earlier Pechman-Okner study found the overall (federal, state, and local) tax system to be moderately progressive under competitive assumptions regarding the incidence of the various taxes. In 1966, the top (wealthiest) decile of households was estimated to bear a tax burden equal to 30.1 percent of its before-tax income, while the bottom decile's tax burden was estimated to be 16.8 percent of its before-tax income. By contrast, in the present study Pechman finds that in 1980 the tax rate for the top decile has fallen to 27.3 percent while it has risen to 20.6 percent for the bottom decile. In short, Pechman finds that the tax system has become substantially less progressive since 1966. Why? According to Pechman: "The tax system became less progressive . . . primarily because the corporation income tax and the property tax declined in importance while more emphasis was placed on the payroll tax" (p. 10).

Although the relative importance of various taxes has indeed changed since 1966, it is easily shown that this cannot be the cause of the decrease in progressivity calculated by Pechman. If we assume that each decile's tax rate due to each tax changed between 1966 and 1980 in proportion to the change in the overall importance of that tax as a revenue source, we can easily calculate what tax rates would have been in 1980 if only the relative importance of various taxes had changed. For example, the lowest decile's tax rate under property taxes was 2.1 percent in 1966, or 70 percent of the 3.0 percent average tax rate for the nation as a whole. In 1980, property taxes had fallen to 2.0 percent of national income, so the tax rate would have been 70 percent of this, or 1.4 percent, for the lowest decile if the only change had been the relative importance of property taxes. Making these calculations, we find that the bottom and top decile tax rates in 1980 would have been 14.6 percent and 28.7 percent, a more progressive structure of rates than in 1966. Thus, the change in the relative importance of individual taxes in the tax system cannot explain the reduced progressivity shown by Pechman's figures.

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There are, in fact, a great many changes in the incidence results for years after 1966 that are puzzling. Let me emphasize the tax rates estimated for payroll taxes (primarily the social security tax), since here the changes reported are particularly inexplicable. In 1966, Pechman estimates the payroll tax rate was 2.6 percent for the lowest decile, but in 1980 the tax rate is shown as 8.8 percent, an increase of 233 percent even though payroll taxes as a percent of national income had risen by only 32 percent over this period. There was no change in the structure of payroll taxes that would account for this disproportionate increase for the lowest decile.

Furthermore, the pattern of tax rates across income classes for payroll taxes shows a major change. In 1966 and 1970, payroll taxes are shown as progressive up to the fifth decile, becoming regressive only for the higher income classes. Then in 1975 and all later years, payroll taxes are shown as regressive throughout the entire income distribution. Again, there was no change in the structure of payroll taxes that could account for this. Moreover, a study by William R. Johnson and me, *The Distribution of the Tax Burden*, found payroll taxes to be progressive up through the sixth decile in 1976, a similar pattern to the earlier years in Pechman's series but in sharp contrast to his results for 1975 and later years.

Although there has been no change in the social security tax that would produce a sharp increase in its tax burden on lower income classes, there has been a change that would be expected to increase the burden for upper income classes sharply. Between 1970 and 1980, the real (adjusted for inflation) ceiling on earnings subject to the social security tax rose by 56 percent. This would increase taxes only on those with high earnings. In addition, the social security tax rate rose by 28 percent over this period (this would affect all wage earners). Taken together, workers with earnings at or above the ceiling for 1980 would bear a tax burden that was approximately twice as large as in 1970. Since most wage income in the top decile is earned by workers in this position, one would expect the average payroll tax rate to approximately double over this period. According to Pechman's estimates, however, the rate increased only from 2.7 percent to 3.2 percent, less than 25 percent.

These and other peculiarities in the results are not referred to in the body of the text; it is necessary to consult the appendix (which contains the detailed estimates for 1966, 1970, 1975, and 1985) to become aware of the way the tax rates for specific taxes change in large and unexplained ways from one year to the next. Moreover, the reader is not informed that the results for specific taxes in 1975 and later years differ sharply not only from the earlier years, but also from tax incidence studies conducted by other people. Of course, it is possible that changes in the composition of income within the various deciles somehow account for the results. However, it is also possible that there are some errors, either in the computer programming or in the underlying data. There is no way to tell why the results came out as they did from reading the book. Unfortunately, this is a common characteristic of work reporting results from large-scale data bases. Until the issues discussed here are clarified, however, I think there is reason to be skeptical of the results reported in this study.

EDGAR K. BROWNING
Texas A&M University

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

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

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

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

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